More Than The Study Of Law

Megillah (4a) - Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that when Purim falls out on Shabbos one must be doresh benyano dhel yom.  The Gemorah asks that this is done every Yom Tov, what tell me this only in regard to Purim?  It answers that we would have thought because of the gezerah d’rabbah not to read the megillah on Shabbbos we wouldn’t teach about the megillah either.  Tosfos understands the question of the Gemorah is that other Yomim Tovim there is a greater novelty that one must teach the laws for there is a law of דורשין ל' יום לפני החג yet there still is a law of הלכות חג בחג.  It is apparent from Tosfos that this Gemorah is discussing the law of הלכות חג בחג and presumably the Gemorah means to teach the laws of Purim.  Rashi however, explains that the doresh benyano dhel yom means to expound about the megillah and Tosfos doesn’t disagree.  Furthermore, Tosfos states clearly that on Purim this requirement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi doesn’t apply for there is more פרסומי ניסא through the reading of the megillah.  What does פרסומי ניסא have to do with halacha?  It is clear from Tosfos that the law of הלכות חג בחג isn’t (just) to teach the halachos, it’s a law in פרסומי ניסא, of hakaras me’en hameorah, to mention the nes of the day.  In the Laws of Tefillah (13:8) the Rambam codifies the law of הלכות חג בחג as an explanation of the Torah reading of the day.  What does one have to do with the other?  It is clear that he holds of the same approach as Tosfos, the halacha is to teach about the greatness of the day.  (Even if one may have to also learn actual laws, (see Shaar Hatziyun 429:5) the Rambam is telling us the geder of the din.)  [I am not sure of how to read the Sheiltos Vayishlach (26) derasha l'chanukah if he is saying that the reading of Chanukah and Purim is a fulfillment of this din, עיי"ש.]  This will answer the question of the Beis Yosef (429) if there is already a law of דורשין ל' יום לפני החג, why do we need a law of הלכות חג בחג?  According to this approach they are two independent dinim, חלוק ביסוד גדרם.  See Shulchan Aruch Alter Rebbe (429:4) where this approach seems to be codified and influences how the rabbi should speak on the Yom Tov.  

A similar takanah to הלכות חג בחג is found in this week’s parsha in the Yalkut Shemoni in regard to Shabbos (in fact it compares it to הלכות חג בחג.)

ויקהל משה - רבותינו בעלי אגדה אומרים מתחלת התורה ועד סופה אין בה פרשה שנאמר בראשה ויקהל אלא זאת בלבד. אמר הקב"ה: עשה לך קהילות גדולת ודרוש לפניהם ברבים הלכות שבת, כדי שילמדו ממך דורות הבאים להקהיל קהילו בכל שבת ושבת ולכנוס בבתי מדרשות ללמד ולהורות לישראל דברי תורה איסור והיתר כדי שיהא שמי הגדול מתקלס בין בני. מכאן אמרו: משה תקן להם לישראל שיהיו דורשין בעינינו של יום, הלכות פסח בפסח, הלכות עצרת בעצרת, הלכות החג בחג. אמר משה לישראל: אם אתם עושים כסדר הזה הקב"ה מעלה עליכם כאילו המלכתם אותי בעולמי, שנאמר: ואתם עדי נאם ה' ואני אל. וכן דוד הוא אומר: בשרתי צדק בקהל רב. וכי מה בשורה היו ישראל צריכין בימי דוד והלא כל ימיו של דוד מעין דוגמא של משיח היה? אלא פותח ודורש לפניהם דברי תורה שלא שמעתן אזן מעולם.

It is clear that the point of the ללמד ולהורות לישראל דברי תורה איסור והיתר is שיהא שמי הגדול מתקלס בין בני.  (courtesy of http://www.daat.ac.il.)  It’s not a learning merely for the sake of knowing how to observe the Shabbbos and Yom Tov, it is to the pirsum hanes, to cause theקילוס  of Hashem (Binyan Av.)

[The pshat in the Yalkut needs to be explained for it starts by saying that there should be gatherings to teach the laws of Shabbos and then it says to do it on Shabbos only?  And how do we derive from there to learn the laws of Yom Tov on Yom Tov?  My great-grandfather explained that in the midbar there was plenty of time to study the laws of Shabbos every day.  However, in future generations when people are working, its limited to Shabbos.  Based upon the fact that they enacted to study the laws of Shabbos on Shabbos, we derive that one should study the laws of the day that pertain to the day i.e. the laws of Yom Tov on Yom Tov.]

This geder of vayakhal Moshe can be derived from another place we find the term hakhal es ham.  It is found by the mitzvah of hakhal where the possuk says the point of the mitzvah is to fear Hashem (this a debate between the Or Hachaim and Gur Aryeh, see here.)  As the Rambam says at the end of the Laws of the Chagigah, hakhal is meant as a remembrance of maatan torah, not (just) as a means of teaching.  (See Sfas Emes Vayelech 5642.)  The gathering of the entire nation at Mount Sinai itself was for the sake of the awesome experience that occurred, not for the learning per se (ibid.) 

