You Decide The Blessings

Rav Hirsch explains on the possuk in Devarim (11:29) וְהָיָ֗ה כִּ֤י יְבִֽיאֲךָ֙ י״י֣ אֱלֹקיך אֶל־הָאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־אַתָּ֥ה בָא־שָׁ֖מָּה לְרִשְׁתָּ֑הּ וְנָתַתָּ֤ה אֶת־הַבְּרָכָה֙ עַל־הַ֣ר גְּרִזִ֔ים וְאֶת־הַקְּלָלָ֖ה עַל־הַ֥ר עֵיבָֽל why did Klal Yisroel have to turn towards Har Grizin and Har Avel and to hear the blessings and curses?  What does the sight of the mountains add to the words?  He explains that the surroundings of mountains looked the same, they were in the same place and received the same rain.  So, how did one grow plants and the other was barren? The answer is that is depends on the internal qualities of the mountains.  The lesson is that the blessings and curses aren’t for or dependent upon the situation that one is in; rather on one’s ability to accept the blessings.  In his words: לפי זה, שני הרים אלה, העומדים זה לצד זה, מציגים באופן מוחשי ומרשים את הברכה והקללה. שניהם מתנשאים מאותה אדמה, שניהם מקבלים מימיהם מאותו טל ומטר. אותו אוויר עובר על שניהם; ואותה אבקת פרחים מתפזרת על ידי הרוח מעל שניהם. אך הר עיבל נשאר צחיח לחלוטין, בעוד שהר גריזים מכוסה צמחייה עבותה עד למרום פסגתו. באותו אופן, הברכה והקללה אינן תלויות במצבים חיצוניים, אלא בנכונותנו הפנימית לזו או לזו, ביחס שלנו למה שמביא ברכה.

The meforshim are bothered that the parsha starts in the singular language, talking directly to every individual, ראה, but then switches to לשון רבים, לפניכם, why does it switch in the middle? The Shem M'Shmuel (5676) brings his grandfather, the Kotzker who explains that things are given to everyone equally, but each individual sees according to his own perspective.  It is up to the individual to take what is given to him.

The midrash says that when this verse was said at Sinai the possuk says evil doesn’t come from Hashem rather it comes by itself on those that do evil.  What does the midrash mean?  According to the Kotzker the peshat may be that inherently there isn’t evil it just is the perspective of the person.

The Kli Yakar asks why does it the possuk say היום, obviously he was speaking to them on that day?  In the obove light we can understand that it is all up to today, it isn’t one’s past situation that determines one’s blessings; it is what he does today. 

Chosen Place

The possuk (12:4-6) says לֹא־תַֽעֲשׂ֣וּן כֵּ֔ן לה' אלוקיכם כִּ֠י אִֽם־אֶל־הַמָּק֞וֹם אֲשֶׁר־יִבְחַ֨ר י״י֤ אֱלֹֽקיכם מִכָּל־שִׁבְטֵיכֶ֔ם לָשׂ֥וּם אֶת־שְׁמ֖וֹ שָׁ֑ם לְשִׁכְנ֥וֹ תִדְרְשׁ֖וּ  וּבָ֥אתָ שָּֽׁמָּה וַֽהֲבֵאתֶ֣ם שָׁ֗מָּה עֹלֹֽתֵיכֶם֙ וְזִבְחֵיכֶ֔ם.  Rashi says לשכנו תדרשו: זה משכן שילה:  This possuk tells us that when the Mishkan was in Shilo, one wasn't allowed to sacrifice on a bammah.  In possuk 11 it says הָיָ֣ה הַמָּק֗וֹם אֲשֶׁר־יִבְחַר֩ יְהֹוָ֨ה אֱלֹֽקיכם בּוֹ֙ לְשַׁכֵּ֤ן שְׁמוֹ֙ שָׁ֔ם שָׁ֣מָּה תָבִ֔יאוּ אֵ֛ת כָּל־אֲשֶׁ֥ר אָֽנֹכִ֖י מְצַוֶּ֣ה אֶתְכֶ֑ם.  Rashi explains that possuk is referring to the Beis Hamikdash; when there is a Beis Hamikdash, there also is an issur bammos.

There is a difference in the obligation to bring a korban to Shilo vs. the obligation to bring to the Beis Hamikdash.  The difference between Shilo and the Beis Hamikdash is that the issur bammos in Shilo is a result from לֹא־תַֽעֲשׂ֣וּן כֵּ֔ן.  Therefore, there had to be a place to sacrifice and that is Shilo.  The place is chosen by Hashem לָשׂ֥וּם אֶת־שְׁמ֖וֹ שָׁ֑ם, but the place itself isn't inherently the "chosen place."  Hence, the  possuk puts the focus on the person bringing the korban to the place, וַֽהֲבֵאתֶ֣ם שָׁ֗מָּה.  It isn't the place that demands the korban be offered there, it is the place that happens to be designated to bring everyone together.  The second possuk focuses on the place, שָׁ֣מָּה תָבִ֔יאוּ, which forces a person to bring the korban there.  It is in the place of the Beis Hamikdash that is 'הַמָּק֗וֹם אֲשֶׁר־יִבְחַר֩ ה, the actual place is desired to be the place of the Mikdash and the issur bammos is an outgrowth from there.  It is the kedusha of the place that causes the issur bammos.  Therefore, the possuk mentions first that the place is "chosen" and the issur bammos is the outgrowth from that (based upon Likutay sichos volume 24.)
 
The Mishna in Megillah (10a) and Zevachim (112a) says that once the Beis Hamikdash was built its no longer permitted to sacrifice on a bammah.  The Mishna says that the intent of the possuk, כִּ֥י לֹא־בָאתֶ֖ם עַד־עָ֑תָּה אֶל־הַמְּנוּחָה֙ וְאֶל־הַֽנַּחֲלָ֔ה, menucha refers to the Beis Hamikdash that once it was built one can no longer use a bammah.  The Gemorah in Megillah assumes this is true only according to the opinion that קדושה ראשונה קדושה לעתיד לבא, however, if the קדושה doesn't continue after the Beis Hamikdash is destroyed, then one can sacrifice on a bammah nowadays.  Rashi (Zevachim 119a) follows this approach and says the Mishna is dependent on the machlokes tannaim.  However, Tosfos (Megillah, Zevachim) understands according to the conclusion of the Gemorah that everyone agrees even after the destruction of the Mikdash the bammos are prohibited.

Why does Tosfos holds even if there is no more kedusha that the issur bammos still applies?  The Achronim explain that even though there isn't kedusha to be able to bring a korban, however, it still is the 'מָּק֗וֹם אֲשֶׁר־יִבְחַר֩ ה.  It isn't the kedusha of the Mikdash that causes the issur bammos, it is sacrificing outside the "chosen place." (See Toras Hakodesh siman 2.)

Shechitah

The Rambam mitzvah 146 counts the mitzvah of shechitah.  His source is from this week's parsha, וְזָבַחְתָּ֞ מִבְּקָרְךָ֣ וּמִצֹּֽאנְךָ֗ אֲשֶׁ֨ר נָתַ֤ן י״י֙ לְךָ֔ כַּאֲשֶׁ֖ר צִוִּיתִ֑ךָ.  Other Rishonim disagree and hold its merely a מתיר to remove the issur of אבר מן החי.  [See Rambam Shoresh 1, Raavad on Sefer Hamitzvot, Tosfos Shevous 24b.]

