Beyond Understanding

Rashi says when Hashem told Avraham to do the akedah he used the terminology of נא, as a request because "[God] said to him, “I beg of you, pass this test for Me, so that people will not say that the first ones [tests] had no substance."  Even if Avraham did not pass the test of the akedah, why would that invalidate his passing all of his previous tests?  If a person gets a score of 90% on a test, does the 10% that he missed invalidate the fact that he got 90% right?  If Avraham did not pass the test of the akedah, maybe he wasn't good enough to pass that test but that doesn't invalidate his passing of the earlier tests? 

There are two parshios devoted to Avraham, parshas Lech Lecha and Vayerah.  The first parsha, Lech Lecha, is a command to leave his geographical homeland and move to Eretz Yisrael.  This command is not a mere command to change locations but to change his entire outlook in life.  He leaves behind his idolatrous upbringing and finds his own service of Hashem.  This service of Hashem is based upon Avraham's understanding.  All the tests Avraham had to pass, although a challenge, were challenges that did not run counter to the entire philosophy of Avraham.  He was challenged to run against his comfort zone, but he could justify his actions to his followers.  

The test of the akedah however was not something that made sense at all in the worldview of Avraham.  How could he, a man who preached understanding, sacrifice his own son.  Avraham has no way of justifying his actions to the world.  He is forced to do something which runs counter to his logic.  This is the test that proves Avraham is really serving Hashem merely for the sake of serving Hashem.  The point of the tests is to test the boundaries of Avraham's commitment.  The tests prove that Avraham's commitment to Hashem is boundless.  However, If he fails the test of the akedah, it is not that his commitment to Hashem goes only 90% of the way and he just missed the last 10%, it means that his service of Hashem only goes so far as his intellect allows it to go.  It means that his entire service of Hashem does not stem from complete commitment to Hashem, but is limited and dictated by his own understanding.  The failure proves that Avraham's commitment is limited by the boundaries of his own mind which shows that the tests he did pass was also only since it made sense to him but not that they were acts of true commitment to Hashem.  It is the akedah that is the litmus test to prove if Avraham is serving Hashem because it fits within Avraham's world or is he serving Hashem purely to serve Hashem (Likutay Sichos volume 20 sicha 3.) 

The Midrash recounts an argument between Yitzchak and Yishmael if getting a bris at 13 years old like Yishmael is better or getting one at 8 days like Yitzchak is better.  It is understandable the argument of Yishmael since he had to choose to go through the pain but why does Yitzchak claim that an 8 day bris is better?  The bris milah is the act of the covenant between Hashem and Klal Yisrael.  If one gets a bris milah due to one's choice it means the bris is limited to one's understanding.  To demonstrate that there is an innate connection to Hashem, not limited to one's understanding, one gets a bris at the first possibility (Likutay Sichos volume 25 sicha 3.)  It is due the bris milah that Avraham gets the ability to have a connection to Hashem beyond his own understanding and can pass the test of the akedah.  Pre-milah Avraham is receives prophesy only as a means of communication as a necessary means of communication.  Post- milah וירא ה אליו, Hashem came merely to visit Avraham, to "hang out" with Avraham.  Avraham's connection to Hashem is not limited to a means to communicate, to do something else, it is an innate connection which in which Hashem comes to visit Avraham purely to experience being with Avraham. 

Delayed Shacharis

Rambam Tefillah (3:1) rules תפילת השחר - מצותה, שיתחיל להתפלל עם הנץ החמה; וזמנה, עד סוף שעה רביעית שהוא שליש היום. ואם עבר או טעה והתפלל אחר ארבע שעות עד חצי היום - יצא ידי חובת תפילה, אבל לא יצא ידי חובת תפילה בזמנה: שכשם שמצות תפילה מן התורה, כך מצוה מדבריהן להתפלל אותה בזמנה שתיקנו לנו חכמים ונביאים.  There are different interpretations as to the understanding that one may pray shacharis after 4 hours until chatzos.  Either this is the law of tashlumin, a law that R' Yehuda that holds one may pray only untill 4 hours agrees בדיעבד there is a concept of praying until chatzos, (see Beis Yosef siman 89,) or it is a new law of a cheftah of prayer שלא בזמנו (see shiur of R' Willig.)  

According to the peshat the Beis Yosef (siman 89) favors and the peshat of the Lechem Mishna there is a concept of prayer after 4 hours even according to R' Yehuda.  Where does that come from?  If R' Yehuda limits the time of the prayers to when the tammid was actually offered why would there be room to daven until chatzos? 

As noted in the past, the Rambam rues both of tefillot being in place of korbanot and that they were established by the avot. The rule of praying until 4 hours is is tefillah is patterned after the korbanot and the times Chazal gave to pray are patterned after the korbanot.  However, the actions of the avot exit to give three basic times to the framework of prayer, morning, afternoon and night.  Hence, even though the timeframe of tefillah to correspond to the korban is lost after the 4^th hour of the day, the fact that it is still morning allows one to pray as a tefillah corresponding to the prayer of Avraham.  That aspect remains to allow one to pray שלא בזמנו and still get a kium of tefillah to parallel that of Avraham.  

Within You

The Midrash at the beginning of Vayerah says וּמִבְּשָׂרִי אֶחֱזֶה אֱלוֹק אילולי שעשיתי כן מהיכן היה הקדוש ברוך הוא נגלה עלי וירא אליו ה.  Rav Wolbe points out it is an interesting term for the MIdrah to use of מהיכן, from where, presumably the question is how, in what zechus did Hashem appear to Avraham, one would have expected it to say כיצד or maybe באיזה זכות, what is מהיכן?  In light of the Sfas Emes of the previous post, we can explain the Midrash is grappling with the question of was this revelation of Hashem an external revelation like prophesy or was it an internal revelation of Avraham recognizing the kedusha within himself as the Sfas Emes suggests.  That is מהיכן, where did this revelation come from?  Answers the Midrash מבשרי אחזה אלוק, it was an internal revelation which Avraham experienced and Avraham recognized that only came from the milah which peeled backed the layers of his גשמית חומרי blockage over his innate kedusha.  This may be peshat in the Midrash (95:3) that Avraham studied Torah himself, רבי לוי אמר מעצמו למד תורה.  How did he know the Torah?  He found it within himself, in his עצמיות after removing the external blockage.

Bring Out The Potential

The meforshim (see Or HaChayim) ask why does it say 'וירא אליו ה and not וירא ה' אליו which is the normal formulation of the possuk (as earlier 12:7, 17:1?)  Furthermore, asks the O.H., what was said to Abraham in this revelation?  

Rav Tzaddok (Pri Tzaddik Noach #6) says ל שורש קלקול הנחש שהיה בפגם זה שהטיל זוהמא בחוה (כמו"ש שבת קמו.) ומזה נדבקה הזוהמא גם באדה"ר ועל ידי כן נעשה משוך בערלתו (כמו שנאמר סנהדרין לח:) והיינו שבודאי נברא מהול. ועל ידי הקלקול נעשה משוך בערלתו  Rav Tzaddok understands when Chazal say that Adam was משוך his ערלה it means that Adam was born with a milah but through the sin a tumah was brought in the world and his milah was covered up.  In other words, the arlah is a reflection of the tumah that man himself brought into the world.