This may explain why the Shulchan Aruch (689:6) cites that it is a good practice to bring young children to the megillah.  Just as hakhal one brought even the young children for the experience of inspiring them with yiras shamayim (see Meshech Chachma Vayelech,) so too for the mitzvah of megillah one should bring along even the small children for the experience of פרסומי ניסא (Binyan Av volume 2 #34.)  

שוב ראיתי that my father shlita touched on this topic here but this is in a different vein.

How To Donate

( לה:ה) קחו מאתכם תרומה לה' כל נדיב לבו יביאה את תרומת ה' זהב וכסף ונחושת

רמבּ"ן - יביאה את תרומת י״י  – כמו: יביא את תרומת ה׳, אבל יכנה ויפרש. וכן: ותפתח ותראהו את הילד (שמות ב׳:ו׳), בבואו האיש (יחזקאל י׳:ג׳), אשר לא יעבדו אותו את נבוכדנצר (ירמיהו כ״ז:ח׳), אשר אנכי נותן להם לבני ישראל(יהושע א׳:ב׳), ורבים כן.

ועל דרך האמת: הוא כמו יביאה עם תרומת י״י, שיביא התרומה העליונה בסוד: ויקחו לי תרומה (שמות כ״ה:ב׳), וכבר פרשתיו (רמב״ן שמות כ״ה:ג׳). ולרבותינו מדרש בותפתח ותראהו את הילד (שמות ב׳:ו׳), שראתה עמו שכינה(בבלי סוטה י״ב:).

The end of the Ramban is strange, why is he citing an explanation of Chazal on an earlier verse when he just finished bringing this a proof that this is the normal way of the verse to speak?  The Alter from Kelm explains that the Ramban is giving another explanation of  our verse.  Just as Chazal interpret ותפתח ותראהו את הילד, the word ותראהו isn't referring to the child, rather to the Shechina that was there, so too in our verse the word יביאה isn't going on the donations, rather it goes on what was mentioned previously, the נדיבות לב.  What built the mishkan wasn't physical materials, it was the hearts of Klal Yisroel.  

For those that want to understand the דרך האמת of the Ramban, they should look in the Zohar that יביאה refers to the Shechina.  When a person gives to the teruma to Hashem, the Shechina becomes united with him (based upon וענפיה ערזי אל.)

Shekel Sense

The Rambam in the beginning of the Laws of Shekalim rules that the half shekel must be given in on shot, one can’t give part of it one day and complete the rest another day.  However, the Ramban says in verse 15:  והנראה מן הכתוב הזה שאם הביא הדל בשקלו פחות ממחצית השקל, שהוא עובר בלאו הזה, שהכתוב הזה מניעה. שאם נאמר בהעשיר לא ירבה שיהיה שלילות, לומר שבכך די לו, לא נוכל לפרש כן בוהדל לא ימעיט. ואם כן, שתיהן מניעות, אם שקל העשיר היחידי יותר, ושקל הדל פחות, עבר בלאו. ושמא מה שהיו תורמין בקופות על האבוד ועל העתיד לגבות (בבלי כתובות ק״ח.) יתקן להם זה, כי הדל הממעיט במותר עתיד לגבות הוא, ומן העשיר המרבה לא יתרמו הגבאין ביתרון, ולא יהו מזכין במותרות. וראיתי לבעל הלכות ולכל המונים המצות שלא הזכירו הלאו הזה.  It is clear that he holds that if one gave part of the half-shekel that he can make up the rest later on.  What is the source of the Rambam and what is this debate about?

I would have expected the Laws of Shekalim to appear in the Rambam’s book of Avodah.  (I polled a few people and most also assumed it would be in Avodah.)  However, that is not the case; it appears in Zemanim.  Why does it appear there (the Rambam really is copying the Mishna which places Shekalim in Moad, but that itself needs an explanation?)  The Rambam is teaching us that the giving of the shekalim isn’t just for the sake of the korbanot, it is its own mitzvah.  The Ramban on the other hand holds that the point of the shekalim is for the korbanot, for the korbanot to be offered from new shekalim.  This may also be the debate between Rav and Shmuel if parshas shekalim is what we read, Ki Sesa or Tzav, the parsha of the korban tamid (Rav Zolti in Kovatz Moadim.)

The Levush cited in the Mishna Berura says that reading parshas shekalim is a fulfillment of ונשלמה פרים שפתינו.  That would seem to fit only if the shekalim is connected to korbanot but if it’s a separate mitzvah than it wouldn’t seem apropos to say ונשלמה פרים שפתינו.  

The achronim ask why does the Rambam hold that shekalim is different from pidyon haben where the 5 selaim don’t have to be given in one shot?  The Rogotchover explains that the half-sheklel isn’t a shiur in quantity, it’s a shiur of quality.  The siman to know if it’s a shiur in quantity or quality is if it causes something else positive than the numbers can add up to equal the required number, if it is to remove something than you can’t add up to the shiur.  According to the Ramban, the shekalim are for the korbanot therefore the half-shekel is a quantitative shiur to be donated towards the korbanot.  The Rambam holds that it is its own mitzvah לכפר על נפשותיכם, to remove sin, hence it’s a qualitative shiur and giving less than a half-shekel is nothing.

