A Few Thoughts From The Rebbe

This Shabbos is the yom helulah of the Lubavitcher Rebbe.  I would like to share a couple of his teachings on the parsha which I think shed light on his worldview. 

 After the episode of Korach the Torah tells us the laws of the gifts that must be given to the Kohan.  On a simple level this was to strengthen the kehunah belonging to Aharon.  However, possibly this sheds light on the whole debate of Korach.  On the words vayikach Korach, the Targum says vaespalag Korach.  The word espalag means to divide.  The Noam Elimelech connects this division to the division between the water in the heavens and the water on earth.  In the Torah of Chabad, they expand upon this Noam Elimelech.  If Korach was claiming everyone was holy and why should Aharon be chosen, then how could he and all his followers all desire to be kohanim, this seems hypocritical? Just like there was a separation between the levels of the water, so too Korach didn’t disagree that there were people on a higher level (he himself was a Lavi,) he just felt they should be on a separate pedestal.  His complaint was “why should you rule over the nation of Hashem.”  He felt Aharon shouldn’t affect everyone else, why should everyone have to be elevated through Aharon.  He desired that he should have kehunah completely divorced from bringing kedusha to the rest of the people.  That was his claim to kehunah.  He wanted a new kind of kehunah.  Therefore, the Torah tells us the laws of the priestly gifts for one designates part of his profits for the Kohan and that brings kedusha to the rest.  That is the job of the Kohan, to bring kedusha to everyone. (see LIkutay Sichos volume 18 sicha 5.)

Korach failed to understand the leadership expected of the Kohanim.  He thought if you are on a higher level that it should be self-contained.  The job of the Kohan, the leader of the Jewish people is to help bring kedusha to everyone.  This is what the Rebbe did.  He viewed it as his mission to bring out the sparks of kedusha within everyone’s soul.

Why would the 250 men offer the ketores if they knew that they would die? A similar question can be asked in regard to the Kohanim Gedolim in the times of the second Beis Hamikdash.  If they all died within the year (see Yomah 9a and the Yerushalmi,) why would people want to purchase the Kehunah gedolah?  The answer is that a Jew has a desire to come close to kedusha.  Therefore, the 250 people wanted to have the opportunity to offer the ketores and in Bais Sheni people wanted to be able to enter the Kodesh Kadashim to serve Hashem.  That is why the parsha is called Korach and not Vayikach Korach, for the word vayikach refers to the argument of Korach.  We want to focus on the positive dimension of Korach, to desire to come close to Hashem, to be like the Kohan Gadol.  This is the lesson to be taken from Korach, to desire to come as close to Hashem as possible (Likutay Sichos volume 18 sicha 1.)  

The Rebbe constantly stressed that one should not be happy with our avodah.  The Rebbe constantly encouraged people to add in their avodas Hashem.  There are always new missions and mitzvot that we can do or encourage others to do in order to come closer to Hashem.

Punishments

The Or HaChaim in Shlach (14:38) asks why does the possuk repeat that Yehoushu and Calev remained alive from the spies?  Furthermore, why does the possuk need to say from those that went to check the land, we know they went?  He explains that the possuk is describing that they merited to live because they stood out from amongst the meraglim.  Had they not have stood out, then even if they were righteous they would’ve been killed as part of Klal Yisroel.  In this week’s parsha (16:21) on the words הִבָּ֣דְל֔וּ מִתּ֖וֹךְ הָעֵדָ֣ה הַזֹּ֑את וַאֲכַלֶּ֥ה אֹתָ֖ם כְּרָֽגַע he says the possuk is referring to the tzaddikim,  but not to Moshe and Aharon for they would not be killed with everyone.  We see from the Or HaChaim there is a concept of collateral damage in the punishments from Hashem, but it will not apply to super tzaddikim like Moshe and Aharon.  In (17:10) the Or HaChaim says the same idea.  (See Babba Kamma 60a for the concept of collateral damage in heavenly punishments and Avodah Zarah 4a for the exclusion of super tzaddikim.)  The Ramban also questions why would the non-sinners be wiped away with Korach?  He answers that there would be a general punishment because the people had a leaning towards Korach.

