The Rashba in Babba Bathra 120b questions why the Torah spells
out in regard to the prohibition of שחוטי חוץ that of Klal
Yisroel are obligated? He explains
that it comes to teach us that even a non-kohan is obligated because shechita
is kasher even if performed by a non-kohan. We see from the Rashba that one is obligated
only because the shechita is kasher. The Achronim ask that we find that in regard
to offering the korban oitsidee the mikdash the possuk says
even a convert is obligated even though his offering of the korban isn’t
valid? The Mekor Baruch siman 1
explains in regard to offering the korban the offering would be accepted
ex post facto because his offering is valid on a private alter. If that is the case, why must the Rashba
establish that in regard to shechita a non-kohan can shect even lichatchila?
The Briskor Rav in Zevachim 14 establishes that the
obligation for offering a korban outside vs. shechting are
distinct. The obligation for offering outside
the mikdash is for doing עבודה outside the mikdash. However,
the obligation for shechting is for doing a מעשה שחיטה של פנים מהחוץ. Based upon this difference, we can understand
the Rashba. When it comes to offering
the korban outside, whatever constitutes an עבודה, even just ex post facto will make you
obligated. On the other hand, regarding shechita
outside one is obligated only if the shechita is done in this manner
inside the mikdash.
The Gemorah in Kiddushin 43a and Zevachim 43a has a derash
on the word הוא in regard to עבודה בחוץ that it comes to exclude one who is אונס
from כרת. The Malbim explains the derasha is
that the word הוא indicates that the person has full brains. The Rishonim ask why do we need a מיעוט
to exclude אונס
it is a general פטור in all of the Torah?
They give various answers. The
Raavad cited in the Rashba suggests one would think there is a no petur of
אונס
because the possuk equates the issur to killing someone, קמ"ל
that there is a פטור
אונס. My issue with this idea
of the Rashba is that the Torat Kohanim in have a dozen places has a similar derasha
in regard to other חייבי
כריתות (see Malbim in Tzav #132)
and over there the answer of the Raavad doesn’t apply there, so how would he
explain those derashot?
We also see from this Raavad had the din been to give
up your life and not violate the issur then there would be a חיוב כרת. This seems to contradict the Rambam Ch. 3 of
the laws of Avodah Zarah and Ch. 5 in Yesoday Hatorah that the obligation of כרת
for Avodah Zarah is only if done with one’s own volition even though there is
an obligation to give up your life. So why does the Raavad not disagree there?