The Krias Sefer says the source of the Rambam is from the verse והדל לא ימעיט, why doesn’t it just say you must give a half-shekel?  Rather it means even the act of giving can’t be less than half a shekel.  However, we don't find a hint to this in the Rambam and that would seem to be a detail in the mitzvah so why would the Rambam put it in the first halacha which teaches us the basics of the mitzvah?  The Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvot says:   המצווה הקע"א הציווי שנצטווינו לתן מחצית השקל כל השנה. והוא אמרו יתעלה: "ונתנו איש כפר נפשו לה'" (שמות ל, יב), ואמר "זה יתנו" (שם שם, יג). וברור, שאין הנשים חייבות במצווה זו, לפי שהכתוב אומר: "כל העובר על הפקודים" (שם). וכבר נתבארנו דיני מצווה זו במסכתא המיוחדת לה, כלומר: מסכת שקלים. ושם נתבאר, שמצווה זו אינה נוהגת אלא בפני הבית. (Kopach edition courtesy of http://www.daat.ac.il.)[Other editions of Sefer Hamitzvot have slight changes in the text.]  Why does the Rambam need to cite two verses when citing this mitzvah?

The Rebbe (Likutay Sichos volume 16 Ki Sesa #1) explains based upon the Rogotchover that the first verse, ונתנו איש כפר נפשו לה, tells us the geder of the shekel is a כפרה, it is a law pertaining to the giving of the individual (דין בגברא.)  The second verse, זה יתנו tells us a law pertaining to the חפצא, that this, the half-shekel must be given, not its value, the coin itself must be given (see ibid footnote 50.)  That is why this law that the half-shekel can't be given in multiple installments is the first law in the Rambam, for it reflects the very essence of the law.

It is noteworthy that Rashi disagrees with the Rambam as well.  Rashi (30:15) says ונתנו כל אחד מחצית השקל, והן לקנות מהן קרבנות ציבור של כל שנה ושנה, והושוו בהן עניים ועשירים. ועל אותה תרומה נאמר: לכפר על נפשותיכם, שהקרבנות לכפרה הן באין.  It is clear that he holds there is no intrinsic atonement in the shekel itself, the atonement is affected by the korbanot bought with the money.  That is why Rashi holds (Menachos 52a ד"ה לרבות) that one must have intent for the korbanot when donating the half-shekel.

The Ramban entertained that if a poor person gives less than a half-shekel or a wealthy person more that it is a violation of a lav.  We understand that giving less would be forbidden but why is giving more a lav, what is the test for the wealthy man that the Torah must make it a lav?  Rav Yeruchem (Daas Chachma U'Mussar #19) explains that if a wealthy individual gives a larger donation he tends to feel look what I did, I made this building etc. and that's why a person wants to give more.  The Torah says, the mishkan is equally owned by everyone.  No one can say the mishkan or korbanot are mine, it was my donation that made it happen.  The same applies in learning, if one thinks of a sevara and then he finds it in a sefer there a sad feeling that it isn't my idea.  It is this feeling of selfishness, sense of self, that the Torah is teaching us to eradicate.

Shekel, Shabbos And Mikdash

Why does the Torah tell us the issur of Shabbos specifically regarding the prohibition to light a fire?  Rashi says that we are told about Shabbos here to tell us that the building of the mishkan doesn’t override it.  If Shabbos if just a detail in the mishkan it would seem more apropos to put the commandment of the mishkan first, why does it put Shabbos first?  Shabbos is the day of unity between Klal Yisroel and Hashem.  We abstain from our normal labor and focus on spiritual pursuits.  This unity with Hashem is dependent upon the unity of Klal Yisroel together, hence vayakhel Moshe.  The Berashis Raabah says 14:9 each one of the days is paired with another bur Shabbos is the odd man out.  So, Hashem said that its pair is Klal Yisroel.  In order for there to be Shabbos, there must be a body of Klal Yisroel, there is a need for ויקהל את כל עדת בני ישראל.  We are all united via our neshamos, division and differences come about because of our separate bodies (Tanya Ch.32.)  It is the pursuit of gashmious that destroys the unity of Klal Yisroel.  Therefore, the Torah warns you shouldn’t have a fire, a bren בכל מושבותיכם, in all of your worldly pursuits.  It is the hakdama of Shabbos, the רזא דאחד, the unity between Hashem and Klal Yisroel that is necessary for the building of the mishkan (based upon Toras Menachem 5749.)

The Shla says כי תשא את ראש is a hint to Shabbos for when you raise the letters of ראש  to the letters following it equals שבת.  The Emrei Noam (Vayakhal) says שבתון קודש לה' stands for shekel.  What is this connection between Shabbos and shekel? See Emrei Noam for his approach.  What is the connection between the two parshios of the week, Vayakhal and Shekalim? 

As we already discussed earlier this week, shekalim hint to the achdus of Klal Yisroel, everyone is equal and they combine toward the korbanot tzibbur, to become one unit.  It effects the unity of Klal Yisroel together and their unity with Hashem.  Why do we give a half-shekel and not a full shekel?  It is a hint that one must be completed by someone else and by Hashem.  We combine to participate in the service of God via the korbanot.  It is this unity that is the meeting ground between Shabbos and the shekel.

