Thought On The Study Of The Laws

The Gemorah in Pesachim 6 brings the source for the law to learn and ask (or ask, depending on the text) about the laws of a holiday 30 days beforehand from Moshe teaching the people about Pesach Sheni 30 days beforehand, on Pesach.  The Beis Yosef in siman 429 cites the view of some Rishonim that hold this law only applies to Pesach because of its many laws, not to other holidays.  This would seem to be the view of the Shlchan Aruch that cites this law regarding Pesach (see however Bach.)  How can this view be correct if the very source for the law is said regarding Pesach Sheni that doesn’t have all the many laws that Pesach does?

What Makes A Food

The Chinuch in mitzvah #160 explains the reason for the need for hechsher for foods to be suspectable to accept tumah because the food is only considered complete after liquid has been applied to it.  It is clear that he holds the hechsher gives the good the shem food.  This is the opinion of Rashi as well who says that it’s not called a food until water has fallen upon it.  This would seem to be supported by thew Gemorah in Chullin 118a that says fruits that haven’t had water put on them are like incomplete vessels.  Another support is from the Gemorah in Kiddushin 59 that compares the water on the fruits to the competion of vessels.  The Toras Kohanim has a ריבוי  to include that besides tumah from a שרץ, a food that has been huchshar can also be susceptible to tumah it is  in the airspace of an earthenware vessel.  Why do we need a ריבוי  if the point of hechsher is that it is considered a food, what difference does it make what the form of tumah is?  It would seem from here that it is a din in the tumah, the Torah gives a law in tumah that it takes effect only after the food has become wet.  This fits with the reason of the Ramban that tamei things will stick to a wet food (Bad Kodesh volume 4 #60 and on the possuk.)

The Rambam Tumas Ochlin (12:1) holds that the fruits become huchshar latumah only if the water fell on them and the owner wanted it to get wet.  The Kesef Mishne cites the Rashba holds it helps if the one that put the water on the fruits wanted it.  However, the Rambam holds that doesn’t suffice.  The Kesef Mishne explains that someone else can’t cause tumah to what isn’t there’s.  Rav Shmuel Rozovski (Shiurai Bavva Metzia siman 19) adds explanation based upon the previous sources that the point of hechsher is to complete the shem food.  If so, only the owner can complete the shem food just like only the owner can make his utensil complete to be susceptible to tumah.
See more about this here.

No Is Yes

האוה"ח הקדוש (ריש פ' אחרי) שהובא והוסבר בחסידות (עיין לקו"ש ח"ג פ' אחרי) מבאר שמיתת בני אהרן לא היה מפאת איזה חסרון ח"ו על אותן שנאמרו בקרבי אקדש אלא להיפך מחמת מעלתם הם מתו.  בגלל שהם רצו לקרב אצל ה' לכן הכניסו פנימה אפי' שלא בצויי מאת הקב"ה.  היו לנדב ואבהו כח גדול של 'רצוא,' השתוקוקות גדולה להגיע עד המדרגה הגדולה ביותר.  אבל באמת התשוקה הזאת שהיה להם גופא היה חרב פיפיות בידם.  בודאי יש בזה מדרגה גדולה אבל מצד השני זה גופא היה החטא שלהם.  חטא מלשון חסרון, הם חסרו יסוד גדול בעבודת ה'.  הקב"ה אי"צ למלאכים שאין להם גוף ועומדין תמיד בקדושה לעשות רצון בוראם, כבר יש לו הרבה מלאכים לשמשו.  מה שרוצה הוא שאדם, האדם בגופו, בדמו ובשרו, יעבוד את ה'.  בודאי יש זמנים של עלייה, יש ימים טובים, ימים קדושים שיש בהם עליית נשמה אבל אין התכלית שהנשמה יפרח מגוף האדם מחמת עלייתו אלא  שהעלייה יתן לו כח להמשיך בעבודתו גם בזמנים של 'שוב', כשאדם חוזר לארץ, כשיוצא מדביקותו, בזמניים הרגילים.  והתכלית הוא עבודת ה' בתוך הגוף, ליתן אור של תורה ומצות בתוך גופו ובשרו.  וזה היה החטא של נדב ואבהו, הם רצו כ"כ לקרב אצלו יתב' עד שיצאו נשנתם מגופם.  הם לא הכירו שיש צורך לשוב אחר הרצוא, שלא ישברו את הכלים של גופם.  מרוב דביקתם היה להם שבירת הכלים ולא יכלו גופם שוב להיות נרתיק לנשמותיהם.

ונראה בדרך דרוש שיסוד זה מרומז בהפסוק גופא.  (עיין לקו"ש ח"לב פ' אחרי עוד ביאור בזה.) כ' בפסוק (ט:י) שמתו על שהקריבו אש זרה "אשר לא צוה ה'."  אדמו"ר הזקן בלקו"ת פקודי דף ו עמ' ג ובתורה אור פ' שמות דף נב עמ' ג כ' של"ת הם במדרגה גדולה ממצות עשה.  לכן מ"ע אפשר לקיימו ע"י מעשה משום שהאור שבו מיתפס ע"י כלי אבל ל"ת האור גדול כ"כ שא"א להחזיק ע"י כלי של מעשה ולכן א"א לקיימו אלא בשלילה.  וזהו כונת הפסוק ירמיה ב:ב לכתך אחרי במדבר בארץ לא זרועה.  האור הגדול ביותר זרוע ונטמן דוקא ב'הלא', דוקא בהל"ת יש האור הגדול ביותר.  

ולפ"ז נראה שזהו ביאור הכת' שנדב ואבהו הקריבו אש אשר לא צוה, הם האחזו בדרגה של לא -  אשר לא צוה ה' - שאין זה רצון ה' שהאדם ישאר בדרגה גבוהה של לא -  שיצא מהגוף שלו מחמת רוב דביקות.   

Entering The Temple Drunk

Tosfos Kerisus 12b says the prohibition of a kohan after drinking only applies if he served avodah but to merely enter the mikdash there is no prohibition.  This is the opinion of the Ramban (on the possuk 8:9 and in his attacks on sefer hamitzvot lavin #73.)  (One should note that there is a rabbinic prohibition merely to enter the Mikdash.) The Rambam (ibid) and in Beas Mikdash 1:15 holds that there is a prohibition even to merely enter after drinking.  The Rambam holds the entering to the עזרה alone is prohibited for a kohan that grew his hair long or had his clothes ripped as well. In Sefer Hamitzvot #73, #163 and #164 the issurim of a kohan drinking wine and serving, growing long hair and ripping their clothes, he says the prohibition is to enter the Mikdash that way.  However, the prohibitions for a zar to serve or a kohan when he is tamah #74-76 he says the prohibition is to serve in the Mikdash. 