The Sfas Emes (5632) says that when one does a bris milah it allows for one to access the kedusha that exists within an individual which is covered over by the ערלה.  As Rashi Kedoshim (19:23) says the word ערלה means closed up and contained.  The kedusha of the individual already is there in potential and the milah allows for one to access it.  In his words, בכל דבר יש נקודה חיות מהשי"ת ורק שצריכין להסיר הקליפה והחיצוניות שנקרא ערלה דחפיא ברית ובהוסר הערלה ממילא מתגלה הנקודה כנ"ל.  The milah serves as a means of fixing the sin of Adam to a certain degree and when that is fixed, one is able to access the kedusha implanted inside a person.  With this idea the Sfas Emes explains our possuk, וזה וירא אליו שנתגלה לו הפנימיות שהי' בעצמותו נסתר ונכסה קודם המילה.  The Sfas Emes reads וירא אליו as in Hashem appeared to Avraham through his actions, אליו is like מאליו , through his milah, it was revealed to Avraham the presence of Hashem.  Hashem didn't appear to Avraham to give him a prophesy, rather Avraham reached a greater recognition and understanding of Hashem's presence in his life.

It is also pointed out by many that the possuk says וירא אליו and it does not say Hashem appeared to Avraham.  The Meor Einayim says this is because this possuk is a lesson for everyone.  Hashem appears to everyone in the form of at times a person will feel an awakening out of nowhere to come close to Hashem.  That idea is placed within a person's head from Hashem, that it the וירא אליו.  That is the form in which Hashem appears to everyone.  The M.E. reads this into the continuation of the possuk as well בפחת האהל כחום היום means that this pesach, this opening of warmth, of closeness one feels, it is up to a person to take it in and do something with it.   

Innermost Desire

וישא אברהם את עיניו וירא והנה איל אחר נאחז בסבך בקרניו וילך אברהם ויקח את האיל ויעלהו לעלה תחת בנו

Why did the איל Avraham offered as a korban have to be designated on Friday בין השמשות?  Chazal (Pirkey D' Rebbe Eliezer Ch. 30) identifies the horns of the ram as the horn blown at Mattan Torah and the horn of Mashiach.  Why is this ram so important that it is designated to be used for the most important points in history?  

The words אחר seems meaningless, what it does it mean another ram?  Chazal translate the word אחר as in אחרי, afterward; either later in history on Rosh Hashana we should blow the shofar to arose mercy or in the days of the future the horn will be blown to redeem us even though we are stuck in averot.  What does that have to do with the story of Avraham?   .

The nisayon of the Akedah was to prove it Avraham's ultimate passion was for the commandment of Hashem.  The passing of the nisayon established that the pnemious of Avraham was to be attached to Hashem.  His essence, his DNA was connection to Hashem.  He passed that down into the generations that followed.  Therefore, even when our merits can be called not question, when the pitfalls of life may have led us astray, the horn of the ram awakens the pnimious to come out and be worthy of redemption of vindication in judgement.  

This deep inner connection to Hashem was transferred into the ram and that is why it is used for events which are an outgrowth of the connection that Klal Ysirael has.  That is why the ram was created Friday bein hashmashot.  It is the bridge between teva and beyond teva.  The teva is the סיבוך surrounding the ram, the hardships of life.  The מעל לטבע is the pnemious connection that can't be severed. 

Rashi (22:2) cites Chazal say Hashem said to Avraham please pass this test so that people don't say the first one's were nothing.  Why if he failed the akedah are the previous tests meaningless?  Because this test was to see if the pnemious of Avraham, if his ultimate desire, when everything else was on the line was with Hashem or not. 

Bowing For Redemption

 The Midrash (56:2) אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק הַכֹּל בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, וְאַבְרָהָם לֹא חָזַר מֵהַר הַמּוֹרִיָּה בְּשָׁלוֹם אֶלָּא בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, וְנִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה וְנָשׁוּבָה אֲלֵיכֶם. יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא נִגְאֲלוּ אֶלָּא בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות ד, לא): וַיַּאֲמֵן הָעָם וגו' וַיִקְדּוּ וַיִּשְׁתַּחֲווּ. הַתּוֹרָה לֹא נִתְּנָה אֶלָּא בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כד, א): וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוִיתֶם מֵרָחֹק. חַנָּה לֹא נִפְקְדָה אֶלָּא בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמואל א א, כח): וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ שָׁם לַה': הַגָּלֻיּוֹת אֵינָן מִתְכַּנְסוֹת אֶלָּא בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה כז, יג): וְהָיָה בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא יִתָּקַע בְּשׁוֹפָר גָּדוֹל וגו' וְהִשְׁתַּחֲווּ לַה' בְּהַר הַקֹּדֶשׁ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם. בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ לֹא נִבְנָה אֶלָּא בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים צט, ט): רוֹמְמוּ ה' אֱלֹהֵינוּ וְהִשְׁתַּחֲווּ לְהַר קָדְשׁוֹ. הַמֵּתִים אֵינָן חַיִּין אֶלָּא בִּזְכוּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים צה, ו): בֹּאוּ נִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה וְנִכְרָעָה נִבְרְכָה לִפְנֵי ה' עֹשֵׂנוּ.

What is the significance of bowing?  It is not the mere physical act of bowing but an inner bowing.  Bowing is an expression of complete subordination before someone else.  By acknowledging that one is totally dependent on Hashem one merits redemption.  See here and Nesivot Shalom. 

The Inheritance Feud

Rashi says that when Sarah heard Yishmoel laying claims to a double portion of yerusha because he was the bechor she said to kick him out.  Rashi says that Yishmoel was doing averot chamurot.  However, Sarah specifically notes that he will not inherit with my son, indicating it was the inheritance issue that drove Yishmoel out.  Why is this the big issue, more than the averot, which cause Yishmoel to be kicked out?  

Rav Elchonon (in volume 2 of Kovetz Shiurim) say that when it comes to yerusha of a bechor there are two aspects.  One aspect is that he inherits because he is related.  The other aspect is that the son stands in the place of the farther, as the Gemorah says קם תחת אביו.  When it comes to a gentile, there is a biological relationship, but there is no concept of קם תחת אביו and hence there is no halacha of a bechor getting two portions.  When Yishmoel was claiming he was the bechor, it was not a mere claim on the wealth of Avraham, it was a claim to the legacy of Avraham.  He was claiming I stand to take over Avraham's life mission, I will carry on his legacy.  That lack of recognition of his place and trying to usurp Yitzchak's right as the true son of Avraham to carry on his legacy is what prompted Sarah to demand his expulsion.  This is why Yaakov felt compelled to ensure that he was the bechor and not Esav for it is the bechor that carries on the father's mission.   

In The City

 Avraham prays that if their are righteous people in the city, Sedom should be saved.  Why use the words בתוך העיר, we know we are talking about Sedom?  (See the Ramban.)  A couple of weeks ago we cited the Seforno that a tzaddik can only affect a town if he reprimands and uplifts the people.  The tzaddik can save them only if he has a chance to  connect to them and mend their ways.  That is what Avraham was saying, he wasn't giving their address but rather that the actions of the righteous people must be בתוך העיר, affecting the city, in order for them to be saved (see Rav Hirsch.)

Hav Hirsch at the beginning of the parsha expounds on the idea that immediately after Avraham is singled out by Hashem for a bris, he is sitting in his tent looking to intermingle with others.  The Midrash Lech Lecha (47:10) says אָמַר אַבְרָהָם, עַד שֶׁלֹא מַלְתִּי הָיוּ הָעוֹבְרִים וְהַשָּׁבִים בָּאִים אֶצְלִי, תֹּאמַר מִשֶּׁמַּלְתִּי אֵינָן בָּאִים אֶצְלִי.  Rav Hirsch understands that Avraham was concerned that now that his life's mission of spreading monotheism would be nullified for he stands alone.  Avraham was not just concerned about the עיר, he wanted to affect everyone.  The midrash concludes  אָמַר לוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עַד שֶׁלֹא מַלְתָּ הָיוּ בְּנֵי אָדָם בָּאִים אֶצְלְךָ, עַכְשָׁיו אֲנִי בִּכְבוֹדִי בָּא וְנִגְלֶה עָלֶיךָ, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (בראשית יח, א): וַיֵּרָא אֵלָיו ה' בְּאֵלֹנֵי מַמְרֵא.  According to Rav Hirsch we have to understand that Hashem is not detracting from Avraham's concern.  The response is that that we are now further empowered to carry on the mission of teaching the the ways of Hashem to others because we are further connected to Hashem. 