According to the Or Hachaim, why is there a concept of collateral damage if Hashem’s judgement is complete truth?  I leave that for the reader to decide.

Another point on punishments in this weeks parsha.  Rashi (16:27) says that we see how difficult machlokus is for even the young children were killed in the rebellion of Korach.  The Maharal asks how can children be punished they aren’t responsible for their actions?  He explains that its not a punishment, it’s a natural consequence. There is an innate connection between machlokes and gehannim.  He says that both  the source of machlokes and gehannim were created on the same day because they are naturally connected.  He expands upon this idea further in Derech Chayim on Avos (5:16.)  We can explain this idea a little differently than he does.  When one is engaged in machlokes it leads to separation from the other individual.  Gehhenom is where one must be placed if the individual needs some additional time to achieve unity with God.   Both things share the common ground of a lack of unity.  One engaged in machlokes uses the sense to able to be in complete unity and that carries over to the individual's relationship with God as well, it isn't a punishment, its an outgrowth of the personality.

Two Aspects Of The Firstborn

There are two verses in this weeks parsha that tell us the rights of a kohan to the first born animal.  The first is (18:15) כׇּל־פֶּ֣טֶר רֶ֠חֶם לְֽכׇל־בָּשָׂ֞ר אֲשֶׁר־יַקְרִ֧יבוּ לַֽי״י֛ בָּאָדָ֥ם וּבַבְּהֵמָ֖ה יִֽהְיֶה־לָּ֑ךְ.  The second, 3 verses later, says וּבְשָׂרָ֖ם יִהְיֶה־לָּ֑ךְ כַּחֲזֵ֧ה הַתְּנוּפָ֛ה וּכְשׁ֥וֹק הַיָּמִ֖ין לְךָ֥ יִהְיֶֽה.  These two verses describe two aspects of the bechor.  It is as the first verse describes, one of the מתנות כהונה solely because it is the first born.  The second verse tells us a second aspect to the bechor, that it has the status of kadashim.

Tosfos Zevachim 75b ד"ה בכור holds that the temurah of a bechor is eaten by the owner when it gets a blemish and one doesn’t need to give it to a kohan.  The Rambam Temurah 3:2 holds it is given to the kohan.  Seemingly, they argue if the kohan gets the bechor because of its kedusha which exists on the temurah as well or because of it being the firstborn and hence one of the מתנות כהונה, which is not so regarding the temurah.  The Or Sameach asks that in Zevachim 9a entertains a הוא אמינא that if an animal was slaughtered with the intent of having the status of bechor that it is given to the kohanim.  We see even if it isn’t a literal firstborn, as long as it has the same kedusha and status as a bechor its given to the kohanim? 

The Briskor Rav (first piece on Laws of Bechoros) suggests that Tosfos also agrees that the din of kedusha obligates one to give the bechor to the kohanim.  Tosfos holds that such a din only occurs after it is slaughtered as a korban for than it falls under the rubric of the second verse and treated as a korban.  It is when the animal is still living that Tosfos holds one must give it to the kohan only because it is a firstborn so the terumah may be kept by the owner.

Guard Terumah

Rambam Terumot (12:1) מותר לטמא תרומת חוצה לארץ בטמאות של תורה ואף על פי שאינה טמאה אלא בארץ העמים שהיא מדבריהם מפני שעיקר חיובה מדבריהם.   The Rambam (7:8) says: תרומת ח"ל הואיל ועיקרה מדבריהן אינה אסורה באכילה אלא לכהן שטומאה יוצאה עליו מגופו והן בעלי קריין וזבין וזבות ונדות ויולדות וכולן שטבלו מותרין לאכילה אף על פי שלא העריב שמשן אבל טמאי מגע טומאות בין שנגע במת שאי אפשר לנו היום לטהר ממנו בין שנגע בשרץ אינו צריך לטבול לתרומת חוצה לארץ.  So why does the Rambam need to say that one can be metameh the terumah of חוצה לארץ because its only Rabbinic, one isn’t causing any loss to the terumah anyway because it can be eaten in tumah?