The Achronim (Bad Kodash, Mases Moshe Pesachim) point out that we see that the Rambam holds that even though the חיוב מיתה is only for serving in the Mikdash, it is entering the Mikdash with a תנאי  of doing avodah that causes the מיתה, not the avodah itself.  

The debate between the Rambam and Ramban is if what it says in the Mishnaos in kelim about the numerous maalos that exist in parts of the har habais if it’s a Torah law or a rabbinic law (see Yoma 44b.)

Briskors And Red Cows

The Rambam (Laws of Parah Adumah 1:9) says that if the cow was slaughtered with intent to be used for mundane purposes it shall be redeemed and doesn’t affect kaparah.  Why must it be redeemed, why is it different from any korban if slaughtered with intent for chullin that its kosher even if it doesn’t affect kaparah?  The Briskor Rav (Maaseh Korbanot 4:11) brings his father explained that we see from here that the parah adumah only assumes the status of a korban after it is slaughtered as a parah adumah, before that it is merely bedek habais.  [The Gemorah in Yoma 42a, Shavout 11b and another half dozen places says its bedek habais.]  The reason why the parah is invalidated as a korban isn’t because of a pasul of שלא לשמה, rather it never assumed the status of a korban and is redeemed as kodshai bedek habais. 

The Raavad Parah Adumah (1:1) says that one can’t designate a calf for the parah adumah because it is a pesul of מחוסר זמן for the cow must be at least three years old.  From here Rav Chayim (stencil) proves that there is the kedusha of a korban once the animal is designated as the parah adumah.  He brings another support to this from the Rambam Laws of Meilah (2:5) that says there is mielah in the parah once it is designated for the parah.  However, this Rab Chayim seems to contradict the previous one that says the parah isn’t considered a korban until it is slaughtered?

It is also noteworthy that the Toras Hakodesh (26:3) brings the Rash in Parah (4:4) explains that the mielah on a parah begins only after the slaughtering and he explains it based upon the first Rav Chayim that it only is considered a korban after the slaughtering and that is when the mielah will start because the sifri learns the law of mielah from that it’s called a chatas; hence it is dependent upon the shem korban.  (If the parah is bedek habais why does the sifri need a derasha that there is mielah on the parah, every bedek habyis has mielah?  See Tosfos Menachos 51b, Kesef Mishne ibid, see Sfas Emes there that will work with this Rosh,  ודו"ק.)  This Rosh is not like the Rambam that says the mielah starts from the time of the hekdesh.  So, it would seem that the Rambam holds that it is a korban already from the time that it is hukdash not like the Rav Chayim cited in Briskor Rav.  

However, Rav Chayim on the Rambam has a different interpretation of that Rambam that the mielah on the parah stems from the din of bedek habayis and the derasha of it being a chatas tells us that mielah no longer applies after it is burnt (עיי"ש.)  [However, the Rav Chayim (stencil) no longer has a proof from here that it is considered a korban from the time it is designated as a parah adumah according to what Rav Chayim on the Rambam writes.]

Rav Hirsch On Shemini

Few points from the Rabbiner.
1. The commandment of the kosher and non-kosher animals is communicated to Klal Yisroel via Moshe and Aharon.  Why is Aharon involved in communicating this commandment more than most others?  Rav Hirsch explains that this commandment is beginning of the next stage of the formation of Klal Yisroel.  After the building of the mikdash, we are instructed that the point isn’t a physical construction, it is to bring kedusha into the individual.  Moshe is the one charged with transmitting the law to the people and Aharon is the one entrusted with task of being the educator, the one to teach how to carry out the laws.  It is specifically this additional layer of the nation that requires the direction of Aharon to make sure it takes root carefully.

2. Rav Hirsch views the laws of tumah to be physiological.  At the end of his commentary on this week’s parsha, he goes through a detailed explanation about how the rules of tumah reflect a person’s feelings when encountered with something that is tamai.  Of course, this is not like the kabbalists that view tumah as an actual status that affects the object.  This would seem to be supported by the Gemorah in Menachos 24 that discusses if we say שבעא לה טומאה and a tamah object doesn’t accept further tumah.  If tumah is merely psychological why should it not become tameh a second time?

Siman Or Sibah

There is a chakirah if the simonim of a non-kosher animal are as the word simonim-sign applies, an indicator that the animal is tamah or the signs actually cause the tumah (see Likutay Sichos volume 1 in name of the Rogatchover.)   The Gemorah in Chullin 42b says that Moshe was shown all the of the animals and told if they were muttur or assur.  Why was this necessary?  The Maharal explains because the simonim just indicate the tumah, Moshe was revealed the cause of the tumah as well. He assumes the simonim are merely indicators, not causes.  

On the other hand, the Gemorah in Niddah 51b says that the Torah wrote fins and scales, even though all that have scales have fins, “lehagdil Torah veyadir.”  The Ritvah understands this to mean that the Torah was identifying the causes of the tumah which are the simonim.  In other words, the Ritvah understands that the simanim are a aebah, the cause of the tumah.  The midrash and Ramban ask if the Torah tells us animals with one siman are tamah, for sure animals without any simanim are tameh, why did the Torah did to say they are tameh?  If simanim are merely an indicator then there is no kal v'chomer because more indicators doesn't actually affect the din.  Since they assume it is a kal v'chomer it would seem that they hold as well that the simanim are indeed a sebah, the cause of the tumah.  However, possibly the answer of the Ramban is to be understood to be making this point that the simanim are merely simanim (see it inside.)

The Rambam counts a mitzvah to know the simanim of grasshoppers, birds, fish and animals as separate positive commandments (#149-152.)  (The Kesef Mishne (beginning of Maacalos Asuros,) Bach beginning of siman 79 and others debate if it’s a commandment just to know the simanim or its just if one wants to eat then they must verify that its kosher.)  If the mitzvah is merely to know the simanim of the animals, why is there a separate mitzvah for each animal, it should be just one mitzvah to check simanim?  It would seem from here that the Rambam holds that the simanim are a sibah, it causes the issur and therefore one must identify each cause.  This would be strengthened by the Rambam Maacalos Assuris 2:1 which cites the same derasha as Rashi does on 11:8 that if there is a lav to eat the animals that have one siman it is a kal v’chomer that animals without any simanim are prohibited by a lav.  If they are merely simanim then there is no kal v’chomer for an animal with one siman isn’t closer to being permitted more than one without any simanim.  We see from here again that he holds the simanim are causing the tumah and it is a valid kal v’chomer for the animal with one siman has part of the cause of taharah and still is prohibited, for sure that which has no cause of taharah is prohibited.

