Nediv Lev #1

The Gemorah in Shevout 26b says that if one pledges to הקדש that one must keep the vow even if he only thought to vow but didn’t utter the words based upon the possuk in this week’s parsha (according to Rashi there), כל נדיב לב.  The Torah Temimah cites the debate in the Rishonim if we equate a vow to charity with a vow to hekdesh.  He asks how can it be that it won’t be valid through thought alone if the Gemorah in Nedarim 7a has a doubt if יש יד לנדר או אין יד לנדר, if it’s similar to הקדש  or not and we rule לחומרא  and equate it with kodshim?  However, we really should first ask a more basic question, what is the ספק, if one is obligated based upon thought alone, for sure he should be obligated even if אין יד.  The Torah Temimah seems to have understood that this very point if charity if like hekdesh is the doubt of the Gemorah and our pesak regarding an obligation via vow would be reflecteve of the conclusion of the Gemorah and that’s why he asks from the conclusion, not from the doubt itself.

 The Shittah Mikubetzes brings this question in the name of the Ream.  He answers that one is obligated only if there is a strong commitment never to retract but in the Gemorah the person didn’t make such a strong commitment and therefore will only be obligated because of יד.  However, the Rosh seems to disagree for in Nedarim 2a he explains that we need the law of ידות because one isn’t obligated in a neder unless it is verbalized.  Clearly, he is saying that had a neder been valid through thought there would be no need for the law of ידות.  Why can’t he give the case of the Ream, must be he disagrees and holds even if there wasn’t a thought of a complete, non retractable obligation it still will obligate the individual.  So how will he answer the question? 

The Mishna Terumos (3:8) says that if one wanted to declare an animal to be a עולה but made a mistake and said שלמים it is invalid.  Why is it invalid if he wanted to obligate himself but just messed up his words?  The Rash says if one’s speech contradicts their thought that the chalos is invalid.  We see from here that the words become part of the chalos chiuv.  Similary, we say in regard to ידים.  True there was a valid thought to give the charity but included in his chalos chiuv is the words he said and if there is no law of יד in regard to charity then it is a meaningless speech and his machshava becomes invalidated as well.  That can explain the Gemorah 6a as well.  The Gemorah says that if a person vows to bring a korban in a manner that it is a יד שאינו מוכח that it is invalid.  Why isn’t he obligated because of his machchava?  Based upon the Rosh we understand that the invalid utterance messes up his chalos chiuv (see Shitta Mikubetzes there.)  [based upon a shiur from Rav Asher Arieli.]   

The question of the Torah Temimah is difficult to understand.  The question of the Gemorah would seem to be a specific law that possibly צדקה is included in יד because it has a hekesh to neder in the verse that teaches us יד.  That doesn’t mean for all laws its treated as hekdash.  Furthermore, we rule that יש יד because we treat a doubt in regard to charity לחומרא, not that we conclude that tzedakah has a rule of hekdash.