The Taz (1:17) explains why a person that can't speak can't separate terumah because he can't say the beracha, but can shect and someone else will recite the beracha.  He says אלא דבשחיטה נראה טעמו דאחר מברך שפיר דברכת השחיטה אינה באה על השחיטה עצמה דהא אין חיוב לשחיטה אם אינו רוצה לאכול אלא עיקר הכוונה לתת שבח למקום ב"ה על שאסר לנו אכילת בשר בלא שחיטה ובזה ודאי כל ישראל שייך באותה ברכה שהרי על כולם יש איסור.  He seems to say that the beracha on shechitah is only a ברכת השבח.  This would seem to fit better with the approach that shechitah isn't counted as a mitzvah.  However, this seems to run contrary to the Gemorah in Pesachim (7b) that equates the blessing on shechitah to other birchat hamitzvot.

The Binyan Av (volume 2 #36) says that the Taz doesn't mean its not at all a bracha on a mitzvah, he means that when it comes to terumah the bracha is on the action of the mitzvah but on shechitah the beracha is on the result of the animal being schechted, hence the beracha can be recited by anyone.

Serving Hashem

The possuk (13:5) says אַחֲרֵ֨י י״י֧ אֱלֹקיכם תֵּלֵ֖כוּ וְאֹת֣וֹ תִירָ֑אוּ וְאֶת־מִצְוֺתָ֤יו תִּשְׁמֹ֙רוּ֙ וּבְקֹל֣וֹ תִשְׁמָ֔עוּ וְאֹת֥וֹ תַעֲבֹ֖דוּ וּב֥וֹ תִדְבָּקֽוּן.  What does it mean וְאֹת֥וֹ תַעֲבֹ֖דוּ? The Sifri says that it means learning Torah and serving Him via the mikdash.  (There are similar Sifri in Ve’eschanan on verse 6: 13, and in Akev chapter 11 verses 13 and 22.)  We see from the Sifri that learning Torah is called the service of Hashem.  The Netziv however, understands the Sifri is only a reference to the study of the laws of the korbanot for then the learning counts in place of offering sacrifices which would be avodah.  However, it seems apparent from the Ramban (that will be cited shortly) that this is not the case, rather it’s a perspective on all Torah learning.

The meaning of mikdash according to the Rambam in his count of the mitzvot #5 refers to prayer which ideally should take place in the mikdash.  The Ramban disagrees (hasagos on Sefer Hamitzvot and in Va’eschanan 6:13) and understands it refers to coming to the mikdash to bow and sing to Hashem. Therefore, the Ramban rejects the counting of prayer as a mitzvah rather its merely an opportunity for man to beseech God.   We see the Ramban understands the Sifri is reflecting different modes of serving Hashem either via Torah learning or coming close to Hashem via service in the mikdash.  This would seem to be a Chassidic approach that all these ideas come under the rubric of serving Hashem

[The Ramban ends of his comment on the possuk says that  one should be like a slave constantly ready to do the bidding of his master and therefore the work of his master is his main work.  Furthermore, one should reach the level were all he does is for the sake of Hashem even what he does for his own body as the possuk (Tehillim 146:2) says “ahallelah Hashem bechayai.”  How does the Ramban see in that possuk in Tehillim that all of one’s actions should be for the sake of Hashem, the possuk seems to be saying that one should thank Hashem for the life that he has been given?  Rav Yeruchem Levovitz (journal Hatevuna from year 5707) explains that we see from the Ramban that the peshat in the possuk isn’t that one should thank Hashem for the life he has, rather the point of one’s life is to thank Hashem.  The whole point of living is to give thanks to Hashem; therefore, it follows that all one’s actions should be for this purpose, for the sake of Hashem.]

The halacha is that Rashbi and his colleagues are except from prayer (Shulchan Aruch 106:2.)  Why is it different than any other mitzvah that they must fulfill?  Based upon the Sifri we can understand for Torah and Tefillah are really two sides of the same coin, that is service of Hashem.  Since Rashbi served via learning he didn’t need to pray.

Bring It To The House

The Rambam counts mitzvah 84 to bring korbanot to the Beis Hamikdash, היא שצונו להקריב כל הקרבנות בבית הבחירה. והוא אמרו יתעלה שם תעלה עולותיך ושם תעשה,.  Mitzvah 85 is even if the korbanot are outside of Eretz Yisroel one must still bring them to the Beis Hamikdash, ואע"פ שהם בחוצה לארץ כלומר שנתחייב בהם בחוצה לארץ הנה נצטוינו להביא לבית הבחירה, והוא אמרו רק קדשיך אשר יהיו וגו'.  The Ramban holds that these two are only counted as one mitzah.  The Achronim mostly understand that the additional mitzvah of bringing from outside Eretz Yisroel is that even though it is hard to bring the animals, still one is obligated (see the Chinuch.)  It is difficult to understand the הוא אמינא that difficulty would be a פטור.

Rav Avrohom Gurovitz wants to suggest a different interpretation.  He says that the chiddush is specifically from outside Eretz Yisroel.  I would have said just as korbanot can only be offered in Eretz Yisroel, so too only animals from Eretz Yisroel assume the obligation to be offered in the Mikdash.  However, animals from outside Eretz Yisroel don't assume the obligation ot be offered in the Mikdash, for its not a place of korbanot.  Hence, we need an addition mitzvah to tell us even outside Eretz Yisroel there is an obligation to bring the korban to the Mikdash.

He also questions why there is a need for an asseh to bring one’s korban to the Mikdash, one should be obligated because of his vow?  He understands that really there isn’t a need for the asseh and the main point is that it’s a negative commandment not to sacrifice outside the Mikdash.

Rashi Meilah (19a,) Tosfos Chullin (22b) that say that the obligation to bring a korban only requires one to bring the korban into the azarah, but doesn't require one to actually bring it on the altar.  According to this, we can argue on the whole premise of the question.  One's neder doesn't require him to actually offer the korban on the alter.  However, the Turay Even Megillah (8b) asks many questions on this idea.  The Roshei Yeshiva explain the Rashi that there are two obligations to a korban.  There is a monetary obligation, that one owes the value of the korban to hekdesh.  It is regarding this obligation that Rashi says bringing it to the Mikdash and handing it to the gizbur suffices for the korban is now in propery of hekdesh.  However, there is another obligation upon the individual to bring the korban as an obligation of nidrei mitzvah and thar obligation still hangs over his head.  According to this, the question still stands.

The Chinuch says (#440) אבל אין הכונה לומר, שיהיה עליה חיוב להקריב קרבן בבית המקדש עכשו שהוא חרב, זה דבר ברור הוא.  The Achronim ask why, מקריבין אע"פ שאין בית?  The Steipler (Zevachim #32) says we see from the Chinuch that מקריבין אע"פ שאין בית means one can bring the korban, however there is no obligation to offer the korban.  Why this would be isn't very clear, the Steipler struggles for an explanation.     