Non-Priestly Blessing

Rashi explains (9:22) that the beracha Aharon said was birchat kohanim.  The Ramban asks that it doesn’t sat the commandment of birchas kohanim until Parshas Nasso?  The Rebbe (Likutay Sichos volume 22) explains that Rashi doesn’t mean that Aharon was fulfilling the commandment of birchat kohanim rather it was the text that Aharon chose to say his beracha.  Aharon used this text as a means of expressing a request for forgiveness for the agel. 

Based upon that explanation it is not problematic what the achronim ask why did only Aharon do birchat kohanim and not his sons, they also have the mitzvah?  Based upon this, the mitzvah wasn’t given yet, this was just Aharon’s personal blessing.

Dunking Hands

The Toras Kohanim derives that a mikvah causes taharah only if it has 40 seah but a natural spring, a מעין  doesn’t require 40 seah and it causes taharah even with a כל שהוא.  However that halacha of a מעין  isn’t applicable for a human being because the whole body has to be covered.  the Gemorah (Chagigah 11a) says that 40 seah is required for a mikvah because that is the amount of water necessary to completely cover a person’s body.  That is measuring with the average person and therefore by a mayen we may measure with the specific person dunking.  However, the Rosh and R”i hold even in regard to a mayen 40 seah are required (see Tur Yoreh Deah beginning of siman 201 cites all the opinions.) 

Rav Shimon Shkop (Sharei Yosher 3:19) says that the 40 seah requirement for a mikvah isn’t an amount of water necessary o be contained in the mikveh to cause taharah, it’s necessary for the shem mikvah as opposed to the 40 seah requirement for a mayen is just an amount of water needed to cover the person dunking. 

The Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 159:14 brings two opinions if for netilas yadayim one needs to dunk his hands in a mikvah of 40 seah or its enough if it has enough water to cover his hands.  However, by a mayan everyone agrees 40 seah isn’t required.  If 40 sea is only necessary because that’s the amount of water needed to cover a person’s body, when it comes to washing only one’s hands, 40 seah shouldn’t be required.  So why is there an opinion that 40 seah is required?  Furthermore, what’s the difference between the mayan and mikvah? 

It would seem they hold that 40 sea is required for the shem mikvah and therefore require 40 seah even for cleaning just one’s hands.  However, in a mayan there is a chalos of causing taharah even with less than 40 seah.  The 40 seah requirement is just to cover the person's body but for hands 40 seah wouldn't be required as Rav Shimon explained (Yalkut Yosef.)  However, this explanation is difficult for it assumes that there is an opinion that there can’t be a mikvah with less than 40 seah but we see that to dunk utensils that are small it is enough with a רביעית (see Pesachim 17b and Rashi there;) seemingly one can have a mikvah with less than 40 seah?  However, the Gemorah comes out (Nazir 38b) that the Rabbis always required 40 seah for a mikvah so it can be that same enactment applies to washing hands.  If so, why is there an opinion that 40 seah isn’t requires for washing hands, what happened to the Rabbinic decree?

Tumah Of The Heart

The Gemorah (Yoma 39a) has a derasha on the possuk (11:43) venetmasem bam—you shall become tamah because of them, that it should be read as venetamtem-it shall block up.  Things which are forbidden to eat will block a person’s heart and separate him from Hashem.  Why is it that forbidden foods contaminate the heart of a person?  The Gemorah could be understood in two ways, either it’s the issur of the Torah that causes the contamination or possibly there is something in the physical makeup of the forbidden foods which causes the contamination.  The Maharal in Teferes Yisroel chapter 6 understands that it’s the issur which causes the contamination.  This would seem to be the opinion of the Raf in the Ain Yaakov who explains as well that the issur causes the contamination.  On the other hand, the Ramban explains the reason why certain foods aren’t allowed to be eaten is because these animals have cruel traits and these traits become part of a person when he eats those animals.  This approach is followed le’halacha by the Chosom Sofer in Responsa 83 that doesn’t allow even a shotah to eat forbidden foods for it will contaminate their heart.  The shotah is exempt from the issur, yet the Chosom Sofer assumes his/her heart will still be contaminated.  The Tanyah assumes this position as well in chapter 6.  The crux of the debate seems to be dependent on what the Maharal discusses in the previous chapter in Teferes Yisroel if the Torah forbade things because they are evil inherently or they become evil because the Torah forbids it.  The Maharal holds like the second way therefore, he explains that it’s the issur which causes the contamination.  However, the Ramban follows his own approach (quoted in Maharal,) that things that the Torah forbade are inherently evil.

How To Be a Cannibal

The Ramban (11:3) cites the Rambam that the words אותה תאכלו comes to exclude human flesh is prohibited because of an aseh.  The Ramban disagrees since the Gemorah (Ketubos 60b and Kiresos 21b) excludes blood and milk from any issur and the rule is what comes from something that’s tamah is tamah so it must be that the flesh of humans isn’t prohibited.  The Ramban echoes his words in Ketubos 60b.  The Ramban does mention that after death the dead person is assur be’hanah and therefore it will be prohibited.  The Rosh in Ketubos and the Rashba in responsa 364 maintain that human flesh is only rabbinically prohibited (the Meiri and Avnei Nazer Even Ha’ezer 332 indicate the Rambam will also agree to the rabbinic prohibition.)

 In response to the question of the Ramban, the Maggid Mishnah (Maacolos Assuros 2:3) says that according to the Ramban the possuk tells us that the blood and milk are muttar despite the fact that the flesh is assur.  As to why this is understood as an exemption to the rule and doesn’t disproof the rule, the Maggid explains that the rule of something coming from an issur is assur doesn’t apply to an issur aseh (see Shach 79:4 and Pri Migadim ad loc.)  Why should this be true, what’s the difference?  I would suggest that an issur aseh is merely an issur gavreh and doesn’t define the object as a davar tameh.  The Maggid in fact finds it difficult according to the other Rishonim why do you need a possuk to permit the blood and milk.  Rav Chaim on Shas explains the there are two issurim included in coming from something tamah.  1. It’s a siman that what comes from the davar tamah is also assur.  2. It creates a separate issur on what comes from the davar tamah.  The possuk excludes that it doesn’t become its own issur however the Rishinim are assuming that it still should be assur because it came from something tamah.  He explains the Rambam holds both are excluded (he explains it depends on 2 peshatim in Rashi Kiresos.)