We see from here that that the commandment of וַיְדַבֵּ֣ר י״י֮ אֶֽל־אַהֲרֹן֒ וַאֲנִי֙ הִנֵּ֣ה נָתַ֣תִּֽי לְךָ֔ אֶת־מִשְׁמֶ֖רֶת תְּרוּמֹתָ֑י (18:8,) isn’t merely to avoid causing the terumah any loss, it is its own issur to cause tumah to terumah irrespective of effect.

Rambam (12:4) חבית שנשברה בגת העליונה והתחתונה טמאה אם יכול להציל ממנה רביעית בטהרה יציל ואם לאו יציל בידיו בלא נט"י ואע"פ שהוא מטמאה כמו שיתבאר בענין טהרות.  Rashi in Menachos 48b understands this Mishna (Terumah 8:7) to mean one can cause tumah to the terumah with vessels that are tamah even דאורייתא.  However, the Rambam understands that the Mishna only permits one to cause it tumah d’rabbanan even if all the terumah will be lost.  Why doesn’t he permit causing even טומאה דאורייתא if its not going to cause any loss to the terumah?  It fits with the above Rambam that holds there is a issur in it of itself to cause tumah to the terumah (Minchas Avrohom Menachos 48b in the name of Rav Beril Solevetchik.)

Walking Zombies

וירדו חיים שאולה - שגם בשאול חושבים שהם חיים.
הברכה בוירדו חיים שאולה, כמו בני קרח לא מתו, מקום נתבצר להם ועשו תשובה, כי תשובה מועלת רק כל עוד שהוא חי, וזוהי הברכה, שגם בשאול יהיו חיים ויוכלו לעשות תשובה  (Yom Yom 26 Sivan.)

This is a double-edged sword.  There are people that appear to be alive and living a normal life but really, they are in שאול.  There are people that are walking zombies and don’t realize it.  It isn’t the being inשאול  itself that is the problem, it’s the lack of realizing where one is holding.  This is the biggest problem as the Baal Shem Tov said on the possuk (Devarim 31:18) הסתר אסתיר פני, the biggest הסתר is when doesn’t even realize that there is a הסתר.  However, the upside is that the person is still alive and can fix things.

Eat Like A King

The Gemorah in Chullin 132b says למשחה (18:8) teaches us לגדולה that מתנות כהונה should be eaten in a manner that is desirable and tasty.  Rashi ד"ה למשחה says the derasha is regarding מתנות כהונה.  Rashi Zevachim 28a ד"ה אבל הכא says the derasha is regarding קדשים.  Why does he change his terminology from מתנות כהונה to קדשים?  Rashi is explaining according to the context of the Gemorah.  In Zevachim the Gemorah says the din applies to the tail of the korban which is eaten by the owner.  It isn’t a discussion in מתנות כהונה, it’s a din in kodashim.  The Gemorah in Chullin references מתנות כהונה, hence Rashi explains accordingly.  What we can derive from these two different Gemoras is that there are two dinim in the law of למשחה לגדולה.  One halacha is that מתנות כהונה must be eaten in a manner of למשחה לגדולה.  This halacha, as the Gemorah indicates and Tosfos Bechorot 27a spells out, applies even to the זרוע, לחיים, והקיבה.  Even though such מתנות don’t have to be used in a manner of kedusha for the kohan can do whatever he wants with it, even to give to a dog; when the kohan eats them, he must eat them in a respectful manner.  This is the halacha of למשחה לגדולה regarding מתנות כהונה.  Another halacha is that kodashim must be eaten in a respectful manner due to their kedusha. This is a din in the cheftzah of the kodashim.

The aforementioned Tosfos in Bechorot debates whether the din of למשחה לגדולה applies to terumah.  Tosfos concludes that it wouldn’t apply for the din of למשחה לגדולה only applies to meat.  The Achronim ask how can Tosfos say the din only applies to eating meat; this runs against the Gemorah in Sotah 15a that the din ofלמשחה לגדולה   applies to menachos as well? Furthermore, the whole source of the din in the Torah is written in the context of terumah which isn’t meat?  Furthermore, the Gemorah in Temurah 23a derives from the possuk והנותרת ממנה יאכלו אהרן ובניו that the kohan should eat other things before eating the mincha so that it should be eaten when he is already satiated.  The Mordechai end of Pesachim explains this din is based upon the principle of למשחה ולגדולה.  So we see again that the din isn’t limited to meat?

