We learn in the parsha (14:8) that it is a positive
commandment to give charity to a fellow Jew.
The Torah stresses that one should give charity with simcha (ibid
verse 10.) Why is there an
emphasis on simcha by giving charity more than any mitzvah? Why is it that if one gives charity for a
reward he is considered a great tzaddik (Rosh Hashana 4a), he gave for
his own purpose; it’s not a perfect mitzvah?
Why is it specifically by charity that G-d promises to pay back what
one spent and one is even allowed to test G-d to fulfill his promise (see
Malachi chapter 3)? Similarly, the
Gemora tells us in Taanis (9a) that if one gives maaser one will get
rich. Why are these promises made
specially for charity?
The answer lies in the Gemora Yevomos (79a) which describes
the nature of Bnei Yisroel as גומלי חסדים. Doing chesed isn't an action one does, but rather is an outgrowth of the nature of Bnei Yisroel (see Or Hatzofon chapter 7.) Doing chesed is a din in the gavra, not in
the cheftzah of giving. That is
why even if one has an alternative reason for giving charity it still is
considered a great deed, for it arouses the natural desire one has to do good
for someone else. (See Rashi in Rosh
Hashana along these lines for why it is a positive deed only when a Jew gives
charity for reward but not for a gentile.)
Tosfos in Bava
Metziah (70b) says that if one takes interest from a loan he does not merit to
be revived when the dead come alive. Why
is there such a severe punishment for taking interest? The Gemorah at the end of Sanhedrin defines a
wicked man as one who steals. Why is
this the ultimate evil doer? And
conversely why is the tzaddik one who gives to others? The explanation may be along the same
lines. If one doesn’t give charity it
shows he has even corrupted the basic traits of a Jew and therefore doesn’t
merit to be resurrected. One who goes
even further, to steal is the ultimate evil.
We may add another label of explanation. The whole creation is merely a kindness of
G-d, which means one’s whole existence depends upon charity. Therefore, built into the very existence of
the whole creation is the need for charity. Based upon this idea, the Bais Halevi in his drashos # 1 explains
why by this mitzvah one can test G-d, for charity is what sustains the whole world and when one attaches himself to this trait he merits that G-d will pay him back for upholding the world.
Based upon this Beis Halevi we can explain the need for simcha in giving charity as
well. Since kindness is what keeps the world running, it behooves one to be in a state of simcha to recognize this fulfillment of the world. When one is fulfilling his
potential, one will feel happy as the Maharal often writes. (See the Bais Halevi’s explanation about simcha in a different vein.) The Ekarim volume 3 chapter 33 says that in fact the reward of charity only comes from the simcha infused into it.
Now we can understand the severity of taking interest. When one takes interest, it shows a rejection of the kindness of Hashem to give him life and therefore, the person doesn’t merit further life in the time of techias hamasim.
Wednesday, August 12, 2020
Tuesday, August 11, 2020
Roots
At the beginning of Ch. 12 the Torah tells us when the Hebrews enter Eretz Yisroel they are to eradicate any trace of idolatry from the land. Rashi says you have to go so far as to לשרש אחריה.
From the context of this possuk it is ruled (see Taz Yoreh Deah 146:12) that this law of לשרש אחריה only applies in Eretz Yisroel. In other words, its a law in settling Eretz Yisroel, not a law in removing avodah zarah.
Many of the sifrei mussar and chassidus use this law as a metaphor for one's own conduct. When one's אל זר has taken root, it is not enough to just remove the bad deeds, one must search for the source of why such conduct is happening to get rid of its very source to guarantee success for the future. As the Gemorah in Shabbos (105b) says כך היא אומנתו של יצר הרע: היום אומר לו עשה כך, ולמחר אומר לו עשה כך, עד שאומר לו עבוד עבודה זרה, והולך ועושה. Its not instantaneous that a person will come to such level of sin, it starts off as a small shoot and grows bigger and bigger.
In light of the previous halacha though, we have an additional twist on this. It is only through the merit of being in Eretz Yisroel that one is able to fully eradicate the אל זר בגופו של אדם. It is the great kedusha of Eretz Yisoel that shines a bright light even in under the dirt of a persons skin and allows one to uproot the roots of evil. This idea is reflected in the Gemorah Arachin (32b) that understands that Moshe couldn't remove the yetzer harah for avodah zarah because he didn't have the merit of Eretz Yisroel, but the later generations, although not as great as Moshe could. It is the merit of the kedusha of Eretz Yisroel that allows one to eradicate avodah zarah (based on Pnenei Harav and Emrei Emes 5670.)
In the ספר זכרון of Rav Hutner in the first section (written by his daughter) it seems he hold that uprooting all forms of avodah zarah is a prerequisite for yishuv Eretz Yisroel :
From the context of this possuk it is ruled (see Taz Yoreh Deah 146:12) that this law of לשרש אחריה only applies in Eretz Yisroel. In other words, its a law in settling Eretz Yisroel, not a law in removing avodah zarah.
Many of the sifrei mussar and chassidus use this law as a metaphor for one's own conduct. When one's אל זר has taken root, it is not enough to just remove the bad deeds, one must search for the source of why such conduct is happening to get rid of its very source to guarantee success for the future. As the Gemorah in Shabbos (105b) says כך היא אומנתו של יצר הרע: היום אומר לו עשה כך, ולמחר אומר לו עשה כך, עד שאומר לו עבוד עבודה זרה, והולך ועושה. Its not instantaneous that a person will come to such level of sin, it starts off as a small shoot and grows bigger and bigger.