The Re’ah is of the opinion that there is an issur lav on human flesh.  He holds that blood should have been included in the issur of basar, however the verse permits it (see Rivash response 373 and the Kehilas Yaakov Zevachim siman 20 for a discussion if blood is considered flesh, the Re’ah holds it is.)      

The Ritvah in Ketubos says that anyway human flesh would be prohibited to eat because of aver min hachai.  The Rashbash responsa 518 maintains this way as well.  The Ran and Rashba (ibid) refute that if it was permitted there would be no obligation of shechitah and hence no aver min hachai (see siman 13 in Bais Yosef and Remah no aver min hachai on fish that don’t require shechitah.)  See also Or Sameach Maacolos Assuros (2:3.)  They seem to be debating if it doesn’t say the din of shechitah do we assume it exists automatically or not.

7 = 8

The parsha starts by saying the preparation of Aharon and his sons was done on the eighth day.  The Kli Yakar is bothered why is it called the eighth day indicating it continues after a previous seven.  The first seven days were the days of preparing the Mishkan for the service in it and the eighth day was to prepare the Kohanim, a seemingly separate idea?  He explains that seven is the completion of tevah and the eighth day always represents that which is above tevah, kedusha.  The Shechinah coming to rest in the MIshkan was an above teva experience, hence the Torah says it happened on the eighth day because it was eight, kedusha that represented the event that was happening.  However, this explanation seems difficult, for the number eight indicates it is a continuation of seven, however according to the Kli Yakar eight is completely separate from seven? 

The Rebbe (Likutay Sichos volume 3) explains that only after the completion of our service of Hashem in its entirety, represented by seven do we become ready to accept eight.  It is only after man has completed his service to its nth degree that a person becomes ready to accept the kedusha of eight.  It was only because of the avodah done on the first seven days that the Shechinah can come to the Mikdash on the eighth day.   The Nesivos Shalom says that in Shabbos itself, besides being the completion of tevah, there is also an aspect of eight to it.  Through completing our avodah of seven, we are able to reach to the level of eight in Shabbos as well.

The same idea is found in sefiras ha’omer.  The Torah says תספרו יום  but we count only to 49.  We do our max effort which is to reach the 49 gates of wisdom.  Once we have completed our avodah to its fullest extent, then we are given the שער נ' as a free gift from Hashem.

Terumas Lachmei Todah

The Gemorah in Menachos (76b) has a doubt if a person eats the terumas lachmai todah  - the loaves of the todah that must be given to the kohan if there is an obligation of death/ reimbursement of an additional fifth  for eating them like by teruma or not.  The Gemorah is unsure if it has the status of terumas maser that is hukash too or it is excluded because of a miut. 

The Rambam (Maaseh Korbanot 9:13) seems to understand the question is a general one if the terumas lachmai todah has the status of teruma or not.  It should follow that according to the Rambam the same doubt of the Gemorah would apply to all the laws of teruma (see Briskor Rav.)

The Minchas Chinuch #284:8 understands that the Gemorah is asking a specific question because of the miut but it does have the status of teruma and therefore before separating the terumah loaves there is a prohibition of tevel to eat from the loaves.  This view is stated explicitly in the mefaresh in Nedarin 12b.  (It also seems to come out that way from the Rash there, עיי"ש.)

The Minchas Chinuch #283:25 points out the Gemorah doesn’t question if a kohanes that married a yisroel and her husband dies if she regains her right to eat terumas lachmai todah like terumah or not.  Why didn’t the Gemorah raise that inquiry?  He explains that the Gemorah understood that for sure she doesn’t regain her rights to eat them.  The Gemorah in Yevomas 87a says that the prohibition of Vakira 22:12 היא בתרומת הקדשים לא תאכל  applies to a kohanes that married out that she no longer regains her rights to eat the chazeh and shok from kodshim.  Says the Minchas Chinuch, the terumas lachmei todah are included in תרומת הקדשים and therefore she doesn’t get to eat them.  It comes out that there are two issurim prohibiting the eating of the terumas lachmei todah, one because of its status as terumah and other because it is תרומת הקדשים.  The last piece in the Brisker Rav on Zevachim cites Reb Chim brought a Yerushalmi Yevomos (very end of Ch. 9) that says like the Minchas Chinuch.  See more about this in Chidushai Hagra"m pg. 93-95. 

The Gemorah in Zevachim 36a says there is a prohibition to eat the loaves of the todah before the terumah was taken off.  According to the Minchas Chinuch it would be the issur tevel but according to the Rambam that there is at least a question if we view the terumas lachmei todah as terumah what would be the issur? According to the other Minchas Chinuch it would seem he would have to learn there is some independent issur of תרומת הקדשים לא תאכל.

Eating Kodshim

The Rambam positive commandment #68 and the Chinuch #134 count a mitzvah to eat the minachos based upon the verse 6:9 וְהַנּוֹתֶ֣רֶת מִמֶּ֔נָּה יֹֽאכְל֖וּ אַֽהֲרֹ֣ן וּבָנָ֑יו מַצּ֤וֹת תֵּֽאָכֵל֙ בְּמָק֣וֹם קָדֹ֔שׁ בַּֽחֲצַ֥ר אֹֽהֶל־מוֹעֵ֖ד יֹֽאכְלֽוּהָ.  The Rambam positive commandment #89 and Chinuch #102 count a mitzvah to eat korbanot based upon the verse in Tetzaveh וְאָֽכְל֤וּ אֹתָם֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר כֻּפַּ֣ר בָּהֶ֔ם לְמַלֵּ֥א אֶת־יָדָ֖ם לְקַדֵּ֣שׁ אֹתָ֑ם וְזָ֥ר לֹֽא־יֹאכַ֖ל כִּי־קֹ֥דֶשׁ הֵֽם.  The Minchas Chinuch asks why do they count it as two separate mitzvot if it seems to be the same idea, to eat the parts of the offering that are permitted to people?  In fact, that indeed it is the opinion of the Rasag in mitzvah 122 (see Rav Perlow) that these two commandments are in in fact one mitzvah.  Reb Leeb Malin (volume 2 #43) explains that the mitzvah of eating korbanot is that the כפרה is only completed via the eating of the offering (as the verse says אֲשֶׁ֣ר כֻּפַּ֣ר בָּהֶ֔ם, see Pesachim 59.)  Therefore, menachos that are merely a voluntary offering the eating can’t be part of the atonement, rather it is a separate, independent commandment to eat the mincha.  Based upon this we can understand why the Ramban holds that the eating of korbanot isn’t a mitzvah for it is considered part of the procedure of the korban but agrees that the eating of a mincha is a mitzvah (see Minchas Chinuch that questions this.)  That is because the eating of a korban is part of the kappareh of the korban, it is part of the process of the korban, but the eating of the mincha is indeed an independent din.