Don't Add

The possuk in Vaeschanan says (4:2) לֹ֣א תֹסִ֗פוּ עַל־הַדָּבָר֙ אֲשֶׁ֤ר אָנֹכִי֙ מְצַוֶּ֣ה אֶתְכֶ֔ם וְלֹ֥א תִגְרְע֖וּ מִמֶּ֑נּוּ.  A similar verse appears in our parsha (13:1) .לֹא־תֹסֵ֣ף עָלָ֔יו וְלֹ֥א תִגְרַ֖ע מִמֶּֽנּו.  The Gra says that the first possuk is referring to beis din not to add onto the mitzvot, hence it’s said in the plural tense, referring to the collective beis din.  The possuk in our parsha is talking to the individual not to add to the specific mitzvah that he does.  (See the Ktav V’kabbalah in both places.)

This would be the source for the Rishonim that assume that it’s a prohibition to add to the number of the mitzvot (see Ramban on the possuk here, Rambam Ch. 2 of Mamrim etc.)  The Gemorah only assumes בל תוסיף in the context of adding to a mitzvoh, we don’t see that adding to the number of mitzvot is בל תוסיף?  According to the Gra the source is the possuk in Vaseschanan.  [Though it is noteworthy that the Rambam reverses the pessukim, in Birchat Kohanim (14:12) regarding adding to a mitzvah, he cites the verse in Vaeschanan, in Mamrim he cites the verse in our parsha.  See more in Minchas Asher Vaeschanan.]   

The Rashba in Rosh Hashana (16a) asks when Chazal said not to blow shofar on Rosh Hashana that falls out on Shabbos, why is it not a violation of בל תגרע?  The Turay Even questions that seemingly according to the Rashba , every time one doesn't fulfill a positive commandment, it will be a violation of בל תגרע as well?  The Baruch Taam and Rav Peurlo (on Rav Saisai Gaon pg. 81b) explain that the Rashba doesn't mean anyone who doesn't fulfill a commandment it will be a violation of בל תגרע; he is questioning that Beis Din should be violating the issur by cancelling out the mitzvah.

The Raavad (Mamrim 2:9) says א''א כל אלה ישא רוח שכל דבר שגזרו עליו ואסרוהו לסייג ולמשמרת של תורה אין בו משום לא תוסיף אפילו קבעוהו לדורות ועשאוהו כשל תורה וסמכוהו למקרא כדאשכחן בכמה דוכתי מדרבנן וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא ואם גרע לפי צורך שעה כגון אליהו בהר הכרמל אף זה דבר תורה הוא עת לעשות לה' הפרו תורתך. ולא תמצא איסור מוסיף אלא במצות עשה כגון לולב ותפילין וציצית וכיוצא בהן בין לשעה בין לדורות בין שקבעה בדבר תורה בין שלא קבעה:  Many understand the Raavad to mean that he disagrees with this additional principle of the Rambam and holds בל תוסיף is only when an individual adds to a mitzvah.  The Briskor Rav said that's not the peshat.  The words of the Raavad, בין לשעה בין לדורות בין שקבעה בדבר תורה can only be referring to Beis Din adding a mitzvah.  What he disagrees is that he holds the issur is only when adding a positive  command, not when adding a negative command (like the Rambam talks about, adding to the issur of milk and meat.)  However, the Rambam holds the issur is any addition. (Yeshurin volume 11 pg. 494.)

Of course, Rashi doesn’t learn this way and holds both pessukim are an issur not to add to a mitzvah being done.  What is noteworthy, is the differences in the Rashi.  In Vaeschanan, he says כגון: חמש פרשיות בתפילין, חמשת מינין בלולב, חמש ציציות.  In our parsha, he says חמש טוטפות, חמשה מינין בלולב, ארבע ברכות לברכת כהנים.  Why switch the third ex. from tzitzit to birchas kohanim and why switch terminology from פרשיות  to טוטפות?  You can find answers yourself.

Many Rashis

There are various pessukin in the Ekev and Re’ah that contain the same message of דביקות בה'.  In Ekev (10:20) it says אֶת־י״י֧ אֱלֹקיך תִּירָ֖א אֹת֣וֹ תַעֲבֹ֑ד וּב֣וֹ תִדְבָּ֔ק וּבִשְׁמ֖וֹ תִּשָּׁבֵֽעַ.  A Ch. later (11:22,) it says כִּי֩ אִם־שָׁמֹ֨ר תִּשְׁמְר֜וּן אֶת־כׇּל־הַמִּצְוָ֣ה הַזֹּ֗את אֲשֶׁ֧ר אָנֹכִ֛י מְצַוֶּ֥ה אֶתְכֶ֖ם לַעֲשֹׂתָ֑הּ לְאַהֲבָ֞ה אֶת־י״י֧ אֱלֹקיכם לָלֶ֥כֶת בְּכׇל־דְּרָכָ֖יו וּלְדׇבְקָה־בֽוֹ.  Rashi there says ולדבקה בו – אי איפשר, והלא אש אוכלה הוא? אלא: הדבק בחכמים ובתלמידים, ומעלה עליך כאילו נדבקתא בו.  Finally, in Re’ah it says (13:5) אַחֲרֵ֨י י״י֧ אֱלֹקיכם תֵּלֵ֖כוּ וְאֹת֣וֹ תִירָ֑אוּ וְאֶת־מִצְוֺתָ֤יו תִּשְׁמֹ֙רוּ֙ וּבְקֹל֣וֹ תִשְׁמָ֔עוּ וְאֹת֥וֹ תַעֲבֹ֖דוּ וּב֥וֹ תִדְבָּקֽוּן.  Here Rashi says ובו תדבקון – הדבק בדרכיו וגמול חסדים, קבור מתים, בקר חולים, כמו שעשה הקב״ה.  Why does Rashi say nothing in one place and change his interpretation in the other places?

In Likutay Sichos volume 14, the Rebbe explains that in the first possuk, Rashi doesn’t need to say anything because we can understand וּב֣וֹ תִדְבָּ֔ק just as we understand ואתם הדבקים בה' in Vaeschanan that it means to love ה'.  However, in the second possuk, it already mentions אהבת ה' and therefore, Rashi must explain it means something else.  In our parsha, Rashi understands that we can’t mean one of those explanations for the previous possuk says the whole point of the false prophet is to test if you have love for Hashem, that is the backdrop for the whole topic so it won’t be repeated as a detail.  It also can’t mean cleaving to talmedei chachamim for the possuk mentions this at the end of the line so it must be the highest level, not someone who merely cleaves to others.  Hence, Rashi gives a different explanation.  

                          An interesting interpretation of the Maggid on the Rashi (11:22.) 

Beyond The Law

The Gemorah Berachos (35b) says according to Rashbi, one should be learning all day long.  The gemorah asks from the second parsha of shema where it says ואספת דגנך ותירשך ויצהרך.  The Gemorah answers that the possuk is talking about אין עושין רצונו של מקום.  Tosfos asks how can this be, it says והיה אם שמע תשמעו אל מצותי אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם היום, it’s talking about when we are doing the רצון of Hashem?  My father always likes to say the answer is that yes, all the mitzvot are being fulfilled but its not considered עושין רצונו של מקום.  There can be someone that keeps every letter in the Shulchan Aruch but is still not doing all that Hashem wants.  There is more than just the letter of the law; that is what’s missing.