Nediv Lev #2

We already mentioned the Gemorah in Shevout 26b that כל נדיב לב obligates one even in a machshava to give to hekdesh.  Rashi Kiddushin 41b explains that if a person thought that he wants to make an animal into a עולה, it becomes a עולה.  The achronim point out that the Rambam disagrees.  When he brings the law in Ch. 14 of Maaseh Korbanot law 12 he says "גמר בלבו שזו עולה או שיביא עולה הר"ז חייב להביא וכו".   The Rambam says there is an obligation on the person to bring the animal, but it itself doesn’t become hekdash.  That is the opinion of the Meiri as well.

The Ketzos 12:1 says that this rule that for kodshim one is obligated by machshava alone applies only to kodshai mizbaoch, not to bedek habais.  Rashi in Shevout clearly contradicts this for he says the rule of כל נדיב לב applied to the terumah of the mishkan (which is the simple explanation of כל נדיב לב in our parsha.)  The words of the Ketzos would only seem to work in Tosfos that understands we are referring to a verse in Divrei Hayomin (2) 29:31 כל נדיב לב עולות.  (Rashi understands the Gemorah refers to terumah lamikdash and korbanot, not like Tosfos that terumah is terumas dagan and hekdash is korbanot.  Rashi can’t learn like Tosfos because he holds terumah requires it to be uttered to be chal, see Bechoros 59a and Tosfos Menachos 55a [Mishmar Halevi Temurah #16.])

Rav Solevetchik sites from Reb Chaim from the fact the Rambam only cites the law in regard to kedushas haguf it supports the Ketzos ( although it is difficult for the Rambam brings the possuk in our parsha.)  What is the difference between kedushas haguf and bedek habais?  When one is being makdish kedushas haguf, he is making a chalos of kedusha, it is a hekdash halacha and we learn from כל נדיב לב that it is obligatory through machshava alone.  However, when one donates to the bedek habais, he is making a business transaction like any other, he is being מקנה to hekdesh.  It is after hekdesh acquires the object that it assumes the laws that pertain to an object of hekdesh.  Since it is like any other business transaction, it requires speech to create the chalos like any other קנין (Rav Chaim in stencil.)

 The Rashba Kiddushin 50a brings a proof from this Gemorah that one can make a stipulation in a sale even if he doesn’t spell it out.  Everyone asks how is this a proof, it seems to contradict what the Rashba says for the Gemorah says that hekdash being chal via machshava is the exception to the rule?  Rav Naftoli Trop explains the intent of the Rashba.  There are two ways to understand why machshava doesn’t suffice to create a chalos. Number one is that a machshava is meaningless and worthless, it carries no weight at all.  Method number two is that it is valid but lacks the power necessary to create a chalos.  The Rashba says we see from the fact that one becomes obligated through machshova in regard to kodshim that a machshava does carry weight and it just doesn’t have enough power to create a chalos.

Nediv Lev #1

The Gemorah in Shevout 26b says that if one pledges to הקדש that one must keep the vow even if he only thought to vow but didn’t utter the words based upon the possuk in this week’s parsha (according to Rashi there), כל נדיב לב.  The Torah Temimah cites the debate in the Rishonim if we equate a vow to charity with a vow to hekdesh.  He asks how can it be that it won’t be valid through thought alone if the Gemorah in Nedarim 7a has a doubt if יש יד לנדר או אין יד לנדר, if it’s similar to הקדש  or not and we rule לחומרא  and equate it with kodshim?  However, we really should first ask a more basic question, what is the ספק, if one is obligated based upon thought alone, for sure he should be obligated even if אין יד.  The Torah Temimah seems to have understood that this very point if charity if like hekdesh is the doubt of the Gemorah and our pesak regarding an obligation via vow would be reflecteve of the conclusion of the Gemorah and that’s why he asks from the conclusion, not from the doubt itself.

 The Shittah Mikubetzes brings this question in the name of the Ream.  He answers that one is obligated only if there is a strong commitment never to retract but in the Gemorah the person didn’t make such a strong commitment and therefore will only be obligated because of יד.  However, the Rosh seems to disagree for in Nedarim 2a he explains that we need the law of ידות because one isn’t obligated in a neder unless it is verbalized.  Clearly, he is saying that had a neder been valid through thought there would be no need for the law of ידות.  Why can’t he give the case of the Ream, must be he disagrees and holds even if there wasn’t a thought of a complete, non retractable obligation it still will obligate the individual.  So how will he answer the question? 

The Mishna Terumos (3:8) says that if one wanted to declare an animal to be a עולה but made a mistake and said שלמים it is invalid.  Why is it invalid if he wanted to obligate himself but just messed up his words?  The Rash says if one’s speech contradicts their thought that the chalos is invalid.  We see from here that the words become part of the chalos chiuv.  Similary, we say in regard to ידים.  True there was a valid thought to give the charity but included in his chalos chiuv is the words he said and if there is no law of יד in regard to charity then it is a meaningless speech and his machshava becomes invalidated as well.  That can explain the Gemorah 6a as well.  The Gemorah says that if a person vows to bring a korban in a manner that it is a יד שאינו מוכח that it is invalid.  Why isn’t he obligated because of his machchava?  Based upon the Rosh we understand that the invalid utterance messes up his chalos chiuv (see Shitta Mikubetzes there.)  [based upon a shiur from Rav Asher Arieli.]   