The Torah says the mincha of a kohan must be burnt.  Why does is there a mitzvah to eat the mincha of everyone else but a commandment to burn the mincha of a kohan?  Rav Hirsch explains that the eating of the mincha is to represent that even the material side of a person’s existence of a person should be infused with holiness.  The Kohan’s mincha is completely burnt for he is supposed to be completely dedicated to Hashem, he isn’t supposed to have any life ventures separate from his service of God, hence his mincha is completely sacrificed to God.

Minchas Chavitin

A few points on the minchas chavitin.

1. The Kohan Gadol brings a minchas chavitin every day half is offered in the morning and half in the evening.  It was an עשירית האפה of flour baked into 12 loaves.  The Rambam and Raavad disagree if 12 loaves were made and then split into two, half offered in the morning and half in the evening (Rambam) or if 6 were offered in the morning and 6 in the evening (Raavad.)   The Gemorah in Menachos 51b has a derasha from ומחיצתה בערב that if the Kohan Gadol dies in the middle of the day that the new Kohan Gadol doesn’t bring in the evening the completion of the first one’s korban, rather he has to bring his own for the afternoon (and offers half of it, so half of his חביתין and half of the first one’s go to waste.)  The Mikdash Dovid asks why do we need a verse that the second one can’t offer the first one’s korban, one can’t use someone else’s korban for his obligation?  He proves from here that חביתין isn’t a personal obligation on the Kohan Gadol, its an obligation of the day that חביתין must be offered by the Kohan Gadol.

2. The Mishna brings a machlokes between Rebbe Shimon and Rebbe Yehuda if no one else was appointed that day who brings the second half of the korban, if it’s the heirs or the community.  The Rebbe (Likutay Sichos volume 22) explains the debate hinges on if we view the chavitin as a korban tzibbur because the Kohan Gadol prays for the tzibbur (see Chinuch’s reason for the mitzvah,) or we view it as the obligation of the Kohan Gadol.  [See Ritvah and Tosfos Rosh Yoma 50b.]

3. The Rambam Temiddim 3:18 says the chavitin were to be offered every day together with the tammid.  The Briskor Rav points out that we see from the Rambam that he’s not just telling us the timing of the offering (for by other things done after the tammid, he doesn’t mention there is a connection to the tammid,) rather the chavitin are part of the completion of the tammid.  He supports this from the Torat Kohanim that requires a derasha to prove that it can be offered even after the tammid.  Why do we need a derasha?  Because its part of the tammid I would’ve thought that it can’t be offered after the tammid.  See also Rashi Yoma (34a) ד"ה שום מנחה

Seder Of The Temmidim

The Ramban in mitzvas aseh that the Rambam forgot #11 includes a commandment to offer all sacrifices between the two temmidim offered every day which the Gemorah derives from our parsha, 6:5 וְהָאֵ֨שׁ עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּ֤חַ תּֽוּקַד־בּוֹ֙ לֹ֣א תִכְבֶּ֔ה וּבִעֵ֨ר עָלֶ֧יהָ הַכֹּהֵ֛ן עֵצִ֖ים בַּבֹּ֣קֶר בַּבֹּ֑קֶר וְעָרַ֤ךְ עָלֶ֨יהָ֙ הָֽעֹלָ֔ה וְהִקְטִ֥יר עָלֶ֖יהָ חֶלְבֵ֥י הַשְּׁלָמִֽים.  העולה tells us that the tammd in the morning is first and עליה השלמים tells us עליה השלם, the tammid of the afternoon must be last (see Pesachim 58b.)  It comes out to be an aseh derived from a lav to offer all korbanot between the temmidim.  

Rav Perlow in his magnum opus, his commentary on the Smag lav 264 says the Rambam doesn’t count it as a separate mitzvah because it is a detail in the mitzvah of the tamid and the Rambam in shoresh 12 explains that details of a law aren’t counted as separate mitzvot. 

We see that there is an argument between these Rishonim if the din is law in the tammid, it must be the start and end of the day or if it is a law in korbanot that they must be sandwiched between temmidim.   See Briskor Rav Menachos 49a if there is an issur of offering korbanot before/after the tammid if there is no tammid (see also Or Hachaim at the beginning of our parsha,) the issue should hinge on this point.  It is noteworthy that the Megillas Ester gives a different explanation for the omission of the Rambam and that is that he doesn’t count an issur aseh as a mitzvah.   

 

Tosfos in Pesachim equates the law that nothing can precede the tammid of the morning to the law of תדיר קודם.  According to Tosfos the two dinim of nothing before the morning tammid and nothing after the afternoon tammid are distinct.  The afternoon tammid limits the time that a korban can be offered but the morning tammid takes precedence before other korbanot, but it doesn’t come to limit the time one can offer a korban. However, the simple reading of the Ramban (ibid) is that they are the same law.  Tosfos in Yoma 29b and Menachos 49b that understands that the law of the tammid having to take precedence applies to disqualify a korban offered a night because it preceded the tammid of the morning.  At night there is no commandment yet to offer the tammid, yet Tosfos assumes there is a law that the tammid must be offered first, we see he holds its not just a law of precedence, it’s a law limiting the time frame of korbanot.  

There is a debate in the Rishonim if a korban offered before the morning tammid becomes disqualified (see Tosfos Pesachim, Tosfos Horious 4a, Ritvah Yoma 29a, Raavad Tammid 29a etc.)  One might think this should hinge upon the issue we started with.  If it’s a din in the tammid, then its not something wrong with the korban offered and it should still be valid.  However, if it’s a law in the korban, then it will deem the korban invalid.  However, this explanation doesn’t hold water for the Raavad holds the korban becomes disqualified even though he holds that it’s a din in the tammid for he says if there is no tammid, then one offers other korbanot at any time.  So, what could be the explanation of his opinion?