Based upon the previous understanding that there are two dinim in למשחה לגדולה we can possibly understand the Tosfos.  Tosfos agrees that there is a din of למשחה לגדולה regarding the cheftzah of terumah, he is questioning whether this law has the aspect of למשחה לגדולה of eating מתנות כהונה. (Approach of Gevurot Yitzchak, Minchas Avrohom, Moadanei Moshe.)

I have two difficulties with this interpretation of Tosfos.  One problem is that when Tosfos says that למשחה לגדולה only applies to meat, he would seem to mean a sevarah that only by meat it is applicable to say to eat it in a fancy manner.  How does it make sense to differentiate in that sevarah between a din in the eating vs. a din in the kedusha?  Number two is what is Tosfos contrasting between the זרוע, לחיים, והקיבה where there is למשחה לגדולה and terumah where there isn’t if they are two dinim of למשחה לגדולה?

Other Achronim suggest that Tosfos means to differentiate between an obligation of למשחה לגדולה and permission to eat in such a manner.  When it comes to meat, its an obligation to make the meat in a tasty manner, when it comes to menachos its merely permissive.  They bring support to this idea from the language of the Rambam.  When it comes to the meat (Bikkurim V’shar Matnos Kehunah 9:22) he says it’s a חובה to eat them למשחה לגדולה.  Regarding (Maaseh Korbanot 12:14) he says מותרים בכל מאכל.  [The difficulty is the terminology of the Gemorah Zevachim 76a and 90b regarding meat is רשאין לשנות באכילתן, indicating even regarding meat its not an obligation, see Torah Temimah hear that raises the question if its an obligation or not.  Either way, Rav Yosef Engel in Gevurot Shemonim #60 brings proves that the mitzvah of eating kodshim is fulfilled even if it wasn’t eaten in a manner of למשחה לגדולה.]

Nature Of Chermei Kohanim

(18:14) כׇּל־חֵ֥רֶם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל לְךָ֥ יִהְיֶֽה.  The Gemorah in Bechorot 32a (cited in Torah Temimah) says תניא, החרמים כל זמן שהן בבית בעלים הרי הן כהקדש לכל דבריהם, שנאמר (פ׳ בחקתי) כל חרם קודש קדשים הוא לה׳, נתנן לכהן, הרי הן כחולין לכל דבריהם, שנאמר כל חרם בישראל לך יהיה.  There are two ways that one can understand this law.  One way to view it is the person is doing an act of making something hekdesh and the kohanim are given the rights to obtain the object from hekdesh.  Another possibility is that the person is giving a gift to the kohan but the Torah gives it the laws of hekdesh as long as it hasn’t been given over to the kohan.  This would seem to be the doubt of the Minchas Chinuch #357 if gentiles or a מופלא הסמוך לאיש that have the ability to make something hekdesh would be included in this din.  According to the first approach their hekdesh will be valid for it is within their capability to make something hekdesh.  However, according to the second approach that the kedusha is a special din that the Torah superimposes, that is only said regarding Jews that are of age.  This debate of the Minchas Chinuch is already explicit in the Sifri (18:4) that includes gentiles to the law of cherem based on the words כל חרם but some texts have that it is only including גרים (see meforshim.)

The Rosh in Nedarim holds that חרמי כהנים are considered to be a דבר הנדור.  That understanding only makes sense if you assume the person is doing the act of the hekdesh.  However, ר"א מן ההר disagrees with him, he would hold the hekdesh is superimposed by the Torah.

Another difference these two ways of understanding would make is if there should be a din of אמירה לגבוה כמסירה להדיוט regarding חרמי כהנים.  Tosfos Temurah 32b and Sfas Emes there debate this point (see Toras Hakodesh volume 3 siman 13 for further discussion.)