However ,we could learn the conclusion of the midrash is the opposite of Rav Hirsch.  Once Avraham has been singled out as special, then this relationship is more important than preaching to others.  This may be rooted in the machlokes Rashi and Ramban if כי אב המון גוים נתתיך refers to the world (Rashi) or Klal Yisroel (Ramban.)  In Rashi's view, Avraham is the av for everyone.  He retains his mission of preaching to the world.  Accoridng to the Ramban, he is elevated above everyone else and is the father of his unique nation.

Asking For Forgiveness

The Rambam Chovel U'mazzik (5:9) אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה מַזִּיק חֲבֵרוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ לְמַזִּיק מָמוֹנוֹ. שֶׁהַמַּזִּיק מָמוֹן חֲבֵרוֹ כֵּיוָן שֶׁשִּׁלֵּם מַה שֶּׁהוּא חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם נִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ. אֲבָל חָבַל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּתַן לוֹ חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים אֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ. וַאֲפִלּוּ הִקְרִיב כָּל אֵילֵי נְבָיוֹת אֵינוֹ מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ וְלֹא נִמְחַל עֲוֹנוֹ עַד שֶׁיְּבַקֵּשׁ מִן הַנֶּחְבָּל וְיִמְחל לוֹ:  The Lechem Mishna asks this contradicts what the Rambam writes in Teshuvah (2:9)  that it is not enough to return the stolen goods but one must appease the wronged party as well?  The Kesef Mishne Laws of Teshuva  points to two sources for the Rambam.  One is the Mishne Bava Kammah (92a)  אע"פ שהוא נותן לו אין נמחל לו עד שיבקש ממנו שנאמר (בראשית כ, ז) ועתה השב אשת וגו'.  The second is the Gemorah Yoma (85b) דרש ר' אלעזר בן עזריה (ויקרא טז, ל) מכל חטאתיכם לפני ה' תטהרו עבירות שבין אדם למקום יוה"כ מכפר עבירות שבין אדם לחבירו אין יוה"כ מכפר עד שירצה את חבירו.  Why do we need two sources for this halacha? 

Rav Eliyahu Baruch explains we see in the Rambam there are two dinim in asking for forgiveness.  One is a din in teshuva, the limud in Yoma tells us that one's teshuva is not complete until they appease the wronged.  In Bava Kammah, as the name of the tractate indicates, it is a law in damages.  When it comes to paying for damage goods, the obligation is to reimburse the one damaged.  For that one does not need to ask for forgiveness.  However, is one causes bodily harm to another individual, no payment can fully make that up.  That is what the Mishna in B.K. sees from the story of Avimelech.  He was a gentile, not commanded in teshuva, his request for michela is a choval u'mazzik law, in order to compensate for causing damage to another person, appeasement is required.  That is why the Rambam limits this law to causing bodily pain for causing monetary damage it suffices to merely repay for the damage.  With this we can understand other differences in the Rambam in the two laws.  In Teshuva he writes, צָרִיךְ לְפַיְּסוֹ וְלִפְגֹּעַ בּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּמְחל לוֹ. לֹא רָצָה חֲבֵרוֹ לִמְחל לוֹ מֵבִיא לוֹ שׁוּרָה שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם מֵרֵעָיו וּפוֹגְעִין בּוֹ וּמְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ. לֹא נִתְרַצָּה לָהֶן מֵבִיא לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה וּשְׁלִישִׁית. לֹא רָצָה מְנִיחוֹ וְהוֹלֵךְ לוֹ וְזֶה שֶׁלֹּא מָחַל הוּא הַחוֹטֵא.  Why does he add פיוס ורצוי ןמ the Laws of Teshuva but not in the Laws of Chovel U'mazzik?  Furthermore, why does he mention 3 times is the charm in the Laws of Teshuva but in Choval he indicates you must receive mechilah?  Because in Chovel, the point is to receive the pardon of the damaged for the damage caused, for that it is enough to receive a pardon.  On the other hand, if a pardon is not received, there still is a monetary obligation upon you.  For teshuva, more than a pardon is necessary, you must appease him.  On the other hand, once you did your obligation to attempt to do teshuva, 3 times, more is not required. 

The end of the Mishna in Bava Kammah says ומנין שאם לא מחל לו שהוא אכזרי שנאמר (בראשית כ, יז) ויתפלל אברהם אל האלהים וירפא אלהים את אבימלך וגו'.  The Rambam cites this halacha in three places.  In the Laws of Deot (6:6) he says וְאִם חָזַר וּבִקֵּשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ לִמְחֹל לוֹ צָרִיךְ לִמְחֹל. וְלֹא יְהֵא הַמּוֹחֵל אַכְזָרִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (בראשית כ יז) "וַיִּתְפַּלֵּל אַבְרָהָם אֶל האלקים.  In Teshuva (2:10) he adds that there is an issur not to be mochel.  אָסוּר לָאָדָם לִהְיוֹת אַכְזָרִי וְלֹא יִתְפַּיֵּס אֶלָּא יְהֵא נוֹחַ לִרְצוֹת וְקָשֶׁה לִכְעֹס וּבְשָׁעָה שֶׁמְּבַקֵּשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ הַחוֹטֵא לִמְחל מוֹחֵל בְּלֵב שָׁלֵם וּבְנֶפֶשׁ חֲפֵצָה.  In Chovel (5:10) he adds details for when one should be mochel, וְאָסוּר לַנֶּחְבָּל לִהְיוֹת אַכְזָרִי וְלֹא יִמְחל אֵין זוֹ דֶּרֶךְ זֶרַע יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶלָּא כֵּיוָן שֶׁבִּקֵּשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ הַחוֹבֵל וְנִתְחַנֵּן לוֹ פַּעַם רִאשׁוֹנָה וּשְׁנִיָּה וְיָדַע שֶׁהוּא שָׁב מֵחֶטְאוֹ וְנִחָם עַל רָעָתוֹ יִמְחל לוֹ. וְכָל הַמְמַהֵר לִמְחל הֲרֵי הוּא מְשֻׁבָּח וְרוּחַ חֲכָמִים נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ:  Why does he add that here?  The Rebbe (Likutay Sichos volume 28 Chukas sicha 2) explains that it depends who the focus is on.  In Deot, the focus is on the person doing the mechilah, his deot.  From that perspective, one should grant mechilah once it is asked for and not be cruel to hold out for a more serious expression of regret.  In Choval, the focus is on the one who caused the damage.  One should grant mechilah to that person only after he has seriously fulfilled his obligation of seriously asking for a pardon in order to ascertain the damager fulfilled their obligation of asking for a pardon. In Teshuvah, the focus is on the appeasement of the damager to the one damaged for that is his obligation in teshuvah, he must appease the damaged party and hence he says when he has been appeased, it is forbidden for the damaged party to be cruel and withhold forgiveness.

Teaching Seder

From the sefer לפרקים - writings from Rav Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg

For anything to become part of a person's natural way of life, seder is required.