The question of the Torah Temimah is difficult to understand.  The question of the Gemorah would seem to be a specific law that possibly צדקה is included in יד because it has a hekesh to neder in the verse that teaches us יד.  That doesn’t mean for all laws its treated as hekdash.  Furthermore, we rule that יש יד because we treat a doubt in regard to charity לחומרא, not that we conclude that tzedakah has a rule of hekdash.

Hearts Of Wisdom

The Torah describes the woman whom spun the wool's hair for the covering of the mishkan as נשא לבן בחכמה.  The Torah uses the expression נשא לבן or נדבה רוחן.  What is this additional expression of חכמת לב?  Rav Hirsch says that the other descriptions refer to the willingness to give (נדבה רוחן) or to give one's entire self over(נשא לבן.)  However, חכמת לב refers to that their willingness to give was guided by their brain.  Everyone rushed to donate the beautiful materials but forgot about the basic materials needed for the coverings.  However, the woman that were חכמי לב realized that this was the most important.  "This was the real actual אהל and the making of an אהל is where the quintessence womanhood is concentrated, so in that in this they displayed both careful thought and their sense of true womanhood, their חכמה." 
The woman that were חכמי לב recognized the correct roll of woman in society and reflected it through their work on the mishkan.

What's Wrong With Carrying

The Gemorah in the beginning of the 11^th chapter of Shabbos asks how do we know that הוצאה  is considered a מלאכה and the Gemorah derives it from וַיְצַ֣ו משֶׁ֗ה וַיַּֽעֲבִ֨ירוּ ק֥וֹל בַּמַּֽחֲנֶה֘ לֵאמֹר֒ אִ֣ישׁ וְאִשָּׁ֗ה אַל־יַֽעֲשׂוּ־ע֛וֹד מְלָאכָ֖ה לִתְרוּמַ֣ת הַקֹּ֑דֶשׁ וַיִּכָּלֵ֥א הָעָ֖ם מֵֽהָבִֽיא for Moshe was speaking on Shabbos (as the Gemorah derives from a gezareh shavah) and telling the people not to carry from the reshus hayachid to the reshus harabim.  That is the test Rashi has and explains in the Gemorah.  Normally we don’t need a possuk to tell us something is forbidden on Shabbos, if it was done in the mishkan it is forbidden.  Why do we need a verse for הוצאה?  Tosfos explains because it is a מלאכה גרועה, we wouldn’t have assumed it’s prohibited if not for the possuk. 

The Rambam says:

הוצאה והכנסה מרשות לרשות מלאכה מאבות מלאכות היא. ואף על פי שדבר זה עם כל גופי תורה מפי משה מסיני נאמרו. הרי הוא אומר בתורה איש ואשה אל יעשו עוד מלאכה לתרומת הקדש ויכלא העם מהביא. הא למדת שההבאה מלאכה קורא אותה. וכן למדו מפי השמועה שהמעביר ברשות הרבים מתחלת ארבע לסוף ארבע הרי הוא כמוציא מרשות לרשות וחייב.  The Rambam indicates we knew it was prohibited to carry even without the verse, it just comes to teach us that it is called a melacha.  The Maggid Mishna points out that he holds like the text of the Rav Hai Gaon in which the Gemorah isn’t asking how do I know thatהוצאה  is prohibited, that we know, rather its asking how do I know it’s a מלאכה.  This fits very well with the Rabbenu Channonel (cited in Tosfos) that deletes from the Gemorah the whole gezareh shavah for even if Moshe wasn’t warning the people not to bring anything because of Shabbos, we still see that the act of carrying is called a מלאכה.  (Tosfos points out this is supported by the Yerushalme, see Haamek Davar.)  According to Rashi, we need to know it was Shabbos to tell us this action is forbidden, however according to Rav Hai, Rambam, Rabbenu Channonel we know that carrying is forbidden, we are just looking for a source that its called a מלאכה. 