 Rav Ezrachi (Pesachim #25) explains the yesod of the din (he answers many questions with this principle,) is a law of seder in the daily korbanot.  The Torah is giving an order in which the korbanot must be offered.  Based upon this, I believe we can understand the Raavad.  What’s wrong with the korbanot is that they didn’t follow the prescribed order and that disqualifies them. 

Rashi on the verse, 6:5 and even clearer in Pesachim 58b and 59a (and Yoma 33b) is clear that the law of the morning tammid coming first is a law in the fire of the mizbaoch, that the tammid should be the first offering burnt on the fire.  This fits very well with the context of the possuk that puts this law of השלמה within the commandment to have a fire on the mizbaoch.   Based upon this we have an answer to the question of Tosfos as to why this isn’t the regular law of תדיר קודם.  The Mefaresh on Tammid (39a) says that even korbanot that were burning overnight can’t be burnt in the day before the tammid.  The Rosh disagrees for the tammid must only come before the korbanot of the day.  The Mefaresh however holds like Rashi that its in a din in the fire of the mizbaoch that the first offering burnt on it must be the tammid.  This law wouldn’t be included in the regular rule of תדיר קודם because their mitzvah has already been started (Minchas Avraham Yoma.)   

What we see from here is that the Torah emphasizes the very important, basic principle in Judaism (as discussed by Rav Yeruchem in intro. to Daas Torah,) of seder.  The Torah prescribes an order for the Temple service because such a holy place must run on a daily schedule. 

The Rambam Kli Mikdash 10:1 gives the order in which a kohan must don his garments based upon the pessukim in our parsha.  This makes sense only in because the Rambam holds there is an independent mitzvah to wear the garments; its not just a preparation for the avodah as discussed here.  The Briskor Rav (Kuntres Yoma) points out that the Rambam learns from the order Aharon and his sons put on the garments the order in which it must be done.  He questions how we can learn from here if a may just be a הוראת שעה for that time.  Either way we see again that the order in which things were done plays a vital role in the fulfillment of the mitzvah in its optimal form.  

Cleaning Out Holy Vessels

Rashi (6:21) explains that the obligation to break a earthenware vessel that absorbed the taste of kodshim doesn’t only apply to the scenario of the verse, a chatas, but applies to all kodshim.  This is the opinion of the Raavad as well in Maaseh Korbanot (8:14.)  Therefore, Rashi understands the Mishna in Zevachim  (11:4) that says there is a stringency of chatos over other offerings refers to the law of washing out a blood stain.  The Rambam disagrees and holds the law of breaking an earthenware vessel applies only to a chatas but by other kodshim it suffices to wash out the vessel.  However, this is very difficult for it is the same verse that tells us the law that a copper vessel that absorbed the taste of kodshim must be washed out as the law of breaking an earthenware vessel.  So how could the Rambam rule that the law of washing the copper vessel applies to all kodshim (as the Gemorah 96b says,) but the law of breaking an earthenware vessel only applies to a chatas?  How can the possuk be split that way? 

The simple understanding of the requirement to wash out the vessel is to remove the taste absorbed in the vessel, to כשר  it (see Gemorah (97a.)  However, we also find the Gemorah (94b) derives that washing must be done in a מקום קדוש (Rashi (93b) explains that means the עזרה, in regard to לשכות built in חול ופתוחות לקודש see Chizkuni (6:20) and Meshech Chachma.)  If it is a mere act of koshering the vessel, why must it be done in a holy place?  We see that it is just a mere act of koshering but there is an aspect of a mitzvah to it as well.  [The two aspects are derived from the obligation to wash it in a the עזרה but yet one must wait until the taste becomes נותר.]  The Rambam understands that it is the aspect of mitzva that is said only in regard to the chatas (see law 11 and 14 ibid that only in regard to the chatas must the washing be done in the עזרה.)  The breaking of the earthenware vessel doesn’t remove the issur on it as we see there was a miracle that it sank into the ground (Yoma 21a.)  That means the possuk only requires the breaking because of the aspect of mitzvah and that is only required by chatas.  Hence, the verse is consistent according to the Rambam, it is telling us the obligation of the mitavah to remove absorptions of taste and that only applies to the chatas (Rav Dovid Solevetchik in the name of Rav Chaim.)

The problem is that the Gemorah in Pesachim 30b derives from the obligation to break the vessel that a earthenware vessel has no possibility of הכשר.  According to the Rambam there are two problems. 1. We see that there is הכשר  because washing out works for taste absorptions that aren’t from a chatas?  2. How can learn from here if it merely a mitzvah?  Rav Chaim explained that the Rambam understands that there is washing out works to remove most of the absorptions in the earthenware vessel to the degree that it will not give any significant taste.  However, it doesn’t extract it entirely.  Therefore, it is the Torah gives a mitzvah by the absorption from a chatas that even that slight amount forbids the vessel from usage and it must be broken.  [This idea is in Ramban Pesachim 30b, Shaar Hamelech laws of Chametz 5:25.]  However, by other kodshim it suffices to wash it out.  How can the Gemorah derive that even in regard to chullin there is no way of koshering the vessel?  The Gemorah only says it in regard to יין נסך וחמץ בפסח where there is no bittul and even a miniscule taste left will cause an issur.

Rashi (95b) understands that the washing out of the vessel functions as a means of הגעלה.  The Meiri in Pesachim 30b brings such a view as well.  The Ridvaz points out that the Rambam disagrees and holds it is just an obligation to wash out the vessel, not to do an act of הכשר.  Why doesn’t the Rambam require hagalah?  The Riddav explains that it is נותן טעם לפגם and therefore there isn’t any reason that there should be a requirement to kasher the vessel.  So why does the Rambam require spits, grills and other objects used on the fire to get hagalah?  He explains since it is used on the fire it has a greater absorption and requires hagalah.  It comes out according to the Rambam that the washing out isn’t a normal act of hecsher but is a special law over here by kodshim (see Briskor Rav and Netziv on Shieltos 137.)  Based upon this we understand that why the Rambam holds even if one washes out the vessel before its נותר rather once the time one has to eat the korban has ended there also is a requirement to wash out the vessel.  Why it isn’t נותר  yet, there is no issur yet?  Because according to the Rambam the din isn’t to remove the נותר, it’s an independent law the Torah prescribes.