Yitzchak: The Olah Man

Rashi at the end of Vayera (22:12) says that the entire command of the akedah was not to slaughter Yitzchak, rather just to bring him up to the mountain. כשאמרתי לך קח מוצא שפתי לא אשנה, לא אמרתי לך שחטהו אלא העלהו, אסקתיה אחתיה.  The simple reading of Rash is that the there never was a need to slaughter Yitzchak, merely to bring him up to the mountain.  This is difficult for then the entire akedah, that we mention as a zechut in our prayers all the time is really just a mistake?  And how did Avrohom misunderstand his prophecy?

Rashi (26:2) says אל תרד – שהיה דעתו לרדת מצרים, כמו שירד אביו בימי הרעב מצרימה, שאתה עולה תמימה, ואין חוצה לארץ כדיי לך.  In the Midrash it says that there would be a real pesul of יוצא for Yitzchak to leave Eretz Yisroel.  Why would there be such a pesul that only takes effect after shechita and Yitzchak never was supposed to be slaughtered, only brought up to the mountain?  And what does Rashi mean that Yitzchak is a עולה תמימה, of course, every עולה is תמימה?  Rashi (26:1) says One of the reasons Yitchak was blind was דבר אחר כשנעקד על גבי המזבח והיה אביו רוצה לשחטו, באותה שעה נפתחו השמים וראו מלאכי השרת והיו בוכים וירדו דמעותיהם ונפלו על עיניו, לפיכך כהו עיניו.  Why did the angels cry, if the command was only to bring Yitzchak up to the mountain, then obviously he won't be shechted?

Rab Chayim explained that the command to bring Yitzchak up wasn't just to bring him to the mountain, it was that when he is brought to the mountain, he will have the status of an עולה and as an outgrowth will be obligated in all the עבודות of the עולה.  The direct command wasn't just bring him up to the mountain and then take him down, but that through bringing him up the mountain Yitzchak will become a עולה.  What Hashem came to tell Avrohom was that there was no direct commend to shect Yitzchak for if that was the case it wouldn't have been fulfilled.  Since the command wasn't to shect Yitzchak, rather, just to bring him up and only as an outgrowth he will become an עולה, therefore there can be a פטור אונס on the avodot of the korban and Avrohom did fulfill Hashem's command.  According to Rav Chayim, Yitzhak had the status of an עולה but the dinim of avodah weren't fulfilled.

Now we can understand all the Rashi's in our parsha as well.  For a regular עולה is becomes הקדש when the owner is מקדיש it but the שם עולה only applies after the shechita.  Yitzchak is the only עולה that the שם עולה is on him when he is still תמימה, when he is still alive.  That's why Yitzchak had a פסול יוצא  for he had the status of a korban already in his lifetime. And that's why the angels cried, for with out a command from Hashem to stop then Avrohom would've had to continue to slaughter Yitzchak.

Salty Solutions

The Zohar says that the three men Avrohom saw were the three Avos.  How could Avrohom see them if two of them didn’t exist yet and one of them is himself?  The possuk says וירא אליו, why doesn’t it say whom Hashem appeared to?

The Meor Einayim says that the parsha contains a lesson for all of us.  That’s why it doesn’t say who Hashem came to for the Torah is hinting that there is a lesson when Hashem comes to every individual.  He says Hashem comes to every individual in אלוני ממרא, meaning at the strength of one’s rebellions against Hashem.   Where a person finds it the hardest, that is where Hashem appears to him.  That is where he is given the opportunity to shine.  How? והוא יושב פתח האהל כחום היום, the doorway is opened for him when he feels the passion of the thoughts of teshuva implanted in his mind by Hashem.  In his words -זהו וירא אליו ה׳ כתב סתם ולא כתב אל אברהם כי קאי על כל אחד מישראל שמתראה אליו השם יתברך דהיינו אפילו רשע גדול ח״ו מתראה אליו השם יתברך דהיינו הרהורי תשובה שבאים לו כנ״ל והוא יושב פתח האוהל פירוש שזה פותחים לו פתח כחום היום כשבא לו התלהבות הרהורי תשובה.  Continues the parsha, וַיִּשָּׂ֤א עֵינָיו֙ וַיַּ֔רְא וְהִנֵּה֙ שְׁלֹשָׁ֣ה אֲנָשִׁ֔ים נִצָּבִ֖ים עָלָ֑יו וַיַּ֗רְא וַיָּ֤רׇץ לִקְרָאתָם֙ מִפֶּ֣תַח הָאֹ֔הֶל וַיִּשְׁתַּ֖חוּ אָֽרְצָה.  The Meor Einayim explains in his vein that a person takes to heart the feelings of teshuva inspired within him and feelings a great desire to be able to reach the maasim of the Avos (Tanna D’ve Eliyahu Ch. 23,) and completely nullifies himself before Hashem.  In his words - וישא עיניו פירוש כשמגביה השכל שלו וירא והנה שלשה אנשים אברהם יצחק ויעקב רצה לומר שהוא מדריגת האבות שהיו מרכבה לשמו הגדול. וירא וירץ לקראתם שאומר מתי יגיע מעשי למעשי אבותי ורוצה להגיע גם כן למדריגה זו להיות מרכבה אליו יתברך שילך רק למקום שהוא יתברך רוצה. מפתח האוהל מאותו פתח שפתחו לו כנ״ל ואז וישתחו לאפיו השתחואה הוא המשכה שממשיך המשכה לבחינת ארציות והבן. 

The lesson is that it is where a person feels that they are most distant from Hashem that can be the mode to bring a person the closest to Him. This is the lesson of Chazal (Midrash 41:4) אמר רבי יצחק (תהלים פט): מצאתי דוד עבדי. היכן מצאתיו? בסדום:  How can it be that Dodiv arises from a place that was so bad it had to be eradicated?  In the Sedom of every individual, in the lowliest aspects of the soul, there is the opportunity for Dovid to rise up.  Only where there can be an opening for such rebellion against Hashem can there be opportunity for the tremendous bittul.  The reason for all the lack of normal civilized conduct in Sedom was because of its great spiritual potential.  Because it had such great energy without anything to contain it, things went haywire.  Ultimately that power is harnessed in Dovid Hamelech.  That is why the possuk in Yechezkal (16:53) says וְשַׁבְתִּי֙ אֶת־שְׁבִ֣יתְהֶ֔ן אֶת־שְׁב֚וּת (כתיב שְׁב֚יּת) סְדֹם֙ וּבְנוֹתֶ֔יהָ.  Once Moshiach is here, the great spiritual power of Sedom can be harnessed in the proper vessels and it can be inhabited again (Likutay Sichos volume 35.)

The Sefer Gilgulay Nishomos from the Rammah M’pano says עידית אשתו של לוט אין לה גלגול, דכתיב עד היום הזה, ובמשנה ג"כ הרואה אשתו של לוט (מאי) מברך כו', כי נשמתה היא דוממת, וכל מה שמלחכים ממנו הבהמות חוזרה לקדמותה הראשון, ותיקונה הוא על כל קרבנך תקריב מלח, וכן על השלחן שהוא מזבח צריך מל"ח מח"ל לח"ם.  What does this mean, how it putting salt on bread or a korban a תיקון for Lot’s wife and why can’t she get our of her salted state?  Why was the wife of Lot transformed into a pillar of salt of all things?  Salt in it of itself is not a food.  One can't eat large amounts of salt strait for it is too bitter.  It is merely meant to enhance, enrich and bring out the qualities of another food.  When one faces salty patches in life, s/he can't get stuck in them for it will just bring a person down.  Those bitter moments and struggles are productive only if used to bring a person to open the door to climb to greater heights, as we learnt from the Meor Einayim.  The mistake of Lot's wife was that she couldn't pull herself away from the salt of Sedom.  She couldn't go forward with the knowledge of her actions as a Sedomite for so many years.  Hence, she became a salt stick of shame and pain and her whole essence became transformed into salt and she couldn’t go further.  That is why the תיקון for this is to add salt to our bread and korbanot for then we are using the salt to elevate us to come closer to Hashem, we don’t become submerged in salt, but elevate it.  We are taking our אלוני ממרא and using it for the positive, not being consumed in it.  (Based upon Avodas Halevi and lecture by Rabbi Y.Y. Jacobson.)   