What is this debate between the Rishonim?  All the Rishonim at the beginning of Shabbos point out that הוצאה is a מלאכה גרועה however we learn out from רְא֗וּ כִּֽי־יְהֹוָה֘ נָתַ֣ן לָכֶ֣ם הַשַּׁבָּת֒ עַל־כֵּ֠ן ה֣וּא נֹתֵ֥ן לָכֶ֛ם בַּיּ֥וֹם  הַשִּׁשִּׁ֖י לֶ֣חֶם יוֹמָ֑יִם שְׁב֣וּ | אִ֣ישׁ תַּחְתָּ֗יו אַל־יֵ֥צֵא אִ֛ישׁ מִמְּקֹמ֖וֹ בַּיּ֥וֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִֽי that it is prohibited to carry on Shabbos (Eruvin 17b.)  What is the possuk teaching us, is it that it is a מלאכה גרועה but is prohibited anyway, or is the verse teaching us that it is now considered a מלאכה?  Rashi and Tosfos understand that it is a מלאכה גרועה and we need two pessukim, one to tell us that you can’t carry from a private domain to public, and one to tell you that you can’t carry from a public domain to public.  They understand it’s a novelty to say a change in domain is prohibited and I need a verse for both ways.  The other Rishonim understand that its not the change in domain that is the novelty, the act of carrying itself wouldn’t seem to be classified as a prohibited act on Shabbos, קמ"ל  that it is prohibited and therefore the second verse tells us that it’s a מלאכה.  (The Rambam understands it’s from a halacha because he uses the verse in Eruvin to tell us that techumim is prohibited [Laws of Shabbos Ch. 27:1 היוצא חוץ לתחום המדינה בשבת לוקה שנאמר אל יצא איש ממקומו ביום השביעי,] therefore he’s forced to say the prohibition itself is learnt from a halacha.)

There are many differences if its called a מלאכה or not.  See Pnei Yehoshua beginning of 5^th Ch. Of Shabbos if an animal may carry from one domain to another for the prohibition to have one’s animal work on Shabbos may only apply to מלאכות.  See also Pri Migadim in his intro. to the laws of Shabbos in regard to חצי שיעור, ואכמ"ל.  [Based upon Binyan Av volume 1 #12.]

Why is הוצאה prohibited if it isn’t a constructive act like the other prohibited acts of Shabbos?  The Rabbiner Rav Hirsch explains that by refrain from positive creation on Shabbos, man demonstrates that his powers are nothing compared to the ultimate Creator of the World, this is זכר למעשה בראשית.  The prohibition from carrying is a social restriction.  A community is dependent on the people giving to each other, on the transfer of goods to each other.  זכר ליציאת מצרים is to recognize that our nationhood, established through the Exodus is only complete when it recognizes the law of God within the community and nation as a totality.  That may be why Yermiyahu warns in Ch. 19 right before the golus about הוצאה in particular for by recognizing our subjectivity to God even in this state that will keep us united as one nation until the geulah.

Coming Together

The Gemorah in Megilah (13b) says Hashem knew that that Haman would give shekalim to Achashverosh, therefore he gave us a mitzvah of shekalim to counter the shekalim of Haman.  How do our shekalim overturn the shekalim of Haman?  And why do we need shekalim to overturn Haman’s decree?  Why is the name of Mordechai hinted to in the list of the ketores, mor dror-Mordechai (Chulin 139b?)  What is the connection between Mordechai and the ketores?  The Gemorah (16b) says that when Haman went to get Mordechai to lead him around the city in the royal garments, Haman found Mordechai teaching the laws of kemitza.  Rashi explains since it was the sixteenth of Nissan, the day of the offering of the omer, he was teaching how to do the kemitza of the korban omer.  Haman proclaimed that your kemitza is causing my downfall.  Why is it the merit of the kemitza that causes the downfall of Haman?

Achashverosh wasn’t so keen on killing out an entire nation from his kingdom.  Haman assuaged his concerns because klal yisroel is scattered among the nations and their absence won’t be noticed (13b).  This explanation of עם מפוזר ומפורד, wasn’t just to calm Achashverosh, it was why Haman thought he could be successful.  We are strong when united but fall when divided.  Haman noticed a lack of unity amongst us.  (See the Maharal on the verse (3:8) yeshnu am echad why the word yeshnu is used as opposed to yesh, to indicate separation, for the hey and nun don’t combine with any other number to complete a unite of ten or hundred.)  And that was why he sensed he could be successful in his attempt of annihilation. 

 The antidote to Haman was through the unification of klal yisroel.  The Alshich explains that we give a half shekel to recognize that you need someone else to complete you.  The shekalim show the achdus of klal yisroel and therefore they are able to counteract the actions of Haman.  The kemitza demonstrated achdus as well.  Rav Yosef Engel (Otzros Yosef 4,4) explains that a kmetiza is made up of two zeisim and is combined in the hand.  The combination of many parts symbolizes the unification of the many bodies of klal yisroel.  He adds that it was the kemitza of the omer, offered on Pesach, represented by Avraham, who taught יחוד השם to the world.  He suggests that’s why meshloach manos is two items united in the givers hand. 

The ketores had the power to include the chelbana.  The chelbana smells bad and represents the sinners that are included together with the rest of klal yisroel.  That’s why Mordechai is represented by the ketores for he was the leader to bring klal yisroel together to avert the evil decree of Haman.  The end of the Megillah reflects the unity achieved by klal yisroel, as the Gra points out kimmu ve’kiblu hayihudim is said in a singular terminology.  Klal yisroel become united and reaccepted the Torah together.