Other Rishonim hold that there must be an act of hagala to kasher the vessel and are bothered why is it a problem, it should be נותן טעם לפגם before it becomes נותר so why must it be koshered?  See Rosh Avodah Zarah Ch. 5 #36, Ran (76a), Mizrachi etc.  It is noteworthy that the Chavvas Daas (93:2) proves that the koshering isn’t to avoid the vessel being forbidden for one must wash it out even if its not used for cooking, rather the Torah wants the נותר  itself to be removed

Purim And Todah

מצינו קשר בין פרשת השבוע והיו"ט שחל בשבוע זו דהיינו פורים.  חז"ל (ירושלמי תענית ב:ב) אומרים כל המועדים עתידין ליבטל חוץ מפורים.  ויש עוד מאמר חז"ל (ויק"ר ט:ז) כל קרבנות עתידין ליבטל חוץ מקרבן תודה.  וצריך להבין מה מיוחד ביו"ט של פורים והקרבן תודה שלא יבטלו?  ועוד יש למצוא את הצד השוה בין ב' דברים אלו שיוצאין מכלליהם ולא יבטלו.  מה הקשר בין התמיד ופורים? 

בכל המגילה כלל ישראל נקראין בשם יהודים וזה מעניין שלא מצינו בתנ"ך שקוראין לכל ישראל יהודים.  וצריך להבין למה התשמש המגילה בשם זה דוקא?  וחז"ל כבר מעוררין למה מרדכי נקרא בשם יהודי והאם באמת היה יהודי או לאו (עיין מגילה דף יב) ועדיין צריך להבין למה מגדיש המגילה שהוא יהודי? 

אדמו"ר הזקן בתורה אור ריש פרשת ויחי מסביר שהשם יהודה שורשו מלשון הודאה.  "בחי' יהודה שהוא בחי' הודאה הוא בחי' ביטול והתכללות באא"ס ב"ה ממש הסוכ"ע."  ועפי"ז כ' בתורה אור על המגילה דף צט. שבנ"י נקראין במגילה יהודים על שם הביטול שלהם.  וצריך להבין כונתו ולמה מבטא ענין זה של ביטול לאא"ס דוקא בפורים?

כתוב במגילה שהיו"ט נקרא פורים על שם הפור.  וצ"ב למה מרדכי וכל החכמים בחרו דוקא בשם זה שלכ' מורה רק על פרט צדדי בכל הסיפור ועוד שהפור נעשה ע"י המן ולא ע"י ישראל ולמה מזכירין מעשיו?  בחסידות מוסבר (ראה הוספות לתו"א עמ' קכא. ומאמרו של הרבי תשי"ג ד"ה על כן קראו ועוד מקומות) שגורל מורה על דבר שא"א לבחור ע"י שכל משום שב' הצצדים נראין שוין וא"א לבא לידי מסקנה מה יצדק ומשום כך מטיל גורל וכל מה שיצא ע"י הגורל הוא יעשה.    

 הנס הגדול של פורים היה דאפי' במקום שאין חילוק בין לישראל והמן שנראה כמו גורל שיכול לבחור או בהמן או בישראל, אפ"ה יש בחירה בישראל.  (והיינו במקום למעלה מסדר השתלשלות, שאין חילוק כלפי מעלה בין טוב ורע והמן חשיב להגיע לדרגה זו ולכן יהיה לו כח לשלוט על ישראל עיין במהר"ל על עץ גבוהה נ' אמה ובהמועדים עפ"י חסידות של הר' יואל קאהן ואכ"מ.)  בפורים נתחדש שאפי' בגורל יש בחירה, המאזניים לעולם נוטים כלפי ישראל.  ולכן שפיר בחרו חכ' בשם פורים כדי להבליט יסודו של הנס.  זה לא סתם חגיגה של הצלה מהשמדה אלא יו"ט לחוג את גודל בחירת עם ישראל ע"י הקב"ה.

למה יש בחירה אוטומטית בישראל?  התירץ הוא שלעולם יש קשר בין נשמת ישראל והקב"ה.  כנראה זה היה כונת אדמו"ר שהבאנו לעיל "בחי' יהודה שהוא בחי' הודאה הוא בחי' ביטול והתכללות באא"ס ב"ה ממש הסוכ"ע."  הקשר בין עצם הנשמה וה' ג"כ עולה על כל סדר השתלשלות. ובחי' זו של הנשמה נקראית בחי' הודאה.  ענינו של הודאה הוא ליבטל לדבר אחר, להודות שצריך עזר וסייעוה מדבר אחר.  מי שמודה לכח אחר מורה שצריך להיות קשור לכח ההוא.  בחי' זו של הנשמה, בחי' ההודאה, החלק שמסכים אם קשר שלו אם ה', לעולם נמצא בדרגה של הודאה והשתחוה לה'.

ולפי זה יובן גדלותו של פורים על שאר המועדים.  כל המועדים יש בהם הארה והמשכת אור ה' בעולם והם ימים קדושים אבל פורים מגיעין למעלמ מזה, אנחנו מגיעין למעלה מסדר השתלשלות עד א"אס ממש.  ולכן מובן למה אין פורים אסור במלאכה כמו ביו"ט דעלמא.  מה החילוק?  היינו טעמא משום דיו"ט שיש המשכת קדושה צריך פרישות מחול אבל פורים אינו רק הארת קדושה אלא קשור אם א"ס ממש שקדושה וחול שוין אצלו.  (עיין הנ"ל בתו"א וד"ה ויושט המלך.)  וענין זה מתבטא ע"י ענין ההיפוך שמצינו במגילה.  מה שמתגלה אא"ס ב"ה גם בהחול, מה שאחשורש נעשה הכלי לגרום הגאולה, הפיכת יום שנראה רע לטוב, החודש אשר נהפך מאבל ליו"ט, זה שייך רק בדרגה זו למעלה מהשתלשלות שחשיכה ואורה שוין לפניו.  רק ע"י שמגעין לדרגה זו מתגלה הפנימיות שיש בכל דבר, ששורה אא"ס בכל דבר אפי' בהחושך.