Everyone asks that in the first parsha of Shema it says ובכל מאודך but in the second parsha it doesn’t appear; why?  In this vein we may suggest that בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך, albeit a great level, but it still it not going above and beyond the basic law.  It is בכל מאודך, which the Ramban explains as giving all your מאד, giving above and beyond what the law requires which shows a person’s true service of Hashem.  That is in the first parsha only which is עושיו רצונו של מקום. 

The possuk says (11:14) וְנָתַתִּ֧י מְטַֽר־אַרְצְכֶ֛ם בְּעִתּ֖וֹ יוֹרֶ֣ה וּמַלְק֑וֹשׁ וְאָסַפְתָּ֣ דְגָנֶ֔ךָ וְתִֽירֹשְׁךָ֖ וְיִצְהָרֶֽךָ.  In Bechukosai, it says (26:4,) וְנָתַתִּ֥י גִשְׁמֵיכֶ֖ם בְּעִתָּ֑ם וְנָתְנָ֤ה הָאָ֙רֶץ֙ יְבוּלָ֔הּ וְעֵ֥ץ הַשָּׂדֶ֖ה יִתֵּ֥ן פִּרְיֽוֹ.  The Likutay Sichos volume 19 sicha 4 has a דיוק in the possuk; here it says ונתתי מטר ארצכם, the rain of the land, it fits with the nature.  In Bechukosai, it says וְנָתַתִּ֥י גִשְׁמֵיכֶ֖ם בְּעִתָּ֑ם, your rain, not built into the nature, rain specific for you.  What's the difference?  In Ekev, the rain is good, but fits with the nature just as you are fulfilling the laws of Hashem according to your nature, following the law exactly.  However, in Bechukosai, its referring to one who goes above the requirement of the law, one who is עמל בתורה.  Therefore, the rain is not rain for the land, rain of nature, it's your rain, a miracle rain tailor-made for your needs.  See there how he explains the differences in Rashi based upon this. 

In the words of the Maggid of Mezeritch:

Teaching Your Son

Rashi (11:19) says: לדבר בם – משעה שהבן יודע לדבר למדהו, תורה צוה לנו משה וגו׳ (דברים ל״ג:ד׳), שיהא זה לימוד דיבורו. מכאן אמרו: כשהתינוק מתחיל לדבר, אביו מסיח עמו בלשון הקודש ומלמדו תורה, ואם לא עשה כן, הרי הוא כאילו קוברו, שנאמר: ולמדתם אתם את בניכם וגומ׳.

It would appear that this is a din separate from the regular din of chinuch that a father must teach his sons the basic building blocks of Judaism. 

The Tosefta in Chagigah (1:3) says the same thing and its cited in Sukkah (42a,) although the obligation to teach him loshon hakodesh is omitted.  However, the Gemorah cites this obligation amongst other obligations of chinuch indicating that this is also the din of chinuch and that approach is taken by the Ran (Sukkah 28a) and Birkay Yosef siman 37.  Tosfos (Berachos 20a) also understands this way and proves from here that there is a mitzvah of chinuch for kerias shema.  However, Rashi (ibid) holds there is no mitzvah of chinuch for kerias shema for the father isn’t around his son in order to train him to say shema.

How does Rashi deal with the Gemorah in Sukkah?  The Pnei Yehoshua answers that there is no din of chinuch for shema, only for Torah and the possuk of shema is only an example of the words of Torah that one must teach their son.  He proves that is the interpretation of the Rambam as well for he cites this din in the context of teaching one’s son Torah; in Talmud Torah (1:6.)  The Gra (siman 37 and 70) takes this approach in the opinion of Rashi as well.  [It is noteworthy that this interpretation of the Gemorah in Sukkah doesn’t fit well for the Gemorah gives an example of teaching Torah asתורה צוה לנו  and shema is listed is a separate obligation.]  Rav Yitzchak Sorotzkin suggests that the obligation to teach one’s son loshon hakodesh also is merely an extension of the obligation of Talmud Torah.  He basis this off the Rambam in the Laws of Tefillah (12:10-11) that the targum of the Torah is considered תורה שבעל פה.  We see that only loshon hakodesh has the status of Torah Shebksav.  Based upon this, he explains why the Rambam doesn’t mention this obligation to teach one’s son Torah, because it’s included already in the obligation to teach him Torah.  

Rabbi Immanuel Schochet

In honor of my great-uncle's yartzheit which is 20 Av, this Wednesday.
From here (it was written in Mishpacha October 2017.)
Rabbi Yitzchak Schochet, a Chabad Shliach and rabbi of London’s Mill Hill Synagogue since 1993, was asked to write to his late and illustrious father, Rabbi Dr. Immanuel Schochet, of blessed memory.

Here is the letter:

Dear Daddy,

The outside world knew you as a communal Rov in Toronto for more than fifty years; a professor at three universities, an author of thirty-five books and an international lecturer. But to me, you were my mentor, and my go-to-person all through life, just as you were to countless others.

Ever since I was a little boy I was in awe of your unique communication skills – inspiring audiences across the world. I always told myself “I want to be able to do that one day.” I listened to your speeches in Shul every Shabbos, and you would make me repeat them back to you on the walk home. I was too young to appreciate it then, but I know now that you were honing my skills so that one day I’d be able to copy your example.

When I contemplated other options you gently encouraged me to follow in the “family business” of communal Rabbonus – to be another link in an unbroken chain of more than two centuries of Rabbonim. You were so proud on the day of my hachtara (induction). The moving letter you wrote me that day still hangs proudly in my office.

When I finished high school in Ner Yisroel I was at a crossroads. I wanted to pursue studies in the famous Philly Yeshiva but while you appreciated my choice, you were adamant that I continue my learning in Chabad. That advice would dramatically alter the course of my life. The exposure to Chassidus in general and the opportunity to spend much time in the “daled amos” of the Rebbe in particular, instilled within me the drive to reach out to Jews from all walks of life and to broaden my horizons in inspiring souls. It’s what led me to my current position of Rabbonus and Shlichus in London.

Wherever I trek, you still seem to be there. In the summer of 1977 you took us along on a speaking tour in Los Angeles. Somewhere mid tour, you were asked to give an impromptu lecture in San Diego. It was a much longer ride than expected and the audience was particularly small. Needless to say, you were not pleased. One of the few in the audience was a college kid named Jay who was struggling in his Jewish life, like many of that era. He engaged with you and when the hour was late, you insisted you had to head back to Los Angeles. Jay said: “I don’t know much about Jewish learning but I do know it says, ‘whoever saves one Jewish life it is as if he has saved an entire world.”‘ You acquiesced and talked till 2 AM.

The following year you were back in San Diego for a properly organized, well-attended lecture. At the end of your talk, you were introduced to the same college kid, Jay, who had turned his life around and found his way back to his traditional roots.