Less Spirituality Is More

At the end of the parsha we learn that that the face of Moshe shone after he descended from the mountain with the second luchos.  Why did his face shine only after the giving of the second luchos, not after the giving of the first luchos?
 The Shem M'Shmuel explains that was caused Moshe's face to shine was the fact that we was מוסר נפשו for klal yisroel, he said מחני נא, since he was willing to forgo all his spiritual achievements, that elevated his body as well.  The pure spirituality of the first luchos doesn't elevate the body, it is only because of the willingness to forgo great spirituality for the greater good that it is reflected and elevates the body.
The kabbalists explain that the second luchos were the luchos of baalei teshuva which are greater than the luchos of tzaddikim.  The first luchos was a great spiritual power, but it couldn't be contained and was broken.  It is the spirituality that a person is able to contain, that s/he prepares for, that has the power to elevate the body (see here.)

Thought On The Daf

The Gemorah in three places brings the teaching of Rabbe Meir that the techeles is similar to the sea, which looks like the sky, which is similar to sapphire, which is akin to the כסא הכבוד.  Rashi in Menachos 43b explains that when one sees his techeles, he will be reminded of Hashem.  However, Rashi in Chullin 89a (daf hayomi this upcoming Sunday,) explains that when Hashem “looks at” his כסא הכבוד, He will be reminded of the techeles which represents all the mitzvot.  I believe that Rashi switched his explanation for in Menachos the Gemora cites the memra in context of how the mitzvot protect a person from sinning and therefore Rashi explains the memra in a similar manner.  However, in Chullin, the Gemorah is citing it to explain why tiffilin and techales are the reward for Avrohom not taking anything from the king of Sedom.  The Gemorah says that tefillin we benefit because everyone sees the shem Hashem upon us and in regard to techeles it cites this memra.  Therefore, Rashi explains in a similar vein how we benefit from the mitzvah of techeles because hashem thinks of us.  My problem is that Rashi in Sotah17a (in the same context as Chullin,) explains the memra that when one fulfills titzit he is מקבל פני שכינה (that is why the techelas represents the כסא הכבוד.)  So why did he change his explanation from Sotah in Chullin?

Ketores

The Gemorah Zevachim 109b says that if one burns aכזית  of קטורת outside the mikdash it is a violation of העלאת חוץ.  Normally, one is only liable for a הקטרה that would be valid if done in the mikdash.  Tosfos proves from here that the amount of ketores that must be burnt in order to fulfill the mitzvah is an olive’s amount.  However, the Gemorah in Kerisos (6b) says that they would split aמנה  into half and burn half in the morning and half in the afternoon which is much larger than a כזית?  Tosfos says that the amount of a מנה  is a הלכה למשה מסיני, howeverבדיעבד  one fulfills the obligation by burning an olive’s amount.  [That would seem to be the explanation of the Tosfos if you don’t change the text as some Achronim do.]

However, Rashi in Zevachim says that the amount of taking a מנה and splitting it into two to burn it is only Rabbinic.  Asks the Mishne Lemelech (Timidim 3:2) if so, why is one obligated only for coping a מנה of קטורת, one should be obligated for a כזית?  The Briskor Rav (Menachos 49a) cites his brother, the גר"מ, that one fulfills the obligation of offering the ketores with an olive’s worth, but it is only defined as a korban, it only has a שם קרבן if it is a מנה. 

The Briskor Rav (Kli Mikdash) points out that the Rambam says the mitzvah of offering ketores is incumbent upon the kohanaim as opposed to korbanot which are an obligation on Klal Yisroel.  He explains that in regard to korbanot the mitzvah is the attonement achieved as by the nation as opposed to ketores the mitzvah is merely to do an act of burning, which is performed by the kohanim.  In line with this reasoning he cites Rav Chaim said there is no pesul is the ketores was burnt without having in mind for the sake of the tzibbur because the act of burning the ketores was done.  This is quite interesting for the Rachash Lavuv #47 cites from the Beis Halevi that if the ketores is offered not for the sake of the owner it is indeed posul.  Even though we don’t have a derasha to say it should be pasul, since one may not voluntarily offer a ketores offering, a korban not being offered for the owner defacto becomes a voluntary offering and in the case of ketores that makes it pasul.  It would seem to be a contradiction within the Brisker dynasty as to how we should view a ketores that was offered not for the sake of the owner.
See update on that here.

Of course, the approach of Rav Chaim and the Rav is classic Brisk and they explain the vos but not the farvus.  Now despite the fact that it may be apekorses to ask such a question but there are certain instances when I feel the farvus is quite glaring and apparent.  Why is ketores different than other communal offerings?!  Possibly we can explain based upon the Ramban at the end of last week’s parsha that explains that the ketores has a power of din, it can cause great harm, yet it can bring great reward as well.  One can offer a korban and achieve atonement, however the ketores has a power to change din into rachamim.  That power is not within a person’s reach.  All the person can do is to offer the maaseh hakravah and the transformation into rachamim will happen by itself as the offering climbs the heavenly spheres.