Avrohom As Kohan Gadol And Sacrifices Of An Onan

The Yalkut Shimoni (remez 101) says אמר יצחק לאביו אבא קשור שתי ידי ושתי רגלי שלא אבעט אותך ונמצאתי מחלל מצות כבד ועשה כן וככהן גדול הגיש את מנחתו ואת נסכו והקב"ה רואה את האב מעקיד בכל לב והבן נעקד בכל לב ומלאכי השרת צועקים ובוכים שנאמר הן אראלם וגו.  The Zais Ra'anan says the Yalkut had to say that Avrohom had the status of a Kohan Gadol for otherwise how would he be able to sacrifice Yitzchak, as he is slaughtering him he would become an אונן and that would defile the avodah as it says in Zevachim (16a.)  Therefore, the Yalkut says Avrohom has the status of a Kohan Gadol that can offer sacrifices even as an אונן.  It is noteworthy that the Gemorah there is unsure if an  אונן can sacrifice on a במה so it would be possible to say that even if he isn't a Kohan Gadol, Avrohom may still be able to do the avodoh for he was sacrificing on a במה as there was no Mikdash.  However, the source of this Yalkut is the Pirkey D'Rebbe Eliezer Ch. 31.  Two weeks ago this blog discussed if the sacrifices of Noach were considered that of a במה or that of the Mikdash. It is clear from the Gemorah Zevachim (115b) that has a derash of ויבן נח מזבח לה' ויקח מכל הבהמה הטהורה ומכל עוף הטהור בהמה כמשמעו חיה בכלל בהמה that Noach was allowed to offer even חיות even though they can't be offered  in the Mikdash.  That is because the Gemotah understands the sacrifice of Noach was considered to be a במה offering as mentioned in the previous post.  However, the Pirkey D'Rebbe Eliezer Ch. 23 assumes that Noach only sacrificed animals that are allowed to be brought in the Mikdash (see Radal.)  Presumably that is because he holds that the sacrifices of Noach were offered in the place of the Mikdash and hence had the status of Mikdash offerings.  Therefore, לשיטתו we can't say the offering of Avrohom (in the same spot,) had the status of a במה offering.

The Mikor Baruch siman 5 takes issue with the Zais Ra'anan that his point should be dependent upon the machlokes Rashi and Tosfos in Yoma (13b) if Rebbe Yosi allows one who became an אונן in the middle of the avodah to complete the avodah.  According to Rashi that learns the Geomrah is refering to a regular Kohan, once you started at a valid time, you finish the job.  If that's the case, Avrohom would become an אונן only after doing the shechitah, and hence would be allowed to finish the job, so we don't have to say he is a Kohan Gadol?

The din of Rashi itself needs to be explained for the Gevuros Ari asks why is becoming an אונן midway different from becoming a בעל מום where he can't finish the job (Zevachim 15a?)  Furthermore, according to Rebbe Yishmoel the whole source that an אונן invalidates the avodah is learnt out from a בעל מום, so how can the din be different?

What we see is that Rashi understood the disqualification of an אונן is distinct from that of a בעל מום.  The Gemorah (16b) says אונן: מנלן דכתיב (ויקרא כא, יב) ומן המקדש לא יצא ולא יחלל הא אחר שלא יצא חילל רבי אלעזר אמר מהכא (ויקרא י, יט) הן הקריבו אני הקרבתי מכלל דאי אינהו אקריב שפיר אישתרוף.  From here we learn out that an אונן disqualifies the avodah.  We see from here the גדר of why a kohan gadol serves is because he is tied to the mikdash.  He is not allowed to leave the mikdash even in his state of אנינות.  The Rambam writes in Beas Mikdash (2:5) כֹּהֵן שֶׁיָּצָא מִן הַמִּקְדָּשׁ בִּשְׁעַת הָעֲבוֹדָה בִּלְבַד חַיָּב מִיתָה בֵּין כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל בֵּין כֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא י ז) "וּמִפֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא תֵצְאוּ פֶּן תָּמֻתוּ."  This din not to leave the mikdash has an application regarding a regular kohan when he is doing the avodah.  Hence, it's quite understandable that in the middle of avodah a kohan doesn't have to stop for vis-a-vis this avodah he has the same status as a kohan gadol.  A בעל מום must interrupt his avodah for he will always create a pesul.  However, the kohan mid avodah is so to speak promoted to kohan gadol status where he continues to finish what he is doing.

The Gemorah in Moad Katan (14b) says והא כה"ג דכל השנה כרגל לכולי עלמא דמי דתנן כהן גדול מקריב אונן.    Rashi explains the Gemorah (ibid) דתנן כ"ג מקריב אונן מדאמר לו אהרן למשה ואכלתי חטאת היום (ויקרא י׳:י״ט) ולא אמר למשה והקרבתי מכלל דהקרבה באנינות ולמדנו דכ"ג מקריב אונן אבל כולי עלמא בשאר ימות השנה אונן אינו משלח קרבנותיו כדאמרינן לקמן (מועד קטן דף טו:) שלמים בזמן שהוא שלם ולא בזמן שהוא אונן וברגל משלח וכהן גדול אונן מקריב כל השנה אלמא כל השנה לדידיה כרגל דמי.  Why does Rashi contrast that other kohanim can't send their korbanot when their in אנינות and not the fact that they can't offer their korbanot?  The Minchas Chinuch (264:29) proves because that even on a regel a kohan can't offer a korban for אנינות applies on the regel as well.  The heter for the kohan gadol to serve in אנינות isn't because he is considered in the midst of the regel, rather because the Torah allows him to serve.  The manner in which see he is considered to be in the regel is since he is allowed to send a korban to the mikdash in אנינות.  Hence, Rashi explains the distinction regarding sending korbanot.  What is the difference between sending in or offering the korban? According to the above explanation the kohan gadol can serve because of his connection to the mikdash, its only regarding sending in a korban that his heter is because he is considered to be in the regel. [However, even according to the Minchas Chinuch the Rashi is difficult because its פתח בכד וסיים בחבית, he starts with talking about offering the sacrifice and then switches to sending the sacrifices.] (See Radal, Rogatchover, Avi Ezri, Chabatzoles Hasaron, Masseh Yad.)
A nice addition from the Mishmar Halevi:

Don't Ask

The Midrash Tanchuma at the beginning of Vayerah says וּלְפִיכָךְ אֵין מִתְפַּלְּלִין בַּשַּׁבָּת שְׁמוֹנֶה עֶשְׂרֵה, שֶׁאִם יִהְיֶה לוֹ חוֹלֶה בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, נִזְכָּר בְּרוֹפֵא חוֹלֵי עַמּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְהוּא מֵצֵר, וְהַשַּׁבָּת נִתְּנָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל לִקְדֻשָּׁה לְעֹנֶג וְלִמְנוּחָה וְלֹא לְצַעַר, לְכָךְ מִתְפַּלֵּל שָׁלֹש בְּרָכוֹת רִאשׁוֹנוֹת וְשָׁלֹש אַחֲרוֹנוֹת וְהַמְּנוּחָה בָּאֶמְצַע.  From here it would seem the reason one may not request things on Shabbos is to avoid causing pain on Shabbos. This reason is cited in Sefer Hapardes L'Rashi (pg. 316) and the Manhig tefillah siman 11. However, the Vayikrah Rabbah (34:16) seems to say a different approach as to the prohibition of making requests on Shabbos: מִמְּצוֹא חֶפְצֶךָ, מִכָּאן אָסוּר לְאָדָם לִתְבֹּעַ צְרָכָיו בְּשַׁבָּת. רַבִּי זְעִירָא בָּעֵי קוֹמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּא בַּר אַבָּא אֲמַר לֵיהּ אִלֵּין דְּאָמְרִין רועֵנוּ זוּנֵנוּ פַּרְנְסֵנוּ בְּשַׁבָּת, מַהוּ, אָמַר לוֹ טוֹפֶס בְּרָכוֹת כָּךְ הִיא. (ישעיה נח, יג): וְדַבֵּר דָּבָר, אִמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחָאי, כַּד הֲוַת מִשְׁתָּעֲיָא מוֹתָר מִלִּין בְּשַׁבַּתָּא הֲוָה אָמַר לָהּ שַׁבַּתָּא הִיא וַהֲוַת שָׁתְקָא.  The second half of the discussion regarding the text on benching on Shabbos is found in the Yerushalmi Shabbos (78b) as well.  The Gemorah in Berachos (21a) says גברא בר חיובא הוא ורבנן הוא דלא אטרחוהו משום כבוד שבת.  Simple reading of the Gemorah sounds like the midrash in Vayikra that there is no issue with asking requests on Shabbos, it is merely for כבוד שבת that it wasn't required.  Unless we reinterpret that טירחא means that a person shouldn't come to have צער  on Shabbos.     

The Rambam Tefillah (1:10) says וְיֵשׁ מִן הַגְּאוֹנִים מִי שֶׁהוֹרָה שֶׁאָסוּר לְהִתְפַּלֵּל תְּפִלַּת נְדָבָה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מַקְרִיבִין בָּהֶן נְדָבָה אֶלָּא חוֹבַת הַיּוֹם בִּלְבַד:  The Raavad says אני דעת אחרת יש עמי בכל אלה דרבי יוחנן לא אמר הלואי שיתפלל אדם כל היום אלא י''ח שהיא תפלת רחמים ובקשה ושוהה ביניהן כדי שתתחולל דעתו עליו ויתכוין דעתו לבקש רחמים אבל תפלת שבת וי''ט שאינו אלא הודאות לא אמר ר' יוחנן ואם יודה ויחזור ויודה ברכה לבטלה היא.  Rav Yitzchak Sorotzkin suggests that this debate may depend on the above reasons.  It one should not request matters on Shabbos just so not to be טורח the individual then technically the person can be considered obligated in a תפלה of requests and can pray a נדבה.  However, if Chazal forbade asking requests so one doesn't feel bad feelings on Shabbos then a נדבה is just as much prohibited.

The Alter Rebbe in the Siddur says to say רוענו זוננו [roanu instead of rianu,] (presumibly to make it a praise, not a request,) but how can he rule not like the Yerushalmi and Midrash? 

Two Types Of Milah

Rashi at the end of Lech Lecha (in some editions,) quotes a midrash in Vayerah (49:2,) מִיָּד נָטַל אַבְרָהָם סַכִּין וְהָיָה אוֹחֵז בְּעָרְלָתוֹ וּבָא לַחְתֹּךְ וְהָיָה מִתְיָרֵא שֶׁהָיָה זָקֵן, מֶה עָשָׂה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא שָׁלַח יָדוֹ וְאָחַז עִמּוֹ, וְהָיָה אַבְרָהָם חוֹתֵךְ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (נחמיה ט, ז ח): אַתָּה ה' הָאֱלֹהִים אֲשֶׁר בָּחַרְתָּ בְּאַבְרָם וגו', וְכָרוֹת לוֹ הַבְּרִית אֵין כְּתִיב כָּאן אֶלָּא וְכָרוֹת עִמּוֹ, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהָיָה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אוֹחֵז בּוֹ.  There is another Midrash at the end of Lech Lecha (47:9) that says נִמּוֹל אַבְרָהָם, אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר כַּהֲנָא הִרְגִּישׁ וְנִצְטָעֵר כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּכְפֹּל לוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא שְׂכָרוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי לֵוִי מָל אַבְרָהָם אֵין כְּתִיב כָּאן אֶלָּא נִמּוֹל, בָּדַק אֶת עַצְמוֹ וּמָצָא עַצְמוֹ מָהוּל. אָמַר רַבִּי בֶּרֶכְיָה בְּהַהִיא עִתָּא אֲקֵיל רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר כַּהֲנָא לְרַבִּי לֵוִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ שַׁקְּרָנָא כַּזְבָּנָא אַתְּ, אֶלָּא הִרְגִּישׁ וְנִצְטָעֵר כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּכְפֹּל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא שְׂכָרוֹ.  According to Rebbe Levi, Avrohom didn't have to do the milah at all, Hashem did it.  How could Hashem do the milah for Avrohom, if he had a commandment to do milah, how did he fulfill the mitzvah?

By way of intro. I will share a peshat in a midrash from Rav Schwab.  The Tanchumah at the beginning of Titzaveh says יְלַמְּדֵנוּ רַבֵּנוּ, קָטָן לְכַמָּה נִמּוֹל? כָּךְ שָׁנוּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ: קָטֹן נִמּוֹל לִשְׁמוֹנָה. מַה טַּעַם? כְּשֵׁם שֶׁנִּמּוֹל יִצְחָק אָבִינוּ.  The midrash is very difficult for what is the question, its an open possuk in Lech Lecha (17:12) וּבֶן־שְׁמֹנַ֣ת יָמִ֗ים יִמּ֥וֹל לָכֶ֛ם כׇּל־זָכָ֖ר לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶ֑ם or Tazria (12:3) בַיּ֖וֹם הַשְּׁמִינִ֑י יִמּ֖וֹל בְּשַׂ֥ר עָרְלָתֽוֹ.  And why does the midrash answer with the possuk of Avrohom doing the bris for Yitzchak, which is just a story, not with the possuk of the command?  And what is this doing in the beginning of Titzaveh?  Rav Shwab explains that the midrash knows when the action of circumcision is done.  However, the milah of the skin is merely an indicator of the milah of the heart.  The midrash wants to know when does the milah of the heart happen.  Is it possible for an eight day old kid to be have the תיקון הנפש done, or does that only come about when he obtains brains?  The midrash answers the possuk says (21:4) וַיָּ֤מׇל אַבְרָהָם֙ אֶת־יִצְחָ֣ק בְּנ֔וֹ בֶּן־שְׁמֹנַ֖ת יָמִ֑ים, obviously its Yitzchak, his son, just say וַיָּ֤מׇל אַבְרָהָם֙ אותו?  We see that already at eight days he is called Yitzchak, he has the nefesh and powers of a Yitzchak.  From here the midrash derives that the milah of the heart comes simultaneously with the milah of the skin.  How does this happen if he doesn't have any brains?  It's the zertizut of the father and mesiras nefesh that causes this תיקון הנפש to happen.  That's the דיוק of the possuk (ibid) כַּאֲשֶׁ֛ר צִוָּ֥ה אֹת֖וֹ אלקים, the word צִוָּ֥ connotes zerizut (Kiddushin 29a.)  That's why it appears in the beginning of Titzaveh, to pick up on this theme of zerizut.  