You often retold that story to emphasize to us the important lesson you learned. “It’s never about the number, it’s always about the substance!” From that day, you insisted, you were never bothered again about how big or small the audience, “because you never know the impact you can have on even one soul in the crowd.”

Fast forward to this past summer of 2017. I am on route to San Diego to deliver a lecture. The Rabbi expressed to me his concern about audience attendance, it being a mid-week, mid-summer etc. I repeated to him, as I had done to numerous others before him, your story and message. In the end, there was a full house. But it was the gentleman who approached me at the end of my talk that brought tears to my eyes and made my soul brim over. “Hi, my name is Jay….”

Forty years on, he married off all his children to Jewish spouses. “I don’t normally come out to events, but I needed to come here tonight to tell you about the fruits of your father’s labor.” We had an emotional embrace and he said: “Your Dad is looking down right now, and he’s smiling!” And I stood there thinking: “You never know the impact you can have on even one soul in the crowd.”

A timely message as I write this before Yom Kippur, when I know you will be looking down once more, still gently guiding me. And I hope that I still give you cause to smile as I endeavor to continue giving you nachas.

Es bincha asher ahavta,
Yitzchok 

Rain

The sixth aliyah opens by contrasting Egypt, where one irrigated the fields from the rivers with Eretz Yisroel which needs rain (see Rashi and Ramban.)  The Torah stresses the relationship to Eretz Yisroel in terms of rain.  In the following pesukkim (of the second parsha of Shema,) the Torah says following the mitzvot or not following will affect the rain.  In fact, in every tochacha or parsha of rebuke there is mention of the withholding of rain.  Why is rain the medium the Torah uses to measure reward vs. calamity? The Rambam (Taanis 3:11) rules that the only time there is a taanis tzibbur with all the stringencies of Yom Kippur when rain is withheld in Eretz Yisroel.  Why is only this calamity which bears such stringencies?  Rav Solovetchik (Shiurim L’zacher Ava Mari volume 1 pg. 197) explains that the lack of rain isn’t just an obstacle for one’s livelihood but represents the lack of a relationship between Klal Yisroel and Hashem.  However, what still needs to be explained is why is it specifically rain that alludes to this relationship?

The following two paragraphs are from my father’s blog from 2012.  "At the opening of Zos haBracha the Torah describes Moshe Rabeinu as "Ish haElokim," an interesting contrast with the earlier description of Moshe as "Eved Hashem" -- note the change from "eved" to "ish", and the change in the name of G-d used.  The GR"A explains (in Aderes Eliyahu) that the name Elokim is a description of G-d as He makes his presence manifest through nature.  We see this name Elokim again and again throughout the upcoming parsha of Braishis in describing the creation of the physical world, starting with the first pasuk in the Torah, "Braishis bara Elokim..." Moshe Rabeinu is "Ish Elokim" = master over nature, one who lives on a higher plane than those forces of nature, someone who transcends the boundaries of the physical world and can bend them to his purpose, to bless Bnei Yisrael.

The GR"A adds that even though the whole physical world is governed by this name "Elokim," there is one exception to the rule.  Chazal tell us that we mention rain, "mashiv ha'ruach u'morid hageshem," in the same bracha as we mention the future resurrection of the dead because these phenomena are equivalent.  What this means, says the GR"A, is that rain comes from the same source as the gift of life itself -- directly from G-d.  There is no law of nature (i.e. there is no governing aspect of the shem Elokim) that allows to perfectly predict when and where and how much rain will fall.  It is completely and directly in G-d's hands.  The gemara (Ta'anis 2) tells us that there are three things which Hashem himself holds the "keys" to and does not give over to mankind -- one of these is rain."

Based upon this we understand why rain represents the special attachment of Hashem to this world for it is in the area of rain that Hashem superimposes over the natural order.  The Gemorah in Taanis (25b) says that when it rains for every drop that comes down, there are two drops that come up from in the earth to greet it.  This shows that this world Hashem trying to unite with Hashem when it rains.  That is why rain also represents our relationship toward Hashem.

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The Ramban brings the Chazal that Hashem looks at what Eretz Yisroel needs and the other lands get their needs agav Eretz Yisroel.  The Ramban says this is the sod of kol (eyen sham.)  I believe the Ramban is alluding to the fact that kol represents the middah of yesod, which is the middah that brings all the other ones together.  It is the channel that all the middos flow through (see Mictav Ma’Eliyahu volume 5 in his explanation of nistar where he explains this idea in detail.)  So too Eretz Yisroel is the channel through which all forms of sustenance flow into the world.

Broken Torah

The Gemora (Shabbos 87a and other places) is dorash on the words (10:2) אשר שברתה, yasher kochachah sh’shebartah.  The simple interpretation would be that the praise is because it saved Klal Yisroel.  However, the words of the derash seem to indicate that there was a positive from the very fact of breaking the luchos, not just because of the effect?  The Gemorah Menachos (98a) records that Resh Lakish derives from the breaking of the luchos that sometimes what seems to be a destruction of the Torah actually leads to greater Torah.  If this was a great act merely because it saved Klal Yisroel, we don’t see that it leads to greater Torah, we see that there must be some added greatness to the Torah, what is it? 

The peshat must be that there was a greater aspect to the Torah in the second luchos than in the first ones.  That is reflected in the Midrash Rabbah Shemos (46:1) that in by the second luchos there was a body of Torah sh’baal peh given.  However, we still need to understand, why was this aspect of Torah only received with the giving of the second luchos and not in the first one’s? 

The breaking of the luchos teaches us that one must have a broken heart, a sense of humility to properly incorporate the study of Torah sh’baal peh within the person.  To be able to be infused with the kedusha and wisdom that comes from Hashem one must feel humbled to allow it to have a positive effect on the person.  We say at the end of Shemoneh Esray ונפשי כעפר לכל תהיה פתח לבי בתורתך.  Only after the feeling of humbleness of feeling like dirt is it possible to try to understand Hashem’s wisdom.    

One must maintain the balance of using his own understanding to its fullest capacity to try to understand Torah but at the same time maintain that humbleness before Hashem.  That is the lesson of second luchos and first broken luchos being combined in the aron.  One must feel confident in his capabilities to be able to plunge to the depths of Torah and understand it.  This is represented by the complete and whole second luchos.  At the same time, one must have the feeling of humbleness before Hashem’s wisdom, represented by the broken luchos.  These are two opposite feelings which would seem to be impossible to balance, but that is the power of Torah.  The Gemorah says in Yoma 41a (and elsewhere) that the aron didn’t take up space, it was miraculous, it defied reality.  So too in or learning of Torah we can blend two opposite feelings together (Based upon Likutay Sichos volume 26 sicha 3 on Ki Sesa.)

[As an aside it’s not so clear it the derash of yasher kochachah sh’shebartah is from our parsha or Ki Tesa (34:1) where the same words apply.  See the midrash there and Maharsha Babba Bathra 14b and footnote 5 in the aforementioned sicha.]

See fantastic article here about why the possuk says וָאֲשַׁבְּרֵ֖ם לְעֵינֵיכֶֽם, the word עיניכם seems extra?