בודאי קרבן התודה מורה על הודאהת וביטול האדם כלפי ריבונו.  האדם שנמצא בסכנה, שיש שיקול אם לחיים אם למות ג"כ נמצא במצב של גורל.  הוא עומד בין החיים ובין המתים וה' בחר לו לחיים.  גילוי זה של בחירה לחיים מחייב האדם ליתן הודאה עבור מה שנבחר לחיים.  התגלות הבחירה ביהודי לחיים הוא כמו פורים פרטי שלו.  האיש נמצא במצב של סכנה נורא אבל ניצול הימנו.  ונמצא מצב שהיה נמצא בה שבשעתו היה נראה נורא ואיום נהפך לשמחה עצומה על שנמלט מהצרה ונשאר בחיים.    

לא נמצא שום חמץ בבית המקדש חוץ מלחמי תודה ושתי הלחם.  מה מיוחד בהתודה?  (לענין שתי הלחם תעיין בשבועות.)  המהר"ל בתפארת פ"ל מסביר שחמץ ומצה הם דברים חלוקים "להודיע כי כל הכחות אשר הם מחולקים הכל הוא אליו יתב'.  ודבר זה ראוי שיהיה הקרבן כאשר נעשה לו נס והציל אותו מן המיתה ובזה מודה לו כי האדם הוא אל השם יתב', שהרי הציל אותו, שע"ז מביא קרבן תודה. ולא שהוא לבד אל השם יתב', רק כל חילופי המציאות, הכל הוא אליו יתב', עד שהוא יתב' הוא אחד ואין זולתו.  ודבר זה יהיה לעתיד, כי יהיה השם יתב' אחד ואין זולתו.  ולכך קרבן תודה לא יהיה בטל, כי קרבן תודה מורה כי כל חילופי וחילוקי המציאות אל השם יתב', וכאשר הכל אל השם יתב', אז הוא אחד ואין זולתו ולכן קרבן זה לא יהיה בטל לעתיד." 

ויש להוסיף שבתודה מבטא הענין שכל דבר אפי' מה שנראה רע באמת יש בו התגלות אלוקות וליפך נמצא בו השמחה הגדולה ביותר.  עיין נצי"ב בהעמק דבר שמבאר גודל השמחה שיש בהתודה ושצריך לשתף בו גם אחרים. 

מצינו למידין שבין בתודה, בין בפורים, יש התגלות נפלאה של בחירת ישראל, יש התגלות של אא"ס למעלה מכל סדר השתלשלות ולכן יש בהם כח להפך מה שנראה רע לטוב וגילוי אור מתוך החושך.

Kids Megillah

The Shulchan Aruch in (689:1) says that one should be mechanach children to hear the megillah.  In sief 6 he says that it is a proper custom that kids should come and hear the megillah.  Why does the Shulchan Aruch repeat himself and why in sief 6 does he call it merely a proper custom?  The Mishna berura (based upon Magen Avrohom) understands that in sief 6 there is the regular obligation of chinuch; the novelty is that one shouldn’t just read for the kids in the house, one should bring them to the synagogue. The source of the Shulchan Aruch would seem to be the Tur that brings the Yerushalmi that Rebbe Levi gathered the children of his family and read for them.  Based upon that the Mishna Berura s very difficult for the whole source of the law is that Rebbe Levi read for them in his house, not in the synagogue?

The Yerushalmi says that the reason that kids must hear the megillah is because they were included in the miracle.  Why doesn’t it just say the regular rule of chinuch?  The Raviah Megillah #569 says that based upon the Yerushalmi even kids that are under the age of chinuch are obligated as long as they can understand a little just like woman and amey ha’aretz.  Why does he need to add like woman and amaey ha’aretz?  He is explaining what is the point of bringing the little kids if they don’t understand what’s being read?  He explains even though they don’t understand all the words, as long as they understand the basic theme, there is פרסומי ניסא just as woman and amey ha’aretz (see Gemorah 18a.)  The Leket Yosher also brings the practice of even bringing very small children to hear the megillah.  Based upon this, we can understand that the Shulchan Aruch in sief 6 is telling us that that it is proper (not chinuch,) to read the megillah even for kids that are under the age of chinuch because they were part of the miracle.

The opinion of the Behag (cited in Tosfos Arachin 3a) is that woman and kids are obligated in the megillah because they were part of the miracle.  However, he distinguishes between the obligation on the man which is to read the megillah and the obligation on woman and kids which is merely to hear the megillah.  The Briskor Rav (4a) asks how can there be an obligation on a kid?  He explains that the woman’s obligation and the kids are different.  There is an obligation on the woman herself to hear the megillah, but the obligation on the kids is on the parent to make the kid hear the megillah.

One could entertain the possibility that the Behag holds that there can be an obligation incumbent upon the minor just like the obligation of chinuch is placed upon him.  However, that itself needs an explanation how can there be an obligation on a minor?  Rav Reuvan Sukkah #2 says that there is an obligation upon him because it is the will of G-d to listen to the rabbis.  However, it is still difficult because if he has no brains and therefore isn’t obligated, how does he have brains to know to listen to the rabbis?

The Tanna Kamma (Megillah 19b) holds a minor can’t read the megillah for someone that is obligated.  The Rishonim ask why not, if he is also obligated because of chinuch?  The Ramban explains that the obligation of chinuch is on the father, the kid himself isn’t obligated.  What then is the opinion of Rebbe Yehuda that a minor can read for a gadol?  Explains the Ramban, he holds that since they were part of the miracle, they are obligated.  The Ran asks if the Ramban assumes there can’t be an obligation of chinuch on the kid, how can there be an obligation because they were part of the miracle?  Possibly even the Ramban concedes that when there is a סברא of אף הן היו באותו הנס that a kid can be obligated.  Normally, one can’t command a kid, he lacks the capability to internalize the meaning of the obligation.  However, אף הן  is something that even the kid understands.  The gratitude that one must have for being personally saved is something even a child can internalize and even the Ramban will agree that in that case it is possible for a minor to be obligated.

The Gra on Shulchan Aruch brings the Yerushalmi and spells out the obligation is the regular rule of chinuch.  And he learns both laws of the Shulchan Aruch are coming from the Yerushalmi.  How can he say it is an obligation of chinuch if the Yerushalmi says its because they were part of the nes?  The simple interpretation of what the Shulchan Aruch says  מחנחין את הקטן would be that it is the regular din of chinuch and the Yerushalmi is לרווחא דמילתא as the Mierey (4a) says.  However, the Gra indicates that he is explaining the Yerushalmi, וצ"ע.  See Birchas Mordechai (Ezrachi) #15, Kuntres Chanukah U’Megillah #13 that give explanations for the Gra, but is still is unsatisfactory.

See what my father shlita wrote about this here and here.