Now that we have established that milah is also a תיקון הנפש, we can revisit the above midrashim.  The possuk in Ekev (10:16) says וּמַלְתֶּ֕ם אֵ֖ת עָרְלַ֣ת לְבַבְכֶ֑ם וְעָ֨רְפְּכֶ֔ם לֹ֥א תַקְשׁ֖וּ עֽוֹד:  You shall circumcise the foreskin of your heart.  However, in Nitzavim (30:6) it says ומל ה' אלקיך אֶת־לְבָֽבְךָ֖ וְאֶת־לְבַ֣ב זַרְעֶ֑ךָ.  And the Lord, your God, will circumcise your heart and the heart of your offspring. It seems to be a contradiction, do you do the milah of the heart or does Hashem do it?  The alter Rebbe explains (Torah Or end of Lech Lecha,) that there are two levels of alah to be removed.  This is the arlah that can be removed through teshuvah; that is your obligation.  Then is is a more fine tuned and more delicate arlah that is beyond one's grasp to remove himself; that Hashem will do.  Based upon this we can say of course Avrohom did the actual milah as he was commanded, the midrash means that Avrohom also merited that Hashe removed the second layer of the arlah as well.  That is the intent that Avrohom was too old, he didn't have the strength to remove this addiotional layer of arlah, so Hashem helped him complete the job.    

Yischok or Yitzchok

A friend of mine pointed out to me last Friday that in the krias shem at a bris, we say in the middle אֲשֶׁ֣ר כָּ֭רַת אֶת־אַבְרָהָ֑ם וּשְׁב֖וּעָת֣וֹ לְיִשְׂחָֽק׃.  He wanted to know why יצחק was spelled with a 'ש.  I pointed out to him that that's  what it says in Tehillim (105:9,) which is the source of that line.  According to the קונקורדציה, it is spelled that way 4 times in Tanach, in the also verse of Yermiyahu Ch. 33, this verse in Tehillim and twice in Amos Ch. 7, verse 9 and  16.  The Metzudos Tzion in Yermiyahu says ישחק. יצחק כי זסשר״ץ מתחלף:  However, what is the significance of this change?
The Yalkut Maom Loaz in Yirmiyahu brings from Chazal:

                                        A different interpretation is given by the Mincha Gedolah in Amos (7:9.) The possuk there is talking about the bammot made for avodah zarah in the land of the ten tribes.  He quotes from the Alshich that the 'ש in place of the 'צ comes from the name of עשו.  He explains that Yaakov is already connected to Esav via the 'ע that exists in his name and the 'ו that sometimes appears in his name. Therefore, when referring to the tribes that did the actions of עשו it adds the connection of the  'ש in the name of Yitzchak.  The problem with this explanation is that it doesn't seem to explain why the possuk would switch in Tehillim and Yermiyahu.

Divorce Of A Ben Noach

The first Mishna in Kiddushin says וקונה את עצמה בגט ובמיתת הבעל.  Is the heter of gerushin and death limited to the kiddushin of a Jew, or does it apply to the marriage of a gentile as well?

The Gemorah Kiddushin (13b) learns from a verse that if the husband dies, the woman is permitted to marry.  The Pnei Yehoshua says that applies to a Yisroel but not to a gentile to whom the verse doesn’t apply and hence there will be an issur asseh of ודבק באשתו (בראשית ב׳:כ״ד) ולא באשת חבירו even after the husband passes away.  This Pnei Yehousha is rejected by everyone after him for reasons both from sevara and Gemarah.  One of the proofs against his theory comes from the words of Tosfos in our own parsha (12:12) משמע שהיה מתירא שיהרגוהו אם יאמר שהיא אשתו מפני שירצו לשכב עמה והם מצווים על העריות. ותימה שהרי כמו כן מצווים על שפיכות דמים ואם יודע הוא שהיו נזהרין על מה שהן מצווין א״כ לא היה לו לירא שיהרגוהו. וי״ל כי טוב יהיה להם שיהרגוהו ויעשו עבירה דשפיכות דמים פעם אחת משיבואו עליה בלא הריגה כי יהיו יראים המצרים פן יצעוק עליהם למלך.  It is clear from Tosfos after Avrohom’s death, it would be permitted for Sarah to remarry.  But why is the Pnei Yehoshua wrong, how is the wife permitted without a possuk?

What is the status of a gentile regarding divorce?  The Yerushalmi at the beginning of Kiddushin (2a) discusses this topic and it’s a subject of debate between the commentators as to how to understand the Yerushalmi.  מהו שיהא להם גירושין ר' יודה בן פזי ור' חנין בשם ר' חונה רובה דציפורין או שאין להן גירושין או ששניהן מגרשין זה את זה ר' יוחנן דצפרין ר' אחא ר' חיננא בשם ר' שמואל בר נחמן (מלאכי ב) כי שנא שלח וגו' עד את ה' אלהי ישראל בישראל נתתי גירושין לא נתתי גירושין באומות העולם ר' חנניה בשם ר' פינחס כל הפרשה כתיב יי צבאות וכאן כתיב אלקי ישראל ללמדך שלא ייחד הקב"ה שמו בגירושין אלא בישראל.

The Ran Sanhedrin (58b) cites Rabbenu David that holds a gentile can’t divorce at all; that right is only given to a Yisroel.  He must have learn along the lines of the Pnei Moshe that the question is if they don’t have the rights to divorce at all or either one of the spouses may walk out on the other and he understands the conclusion that they don’t have any means of divorce.  The logic of this opinion would seem to be that the idea that a marriage can be annulled is a chiddush of the Torah, hence, it isn’t applicable to a gentile.  

However, the Rambam Melachim (9:8) that rules either party can initiate divorced and can be done without any documentation.  He seems to have understood the Yerushalmi is also concluding there is no need for any bill of divorce.  Why would the rules of divorce for a gentile be different from that of a Yisroel?

The Rambam at the beginning of the Laws of Eishus says קֹדֶם מַתַּן תּוֹרָה הָיָה אָדָם פּוֹגֵעַ אִשָּׁה בַּשּׁוּק אִם רָצָה הוּא וְהִיא לִשָּׂא אוֹתָהּ מַכְנִיסָהּ לְתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ וּבוֹעֲלָהּ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ וְתִהְיֶה לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה. כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּתְּנָה תּוֹרָה נִצְטַוּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאִם יִרְצֶה הָאִישׁ לִשָּׂא אִשָּׁה יִקְנֶה אוֹתָהּ תְּחִלָּה בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ תִּהְיֶה לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כב יג) כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבָא אֵלֶיהָ")  Why is the Rambam informing us of this history lesson?  Rav Gustman says that the Rambam here is explaining the concept of kiddushin and the difference between marriage of a Yisroel and marriage of a gentile.  It is when the Torah is given that there is invented a concept of kiddushin. This idea of a kiddushin, a kinyan eishus, only exists for a Yisroel.  For a gentile their status of relationship is the same as pre-Mattan Torah.  There is no kinyan eishus, it is merely the bond that exists because of the coexistence of husband and wife that creates the bond of marriage.  Hence, there is no need for a divorce bill to break any kinyan eishus, if one of the spouses simply wants to walkway, and they are no longer living together, the bond of marriage no longer is in existence.  Based upon this, it is obvious why we don’t need a possuk to tell us the heter of the woman to remarry after her husband dies, for obviously then they are no longer residing together as a couple and there is no more marriage (see Steipler Kiddushin last siman.)

This blog mentioned here the idea of the Briskor Rav that even though the Avos kept the Torah, if a din was dependent upon a chalos that didn’t exist pre-Mattan Torah, it didn’t apply to them.  The Rav says a similar idea to answer why Avrohom didn’t fulfill the mitzvah even before it was commanded.  For the mitzvah of milah is to remove the arlah.  As long as there was no commandment of milah, there was no status of arlah and Avrohom had no capability to fulfill milah. According to the aforementioned idea, the status of the marriage of Avrohom had the status of a marriage of a gentile and he would have no reason to write a bill of divorce.  However, the Pirkai D’Rebbe Eliezer (Ch. 30) and Targum Yonason (21:14) both say that Avrohom sent away Hagar with a get.  Why would Avrohom write a get if it had no halachik bearing at all? (See Beis Haotzar volume 1 klal 1 letter 5, ועדיין צ"ע.)