Food Blessings

The Gemorah in Berachos (35) says that one must say a beracha before benefiting from food for the land is owned by Hashem and it would be like mielah to eat without a beracha.  From there one derives the obligation to say a beracha before eating.  How do we know an obligation to say a blessing after eating?  Rashi explains its derived from birchat hamazon.  We see from here that the two types of berachot are distinct; the beracha beforehand is to remove the issur of benefiting without a beracha, however the beracha afterward is merely to give thanks and blessing for the food eaten.    

Tosfos (39a) says that even if one eats a minuscule amount of food there is an obligation to say a beracha beforehand.  However, regarding the after blessing one is only obligated if they eat a כזית.  What’s the difference?  We see the same principle; the blessing beforehand is a מתיר to allow one to benefit from the food and applies to any amount, on the other hand, the blessing afterward is an obligation of thanks and blessing that only kicks in when eating a respectable amount.

Based upon this idea we understand why there is a ברכה כללית of שהכל for the blessing before eating but there is no such beracha for after eating.  The difference is that the beracha beforehand is to to remove the issur so that is satisfied by a general blessing.  However, to give thanks for the food eaten, the beracha must be specific in order to give proper thanks.

Addition from my father: The Rabbenu Yona Berachos (27b in dafey haRif) and the Kol Bo siman 24 bring an opinion that on less than the shiur one says a ברכת שהכל, not the specific beracha of the food.  Why is this?  Rav Warman (Shearit Yosef volume 1 #2) explains that they hold even in the beracha rishona there are two elements of obligation; the specific beracha is only for the element of thanks and praise which one is obligated in only if they eat a substantial amount, it is a shehakol that suffices to remove the issur of benefiting from the world.

ולא תביא תועבה אל ביתך

Rambam Sefer Hamitzvot negative commandant #25 says:שהזהירנו מחבר דבר מע"ז אל ממוננו, אבל נרחיק ממנה ומבתיה ומכל מה שייוחס אליה. והוא אמרו ולא תביא תועבה אל ביתך. ומי שנהנה מדבר ממנה חייב מלקות. וכבר בארו בסוף מכות (דף כ"ב) שמי שבשל בעצי אשרה לוקה שתים, אחת משום לא תביא תועבה אל ביתך ואחת משום ולא ידבק בידך, ודע זה. וכבר התבארו משפטי מצוה זו בשלישי מסנהדרין.

The Rambam in the beginning of Ch. 11 of Maacolos Assuros says: יִן שֶׁנִּתְנַסֵּךְ לְעַכּוּ''ם אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָה. וְהַשּׁוֹתֶה מִמֶּנּוּ כָּל שֶׁהוּא לוֹקֶה מִן הַתּוֹרָה. וְכֵן הָאוֹכֵל כָּל שֶׁהוּא מִתִּקְרֹבֶת עַכּוּ''ם מִבָּשָׂר אוֹ מִפֵּרוֹת אֲפִלּוּ מַיִם וּמֶלַח הָאוֹכֵל מֵהֶן כָּל שֶׁהוּא לוֹקֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים לב לח) "אֲשֶׁר חֵלֶב זְבָחֵימוֹ יֹאכֵלוּ יִשְׁתּוּ יֵין נְסִיכָם יָקוּמוּ" וְגוֹ':
יַיִן שֶׁנִּתְנַסֵּךְ לָהּ כְּזֶבַח שֶׁקָּרֵב לָהּ וְכֵיוָן שֶׁאִסּוּר זֶה מִשּׁוּם עַכּוּ''ם הוּא אֵין לוֹ שִׁעוּר שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בַּעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים וּמַזָּלוֹת (דברים יג יח) "וְלֹא יִדְבַּק בְּיָדְךָ מְאוּמָה מִן הַחֵרֶם"

Why does the Rambam cite אֲשֶׁר חֵלֶב זְבָחֵימוֹ as the source of the אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָה and not וְלֹא יִדְבַּק בְּיָדְךָ?  Rav Yichial Michal proves from here that וְלֹא יִדְבַּק בְּיָדְךָ isn't a quintessential איסור הנאה, rather as the Rambam says, שהזהירנו מחבר דבר מע"ז אל ממוננו, it is prohibited to obtain financial benefit from עבודה זרה.  In Maacolos Assuros the Rambam is bringing the איסור הנאה of עבודה זרה like any other איסור הנאה and that is learnt only from אֲשֶׁר חֵלֶב זְבָחֵימוֹ (see negative commandant #194.)

The Yeraim #274 says: בשלהי אלו דברים בפסחים (ע"ג א') אמרינן היאך יצא שוחט מכלל מקלקל שהרי הבהמה חיה יקרה מן השחוטה טובא כדאמרינן בחולין פ"א (ח' א') אמר רבא סכין של עבודת כוכבים מותר לשחוט בה ואסור לחתוך בה בשר מותר לשחוט בה מקלקל הוא ובפסחים מתרצינן למה חייב לענין שבת דאמרינן בשילהי אלו דברים השוחט בשבת בחוץ לעובדת כוכבים חייב ג' חטאות מאי תיקן תיקן להוציאו מידי אבר מן החי וההיא דחולין לא קשיא דלענין עבודת כוכבים דכתיב לא ידבק בידך מאומה ריוח ממון יותר הקפידה תורה ומאחר שפיחתו דמיו בשחיטה לא דבק והיינו דתנן לענין עובד כוכבים בפ' כל הצלמים (מ"ט נ') יוליך הנאה לים המלח. אבל לענין שבת כיון שנעשה מלאכה כדרך עושה מלאכה אע"פ שפחתו מדמים מתקן קרינן ביה לענין שבת שרוב מלאכות דשבת בך הם.  (See Tosfos Chullin 8a.)  The Briskor Rav said his intent is what Rav Michal pointed out in the Rambam.

Shema: One Mitzvah

Rambam Sefer Hamitzvot #10, the mitzvah of krias shema: היא שצונו לקרוא קריאת שמע ערבית ושחרית והוא אמרו ודברת בם. וכבר נתבארו משפטי מצוה זו במסכת ברבות (דף כ"א) ושם נתבאר דקריאת שמע דאורייתא. וכתוב בתוספתא כשם שנתנה תורה קבע לקריאת שמע כך נתנו חכמים זמן לתפלה, רוצה לומר שזמני התפלה אינם מן התורה אמנם חיוב התפלה עצמה מן התורה כמו שבארנו, וחכמים ז"ל סדרו להם זמנים. וזהו ענין אמרם (ברכות כ"ו:) תפלות כנגד תמידים תקנו, רוצה לומר שתקנו זמניהם כפי זמני הקרבן. ומצוה זו אין הנשים חייבות בה. (בפרשת ואתחנן, אהבה הלכות קריאת שמע פ"א):  Why does the Rambam start discussing the times of prayer in the middle of this mitzvah?