Wash Your Hands And Feet

Rashi (30:19) explains the kohanim must wash their hands and feet before doing avodah in the mikdash.  It seems if a kohan would enter the mikdash without doing avodah he wouldn’t have to wash himself.  That is the opinion of the Ramban (sefer hamitvot) and in his commentary to Vayikra 10:9.  This is the opinion of Tosfos in Sanhedrin 83a as well.   However, the Chinuch and Tosfos Yoma 5b hold the kohan is obligated to wash his hands and feet even if he doesn’t do avodah.  The Rash Kelim (1:9) brings both opinions.  Clearly, they are debating if the requirement to wash the hands and feet is a requirement for the avodah (either for the avodah or to make the kohan fit for the avodah – see Rav Leeb Malen volume 2 #11,) or it’s a requirement for the mikdash, one can’t enter the mikdash without being properly cleansed.

Be A Searcher

משֶׁה֩ יִקַּ֨ח אֶת־הָאֹ֜הֶל וְנָֽטָה־ל֣וֹ | מִח֣וּץ לַמַּֽחֲנֶ֗ה הַרְחֵק֙ מִן־הַמַּֽחֲנֶ֔ה וְקָ֥רָא ל֖וֹ אֹ֣הֶל מוֹעֵ֑ד וְהָיָה֙ כָּל־מְבַקֵּ֣שׁ ה' יֵצֵא֙ אֶל־אֹ֣הֶל מוֹעֵ֔ד אֲשֶׁ֖ר מִח֥וּץ לַמַּֽחֲנֶֽה.
 The Targum Yonason translates אהל מועד as a בית אולפנא, a place of learning.  The possuk is saying those that wanted to learn Torah, to hear the word of Hashem had to go outside the camp.  The possuk emphasis that it is those that are the 'מבקשי ה that went outside the camp.  It requires a desire to search for Torah that will allow a person to be successful in learning as is well known from the Alter of Nevardik.  Most Rishonim learn these pessukim are written out of place and it actually took place after the second luchos were given.  So why is it written here, after the agel?  The Torah is telling us the path of teshuva, the antidote to the agel is to be a mevakesh devar Hashem.  As we discussed earlier this week, the sin of the agel was a lacking in ahavas Hashem, there was a lack in the desire of Klal Yisroel to come close to Hashem, the tikkun is to take the extra steps to be a mevakesh Hashem.

Does A Mishkan Need A Washbasin

The Sforno asks why is the kiyor mentioned only in our parsha and not listed among the other objects of the mishkan in Teruma?  He explains that the point of the kiyor is merely to prepare the kohanim, not to serve as a vessel of avodah and therefore it isn’t part of the vessels of the mishkan.  However, the Rambam in Beas Habechira 1:6 when he lists off all the objects of the mishkan included in the mitzvah of making the mikdash and he includes the kiyor.  The Gemorah says that ben katin made a מוכני so that the water in the kiyor wouldn’t become disqualified overnight because of לינה.  Rashi (Zevachim 20a) explains that it was a wheel that lowered the kiyor into the ground and then the water became attached to the springs of the ground so there is no problem of לינה.  The Briskor Rav asks how can you move the kiyor underground, you are taking away one of the objects of the mikdash and that is a nullification of the mitzvah?  However, according to the Sforno it’s not difficult because it isn’t considered to be part of the building of the mikdash.  It would seem from the Rambam in perush hamishna Yoma (3:10) and Beis Habechira (3:18) that he disagrees with Rashi and holds the מוכני didn’t lower the kiyor into the ground, rather it was a vessel around the keyor that contained the water and put it into the ground so it would work out well according to the Rambam that the keyor remained in its place.  However, the Rambam in Beas Mikdash (5:14) says like Rashi (see Kesef Mishne.)

The Gemorah Avodah Zara (43a) says its forbidden to make a table that looks like the shulchan or a lamp like the menorah because there is an issur to make a copy of the kli mkdash.  Why doesn’t it say a washbasin can’t be made to look like the kiyor?  According to the Sferno it’s not difficult for its not considered part of the kli mikdash.  The Mikdash David (2:1) says that the issur is only on the Shulchan and menorah for the halacha dictates how they must be made, however there is no commandment how to make the details of the kiyor, hence there is no prohibition of making a copy of it.

The Rambam Bias Mikdash 5:10 rules that לכתחילה  the kohanim should wash their hands and feet from the kiyor.  The Ramban (our parsha) disagrees and proves from the kohan gadol on yom kippur that would be mekadesh from a golden jug that even לכחתילה any כלי שרת  may be used.  However, according to the Briskor Rav that explains the kiddush of the kohan gadol is a separate parsha and din from parshas Acharei Mos, distinct from the halacha of our parsha, the Rambam is very understandable.  It is only in our parsha, where the kiyor is mentioned that the Rambam requires it to be used לכחתילה, however the kiddush of the kohan gadol doesn’t require the kiyor at all.  [My friend S.K. told me that the Briskors use this Briskor Rav to answer this Rambam, see Maadanei Moshe #51 where Rav Moshe Brown asks many questions on this Briskor Rav and in #52 gives a different approach.]   

Even though the kiyor isn't even part of the mishkan according to the Sforno, we find it had an advantage that it was made out of the מראות הצובאות which Hashem says are the most precious to Him (see Rashi Vayakhal.)  The lesson is that it is that one's overcoming of the yetzer harah demonstrated by the מראות הצובאות is even more precious even than the korbanot themselves (based upon Likutay Sichos volume 6.)