Noach And Avrohom: Two Approaches

The Shem M'Shmuel asks why is it that Adam and Noach were born circumcised, but Avrohom was not born that way, rather had a command to circumcise himself?

The midrash (56:10) explains how the name Yerushalayim developed: אַבְרָהָם קָרָא אוֹתוֹ יִרְאֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: וַיִּקְרָא אַבְרָהָם שֵׁם הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא ה' יִרְאֶה. שֵׁם קָרָא אוֹתוֹ שָׁלֵם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בראשית (יד:יח) וּמַלְכִּי צֶדֶק מֶלֶךְ שָׁלֵם, אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אִם קוֹרֵא אֲנִי אוֹתוֹ יִרְאֶה כְּשֵׁם שֶׁקָּרָא אוֹתוֹ אַבְרָהָם, שֵׁם אָדָם צַדִּיק מִתְרָעֵם, וְאִם קוֹרֵא אֲנִי אוֹתוֹ שָׁלֵם, אַבְרָהָם אָדָם צַדִּיק מִתְרָעֵם, אֶלָּא הֲרֵינִי קוֹרֵא אוֹתוֹ יְרוּשָׁלַיִם כְּמוֹ שֶׁקָּרְאוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם, יִרְאֶה שָׁלֵם, יְרוּשָׁלַיִם.  Why did Shem call it שָׁלֵם and Avrohom call it יִרְאֶה,why did they give it different names?

These differences show us a complete different outlook between Noach and Avrohom.  Noach believed that since his entire generation was doing the wrong thing, in order to remain a צדיק, he had to separate himself from the rest of the world. Avrohom on the other hand believed in preaching to the world and trying to teach the proper outlook to the idol worshipers around him.

The Mishna in Avos (5:2) says עשרה דורות מאדם ועד נח, להודיע כמה ארך אפים לפניו, שכל הדורות היו מכעיסין ובאין עד שהביא עליהם את מי המבול. עשרה דורות מנח ועד אברהם, להודיע כמה ארך אפים לפניו, שכל הדורות היו מכעיסין ובאין, עד שבא אברהם וקבל [עליו] שכר כולם.  Why does Avrohom receive the reward of the generations before him, but not Noach?  Because Avrohom attempted to teach those around him, he is able to receive their reward for it is to his credit all of the good that they did.  Noach isn't deserving of receiving reward of those around him for he didn't play any role in any good that they might have done.

The milah represents the ability to bring kedusha into the tumah of the world.  One is able to transform the world in a physical form through a mitzvah.  That ability was devoid of Noach.  He had to remain separate from the tumah of the world, he had to be born mahul.  It is only Avrohom that has the ability to have an affect on the world.  This Weltanschauung is expressed in the different names given to Yerushalayim.  Shem, the son of Noach follows the view that the zenith of spirituality is self perfection, שלימות, hence he gives that name to the holiest city.  Avrohom feels that its about the world feeling יראת שמים, and hence he dubs that as the name of  Yerushalayim.  

Rashi at the beginning of Vayerah says באלני ממרא – כדמפרש בבראשית רבה (בראשית רבה מ״ב:ח׳): הוא שנתן לו עצה על המילה לפיכך נגלה עליו בחלקו.  Rav Hirsch says the Torah points out that Avrohom was still attached to Mamrei dispite the fact that he know had a bris milah.  This additional kedusha didn't separate Avrohom from his mission of teaching others.  In his words: היכן הוא יושב? "באלוני ממרא"! הוא נמצא עדיין עם ענר, אשכול, וממרא, שהיו לא "אנשי בריתו" אלא "בעלי ברית אברהם" (עיין פירוש לעיל יד, יג); כ"בעלי ברית" הם צירפו אותו לקבוצתם. למרות שעתה אברהם הוא נימול, נותרו יחסיו עם בני המין האנושי מחוץ לתחום המצומצם שלו ללא שינוי.

The Knife

The Gemorah (Zevachim 97b) derives from the verse (22:10) "Avrohom took the knife," that a keli as opposed to the harp edge of a reed is required to do the shechita of kodshim.  Rashi Zevachim (98a) understands that this means that the shechita must be done with a kli shares.  This would seem to run at odds with Rashi Menachos (82b) that explains the chiddush of the Gemorah is that an act of shechita is requires on a korban and its not enough to do melika.  According to Rashi Menachos the rule is just coming to tell us you need shechita but you don't see the need for a kli shares.  The Rishonim  (Tosfos Zevachim 47a and Rishonim Chullin 3a) debate this point if the halacha says that a keli is required or its not enough with any keli but a kli shares is required.  The Achronim ask how do we see in the verse that it was a kli shares?  Furthermore, the Rambam (Maaseh Karbonos 4:7) rules that the requirement is to use  kli shares but ex post facto any shechita is good (even without a keli.)  Why is the law only lichatchila?

The question seems to be is this law of a keli required for the shechita of kodshim is that a rule in shechita which is only said in regard to kodshim or is it in a rule in kodshim.  The Rishonim that understand that a keli sharas is required is because they understand if the law says a keli is required it must be a law in kodshim.  If its a law in kodshim than it has the laws of kelim d'hekdash and requires a kli sharash.  It's not some extrapolation from the verse that tells us the requirement of kli sharash, its part of the requirement of keli.  This is the opinion of the Rambam as well.  Therefore, he follows the general rule that by kodshim laws are binding even ex post facto only if there are two verses telling us the law.  Here, there aren't two verses, therefore the rule isn't binding b'deavad.  The Rishonim that don't require a kli sharash just any keli, hold that the law is telling us a law in slaughtering.  It happens to be that this rule of slaughtering only applies to animals of kodshim only, tbut we can't extrapolate from there any requirement of kli sharash (Dibros Moshe Chullin daf 12.)

The Ritvah (Chullin 3a) says that a kli sharas is necessary to be mekadash the blood of the korban (as the Gemorah says in Sotah 14b) but its not a kli sharash gamur and therefore there is no pesul of yotzeh, of the blood leaving the mikdash.  What does he mean, what is a kli sharash gamur or not gamur?  Rav Dovid Elon (Masseh Yad volume 2) explains that we find two types of kli sharash.  We find kli sharash that cause kedusha to other things like the kalim used to receive blood of a korban or put minachos in.  We find a second kind of kli sharash, that which is kodesh in its own right, but doesn't make other things kodesh such as the menorah and aron.  The Ritvah means that the shechita knife has to be kodesh but it isn't mekadesh the blood (see also Tosfos Rosh in Sotah.)  The problem is that this seems to be the opposite of what the Ritvah is saying.  The Ritvah says that the knife is a kli sharash in regard to give kedusha to the blood, clearly he is saying it is a kli sharash to be mekadesh the blood?

An Internal Laugh

When Avrohom confronts Sarah as to why she laughed about bearing a son, Sarah denies the matter and says "I didn't laugh."  The Ramban asks how could it be that a great prophetess like Sarah would deny that what Hashem told Avrohom?  Furthermore, how would Sarah lie to Avrohom in any circumstance?  My great-grandfather explains that possuk 12 says vatizchak Sarah b'kerbah, Sarah laughed internally.  The laugh of Sarah was an emotion deep down in her depths, it was so deep even she didn't realize it and therefore denied the episode.  The mussar is clear.  Sometimes a person will feel that they are doing the right thing but deep down they no its wrong.  One must be in tune with their inner feelings to see what is driving their actions.