The Rambam counts the tefillin of the hand and the head as two mitzvot (#12-13.)  He explains its counted as two mitzvot because one can do one without the other.  The Ramban asks if that’s the criteria, then krias shema should be counted as two mitzvot, once for the morning and a second for the evening?  Rav Solevetchik explains that the Rambam holds that even though the two times of saying shema are independent, if one does only one of them, he is lacking in the complete fulfillment of shema.  Why is that?  The Rambam at the beginning of Sefer Ahavah brings the possuk ofמה אהבתי תורתך כל היום היא שיחתי, the constant attachment to Torah shows one’s love for Hashem.  In the same vein, the two times of reciting shema are bookends to the kabbalas ol that should last throughout the day.  We read the words twice a day but the קיום lasts throughout the day.  Now we understand if one misses one of the times of shema, he is lacking in the complete kabbalas ol throughout the day. 

That is why the Rambam cites the times of tefillah in the mitzvah of shema.  Just as in tefillah there is one mitzvah to pray during the day, yet Chazal enacted that one should do it three times during the day, so too regarding shema, its one mitzvah with multiple parts during the day.  It is noteworthy that the Derech P'kudecha (from Bnei Yissoscher,) in his intro. suggests that one must have in mind by all three prayers to fulfill the mitzvah of tefillah because Chazal extended the mitzvah to three times a day.  

Teaching Torah

The Rambam counts the mitzvah of Talmud Torah as one mitzvah to learn and to teach, in his words mitzvah #11: היא שצונו ללמוד תורה וללמדה וזהו הנקרא תלמוד תורה, והוא אמרו ושננתם לבניך וכתוב בספרי לבניך אלו התלמידים שהתלמידים קרויים בנים שנאמר יצאו בני הנביאים, ושם נאמר ושננתם שיהיו מחודדים בתוך פיך כשאדם שואלך דבר לא תהא מגמגם לו אלא אמור לו מיד. וכבר נכפל זה הצווי פעמים רבות ולמדתם ועשיתם למען ילמדון, וכבר נתפזר הצווי והזרוז על מצוה זו במקומות רבים מן התלמוד.  Why does he count it only as one mitzvah and not two like the Smag (105-106)? 

It is uniquely in respect to Talmud Torah that we find the concept of a Yissocher-Zevulun pact.  By any other mitzah we don’t find a concept of supporting someone else to fulfill the mitzvah and sharing in the reward.  Why is this uniquely in respect to Talmud Torah?  The mitzvah of Talmud Torah isn’t just to do an act of learning, it is to guarantee the perpetuation of Torah.  That’s why one who supports Torah shares the reward for he is helping guarantee that Torah learning will continue to thrive.  That is why it is one mitzvah according to the Rambam for the yesod of the mitzvah is to make sure Torah continues, not learning per say.  That’s why the Gemorah in Kiddushin (30a) says: אמר ריב"ל כל המלמד את בן בנו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קבלה מהר סיני שנאמר והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך וסמיך ליה יום אשר עמדת לפני ה' אלהיך בחורב (דברים ד, י).  Once there is a three-generation chain, there is a promise that Torah will continue.  That is the point of the acceptance at Sinai.

The Ramban understands that the possuk, רַ֡ק הִשָּׁ֣מֶר לְךָ֩ וּשְׁמֹ֨ר נַפְשְׁךָ֜ מְאֹ֗ד פֶּן־תִּשְׁכַּ֨ח אֶת־הַדְּבָרִ֜ים אֲשֶׁר־רָא֣וּ עֵינֶ֗יךָ וּפֶן־יָס֙וּרוּ֙ מִלְּבָ֣בְךָ֔ כֹּ֖ל יְמֵ֣י חַיֶּ֑יךָ וְהוֹדַעְתָּ֥ם לְבָנֶ֖יךָ וְלִבְנֵ֥י בָנֶֽיךָ tells us a commandment not to forget the event of Har Sinai.  He explains this in his commentary on the possuk and in negative commandments that the Rambam forgot #2 שנמנענו שלא נשכח מעמד הר סיני ולא נסיר אותו מדעתנו אבל יהיה עינינו ולבנו שם כל הימים. והוא אמרו יתעלה השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך ופן יסורו מלבבך כל ימי חייך והודעתם לבניך ולבני 'בניך יום אשר עמדת לפני ה' אלהיך בחורב וגו. Everyone asks on the Ramban that the Mishna in Avos (3:8) says the possuk tells us a commandment not to forget one’s learning?  Rav Dovid Povarski explains according to the Ramban the prohibition to forget one’s learning is part of the greater picture that one must remember the events of Har Sinai; part of the events was the giving of the Torah.  In light of the previous idea, we understand why remembering Sinai is vital.  It’s not just because that is the foundation of the nation, which is true of course, but it the passing down of the Sinai experience that gives life to the Torah and will enhance the acceptance of the next generation so that they don’t view as some archaic teachings. 

Two's

The Yalkut Shemoni Yeshayeh (#444) says: לפי שכתוב שתי בכיות: בכה תבכה - על בית ראשון ועל בית שני, לכך: נחמו נחמו עמי.  Why is there a need for a double נחמה for the two Batteh Mikdash, it should be enough with one nechamah, especially since the first Beis Hamikdash was greater than the second and its nechamah should include that of the second?  And what does it mean there will be a double nechamah, how can one have a double nechamah?  Furthermore, the haftorah is of course connected to the time, but what is the connection to the parsha?

In order to understand the double nechamah, we will first look at another round two in the parsha; the second luchos.  There is a tremendous difference between the two sets of luchos.  The first luchos were received when Klal Yisroel was on a tremendous high state and the luchos themselves were written by Hashem.  At Mattan Torah, Klal Yisroel reached the level of Adam pre-sin; they were complete tzaddikim.  These luchos were tzaddikim level luchos.  Klal Yisroel received a luchos of a tremendous אתערותא דלעילא, it was a great light from Hashem.  There was a מעלה to these luchos for they contained tremendous spiritual energy.  However, the downside is that such a great level of kedusha is very hard to absorb.  

The second luchos were of a completely different nature.  They were the luchos of baaleh teshuvah, of man’s climb back to Hashem.  These luchos were written by man, albeit Moshe Rabbenu.  They didn’t contain all the spiritual energy as existed in the first luchos.  That was a tremendous minus.  However, the upside is that the kedusha is easier to absorb.

The same thing occurred with the two Batteh Mikdash.  The first one has a greater level of the presence of the Shechina but it couldn’t be contained.  On the other hand, the second Beis Hamikdash was a lesser kedusha but the kedusha was able to be absorbed and contained.  The Gemorah (Babba Bathra 3) says that the second Beis Hamikdash was greater than the first for it stood for more years and was taller.  How do physical advantages make up for the lessened amount of kedusha?  The physical advantages are symbolic of the greater effect the Mikdash had on the world because its kedusha was able to be absorbed.  It is these two different aspects of the two Batai Mikdash that require a double nechamah. 

What is the double nechamah? The third Beis Hamikdash which will have the advantages of both.  There will be kedusha drawn down into the world, but it will be able to be contained (Based upon Likutay Sichos volume 9 and Machshavas Hachassidus by Rav Yoel Kahn volume1 chapters 7-10.)

