The sair le’azazel is unique for it offers kapporah
but it’s not a sacrifice in the classical sense. So, the question is how should we view it; as
a korban with a special form of avodah, or something else?
The Ramban and Even Ezra when discussing the philosophical
understanding of the sair lazazel say that it’s not a korban. I am not sure that when can derive from their
philosophical writings a halachik position, but I am inclined to think that we
can.
Tosfos in Shavous (13a at bottom) says that even though
normally a korban can’t effect kapparah for what happens after it’s
already offered, the sair lazazel can effect atonement for the entire
day. One of the explanations for this
phenomenon, explains the Tosfos HaRosh, is because the sair la’azazal isn’t
a korban and therefore is not limited to the time of the sacrifice. The Rashba (Shevous 13b) in discussing a peshat
in a Tosefta also raises the possibility of it not being considered a
korban.
The Rambam Avodas Yom Hakippurim (chapter 5 laws 17-18)
rules that if the sair la’azazal has a blemish or is a trefah its
disqualified. The Rambam bases these
rules on pessukim. The Minchas
Chinuch (mitzvah #286) points out that the Rambam doesn’t mention the lack of
an internal organ disqualifies the sair, even though it would disqualify
a korban. The Netziv in his elucidation
on Chumash makes a similar point. Why
does the Rambam need verses to disqualify the sair that has a blemish or
is a trefah; it should be no different than any other korban which is
disqualified? They deduce from here
Rambam doesn’t view the sair as a korban. However, the Rambam in Maaseh
Karbonas (18:1) rules that if one slaughters the sair outside the Mikdash
it’s a violation of shchutay chutz because it will be brought in the
Mikdash to have the vidduy said on it.
From here it seems that it is a korban for otherwise there wouldn’t be a
violation of shchutay chutz. [This
law of Rambam seems to contradict the Gemorah in Zevachim 113b and Yoma 62b
that one can only violate shchutay chutz on the sair before the
lottery decides which one is for Hashem and which one is to azazel. Reb Chaim answers that it depends on the
debate in the Tanaim if the vidduy is necessary, see Briskor Rav
in Zevachim 113.] The two rulings of the
Rambam seem to leave us with a contradiction as to his view on the sair lazazel?
Rav Zolti (Mishnas Ya’avetz siman 56) answers that there are
two atonements in the sair. There
is the vidduy and then there is the kapporah of being sent to azazel. The vidduy is considered the kapporah
of a korban for it’s done in the Mikdash but the going to Azazel isn’t. Therefore, the Rambam holds one violates shchutay
chutz before the vidduy for its kodshim. A blemish doesn’t disqualify the korban
is talking about after the vidduy (עיי"ש a
lengthy discussion involving other rulings of the Rambam as well.)
The Gvuros Ari Yoma (41a) assumes after the lottery
its not a korban. See the sources listed
by Rav Yaakov Elon in the footnotes to the Rashba (ibid) and in his sefer on
Chumash, (Massah Yad volume 1) for more mekoros. See also the work of his father, Toras
Hakodesh volume 2 siman 52.
From Tosfos in Zevachim (72a) it’s clear that the reason the
limbs of the sair would be prohibited to benefit from (argument of Rav
and Shmuel in Yoma 67b) is not because of the issur meilah, rather its based
upon the possuk the Gemorah in Yoma (ibid) is dorash. The Gemorah in Meilah (11a) assumes that the sair
remaining forbidden even after it’s pushed off the cliff, is one of
two examples acting as an exception to the normal heter of naasis mitzvaso. Rav Elchonon (volume 2 of Kovetz Shiurim
siman 21) proves that Tosfos, that understands the issur of the sair
lazazel is not an issur of kodash, holds the heter of naases
mitzvoso is not just a rule in kodshim, it’s a general principle. However, I don’t understand, what issur would
there be that we would say naases mitzvoso on if not for the issur of
kodash? The mitzvah that’s complete is
the avodah of the sair, if the issur doesn’t stem from there how
does naases mitzvoso help you?
Tosfos Yoma (60a at the top) notices a discrepancy between
the Gemorah in Meilah which considers the limbs of the sair to be an
exception to the rule of naases mitzvoso as opposes to the Gemorah in
Yoma which doesn’t list it. The Minchas
Chizkeyu (volume 2 siman 17) wants to say that this debate over whether the sair
lazazel is a kapparah is the very debate between the two
tractates. In Yoma, the Gemorah is
assuming its not considered a korban, therefore the Gemorah (67b) holds the issur
must be learnt from a possuk, because there is no issur of
kodesh. In Meilah, the Gemorah
understands it is a korban, therefore the issur is that of kodesh. Of course, Tosfos in Zevachim doesn’t jive
with the Gemorah in Meilah, he’s explaining according to the Gemorah in
Yoma! According to this approach, Rav
Elchonan has no proof from Tosfos in Zevachim that naases mitzvoso isn’t
limited to kodshim for Tosfos is going according to the Gemorah in Yoma, not
the Gemorah in Meilah.
See debate between satmar rav and r moshe feinstein about הזרעה מלאכותית some of which is centered on the ability to apply a ramban in his philisophical writings in halachic contexts.
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