Don't Covet

Back in Parshat Yisro, this blog discussed the question of the Even Ezra how can one be held accountable for לא תחמד, how can one control their thoughts?  In this week’s parsha, the Even Ezra focuses on another aspect of this question in his commentary on לא תתאוה.  Here, he focuses on the philosophical aspect of do our thoughts matter, is one punished for a mere thought?  His answer is yes, in his words:  ורבים אמרו: כי אין עון במחשבת בלב, ואין עליו שכר ולא עונש.

ויש עליו ראיות רבות להשיב עליהם ולא אאריך, רק אראה להם לב חורש מחשבות און (משלי ו׳:י״ח), אם ראית הטיבות כי היהד עם לבבך (דברי הימים ב ו׳:ח׳), ולישרים בלבותם (תהלים קכ״ה:ד׳). ומשה אמר בסוף: בפיך ובלבבך לעשותו (דברים ל׳:י״ד). ועיקר כל המצות ליישר הלב, ורובם זכר. והמזיד והשוגג יוכיחו.

In the blogpost there, it was suggested that according to the Rambam the question of the Even Ezra about how can one be punished for thought is a moot point for he holds the lav is only violated through an action.  However, The Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvot #265-266 and Gezelah Ch. 1 Laws 10-12) differentiates between לא תחמוד which he defines as cheppiring another person to sell you their object vs. לא תתואה which is a prohibition on even desiring that which belongs to another individual.  Based upon this, even the Rambam would have to deal with that question regarding לא תתואה.  However, the Smag lav 158 disagrees with Rambam and holds that both lavin apply only when there is an action; in which case the question of the Even Ezra in Yisro doesn’t start.

Testing

Vaeschanan (6:16) לֹ֣א תְנַסּ֔וּ אֶת־י״י֖ אֱלֹהֵיכֶ֑ם כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר נִסִּיתֶ֖ם בַּמַּסָּֽה.  There is a machlokes Rishonim as to what the possuk is referring too; testing a navi or God.  The Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvot negative commandment 64 says: שהזהירנו שלא לנסות יעודין ויחולין שיעדו אותנו בהם נביאינו על צד הספק שנספק בהם אחר שנדע אמתת נבואת הנביא שיספר בהם. והוא אמרו יתעלה לא תנסו את ה' אלהיכם.  He repeats this in the last law in Yesodei HaTorah: וכן לדורות נביא שנודעה נבואתו והאמינו בדבריו פעם אחר פעם או שהעיד לו נביא והיה הולך בדרכי הנבואה אסור לחשב אחריו ולהרהר בנבואתו שמא אינה אמת ואסור לנסותו יותר מדאי ולא נהיה הולכים ומנסים לעולם שנאמר לא תנסו את ה' אלהיכם כאשר נסיתם במסה שאמרו היש ה' בקרבנו אם אין אלא מאחר שנודע שזה נביא יאמינו וידעו כי ה' בקרבם ולא יהרהרו ולא יחשבו אחריו כענין שנאמר וידעו כי נביא היה בתוכם:.  He clearly holds the prohibition only applies to testing a navi.  Other Rishonim (Bechai, Yeraim#461, Smag negative commandment #4,) maintain that the prohibition is to test God to see if one gains success because of fulfilling the mitzvot.  A third approach is to say the possuk is referring both to testing Hashem and His prophets.  That approach is shared by the Ramban and Chinuch #424.

The Gemorah in Taanis (9a) seems to understand not like the Rambam and the possuk is referring to testing Hashem.  For the Gemorah says that one isn’t allowed to test Hashem (based upon this possuk,) except for regarding מעשר where the possuk (Malachi 3:10) says ובמנוני נא בזאת.  The Tur in Yoreh Deah siman 247 understands that this rule applies toצדקה  as well.  The Beis Yosef asks that the Gemorah (ibid) aonly mentions מעשר, not charity?  The Tur must have understood that מעשר is just an example but every צדקה has the same ‘deal’.  There is a third opinion (cited in Pischai Teshovu siman ibid) that limits the Gemorah even more.  The possuk cited from Malachai is referring to מעשר דגן, they say that the rule doesn’t apply to any monetary giving; its only a rule regarding מעשר דגן.

Eretz Yisroel Man

The Midrash (Devarim 2:8) says that Moshe asked if the bones of Yosef get to be buried in Eretz Yisroel why can’t I get to go?  דָּבָר אַחֵר, אָמַר רַבִּי לֵוִי אָמַר לְפָנָיו רִבּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם עַצְמוֹתָיו שֶׁל יוֹסֵף נִכְנְסוּ לָאָרֶץ, וַאֲנִי אֵינִי נִכְנַס לָאָרֶץ. אָמַר לוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מִי שֶׁהוֹדָה בְּאַרְצוֹ נִקְבַּר בְּאַרְצוֹ וּמִי שֶׁלֹא הוֹדָה בְּאַרְצוֹ אֵינוֹ נִקְבַּר בְּאַרְצוֹ, יוֹסֵף הוֹדָה בְּאַרְצוֹ, מִנַּיִן, גְּבִרְתּוֹ אוֹמֶרֶת (בראשית לט, יד): רְאוּ הֵבִיא לָנוּ אִישׁ עִבְרִי וגו' וְלֹא כָפַר, אֶלָּא (בראשית מ, טו): גֻּנֹּב גֻּנַּבְתִּי מֵאֶרֶץ הָעִבְרִים, נִקְבַּר בְּאַרְצוֹ, מִנַּיִן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יהושע כד, לב): וְאֶת עַצְמוֹת יוֹסֵף אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם קָבְרוּ בִשְׁכֶם, אַתְּ שֶׁלֹא הוֹדֵיתָ בְּאַרְצְךָ אֵין אַתָּה נִקְבַּר בְּאַרְצֶךָ, כֵּיצַד בְּנוֹת יִתְרוֹ אוֹמְרוֹת (שמות ב, יט): אִישׁ מִצְרִי הִצִּילָנוּ מִיַּד הָרֹעִים, וְהוּא שׁוֹמֵעַ וְשׁוֹתֵק, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא נִקְבַּר בְּאַרְצוֹ  Why does the midrash say Moshe was held accountable for not objecting to be called a MItzri if he did so in order to protect his life?  Furthermore, we don’t find Moshe is criticized for not acknowledging that he is a Jew in this exchange, so why is he criticized for not mentioning his connection to Eretz Yisroel?  Also, Yosef came from Eretz Yisroel, but Moshe didn’t, he came from Mitzraim, so it makes sense that he didn’t call himself an עברי ? 

We see from the midrash that no matter where a Jew comes from s/he is always considered someone from Eretz Yisroel.  This isn’t just a nice idea, it has a halachick difference as well as my father cites in his blog from the Rogatchover that one can even take an oath that they are from Yerushalaim, and its not considered a false oath.

Rav Rafael Shmulevetz explains that the midrash isn’t a critique of Moshe, he didn’t have to point out he is a Jew for it would have endangered his life.  So too he didn’t have to speak up about his connection to Eretz Yisroel so as to not endanger himself.  Moshe’s denial of entry to Eretz Yisroel isn’t a punishment, it’s a metzies, a state of fact.  To have a right to Eretz Yisroel one must retain his connection to the land.  Moshe’s connection was severed and therefore the land no longer “desired” him.