In light of the previous halacha though, we have an additional twist on this. It is only through the merit of being in Eretz Yisroel that one is able to fully eradicate the אל זר בגופו של אדם. It is the great kedusha of Eretz Yisoel that shines a bright light even in under the dirt of a persons skin and allows one to uproot the roots of evil. This idea is reflected in the Gemorah Arachin (32b) that understands that Moshe couldn't remove the yetzer harah for avodah zarah because he didn't have the merit of Eretz Yisroel, but the later generations, although not as great as Moshe could. It is the merit of the kedusha of Eretz Yisroel that allows one to eradicate avodah zarah (based on Pnenei Harav and Emrei Emes 5670.)
In the ספר זכרון of Rav Hutner in the first section (written by his daughter) it seems he hold that uprooting all forms of avodah zarah is a prerequisite for yishuv Eretz Yisroel :
Eat Right
This post is a summary of a shiur (my understanding) of a shiur of Rabbi Ezra Schochet on the zoom yarchei kallah for 20 Av.
Rambam Laws of Brachos (1:2) וּמִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים לְבָרֵךְ עַל כָּל מַאֲכָל תְּחִלָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ יֵהָנֶה מִמֶּנּוּ. וַאֲפִלּוּ נִתְכַּוֵּן לֶאֱכל אוֹ לִשְׁתּוֹת כָּל שֶׁהוּא מְבָרֵךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ יֵהָנֶה. The Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch (167:1) echoes this ruling מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה מִן הַתּוֹרָה לְבָרֵךְ אֶת ה' אַחַר אֲכִילַת מָזוֹן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "וְאָכַלְתָּ וְשָׂבָעְתָּ וּבֵרַכְתָּ אֶת ה' וְגוֹ'". וּמִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים לְבָרֵךְ לִפְנֵי כָּל אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה. What is noteworthy is why the change in terminology from עַל כָּל מַאֲכָל as the Rambam said, to the words לִפְנֵי כָּל אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה that the Alter Rebbe chooses? Furthermore, the Rambam's words would seem to be more precise for the word אכילה means a כזית as the Alter Rebbe himself writes in 184:2 וּמִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים לְבָרֵךְ בִּרְכַּת הַמָּזוֹן עַל כַּזַּיִת, שֶׁהוּא שִׁעוּר אֲכִילָה, אֲבָל פָּחוֹת מִכַּזַּיִת אֵינָהּ נִקְרֵא[ת] אֲכִילָה כְּלָל, and one is obligated to say a beracha before eating even on less than a כזית (as the Rambam and Alter Rebbe 168:7 say)?
To explain why the Alter Rebbe switched from the Rambam's terminology we can say they are going לשיטתם as to what creates the obligation of a beracha. The Rambam holds that anything that is a food obligates one to say a beracha before eating it. Other Rishonim and the ruling of the Alter Rebbe is that one is only obligated for a normal form of eating/drinking. This machlokes is illustrated by a few examples.
1. The Rambam (8:7) based upon Berachos (36b) says הַפִּלְפְּלִין וְהַזַּנְגְּבִיל בִּזְמַן שֶׁהֵן רְטֻבִּין מְבָרֵךְ עֲלֵיהֶן בּוֹרֵא פְּרִי הָאֲדָמָה. אֲבָל יְבֵשִׁין אֵין טְעוּנִין בְּרָכָה לֹא לִפְנֵיהֶם וְלֹא לְאַחֲרֵיהֶם מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן תַּבְלִין וְאֵינוֹ אֹכֶל. The Rambam says there is no beracha only because pepper and ginger aren't defined as foods. The Alter Rebbe (202:22) brings the reason of Rashi and other Rishonim that there is no beracha because its not considered fit for consumption, אֲבָל פִּלְפְּלִין יְבֵשִׁים וְזַנְגְּבִיל יָבֵשׁרמג וְכֵן הַצִּפֹּרֶן (שֶׁקּוֹרִין נעגלי"ך), וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱכָלִים בְּיֹבֶשׁ אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי תַּעֲרֹבֶת – אֵין מְבָרְכִין עֲלֵיהֶם כְּלוּם כְּשֶׁאוֹכְלָם בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָם, שֶׁאֵין זוֹ אֲכִילָה שֶׁל הֲנָאָה לְבָרֵךְ עָלֶיהָ בִּרְכַּת הַנֶּהֱנִין. Even if they were considered an אוכל, food, there is still no beracha for there is not the normal way to eat these things.
2. The Gemorah (35b) says that drinking olive oil straight is not beneficial for the body. The Alter Rebbe (202:10) holds that there is no beracha said. However, The Rambam (8:2) rules one must say a שהכל. Why, if it is not beneficial at all? The Kesef Mishne says because there is still pleasure in drinking it. That reason is contradicted by the Meiri that says there is no pleasure at all from drinking olive oil. The reason of the Rambam may be explained with a Rabbenu Yonah (28b in Rif cited in Beis Yosef 204:1) that says even though drinking vinegar is not considered drinking to be prohibited on a fast day, since one is obligated for eating on Yom Kippur if they drink an amount of רביעית, therefore, in regard to a beracha as well it is still considered a food. The Bach (204:4) says that is the explanation why the Rambam holds there is a beracha on olive oil. We see again, even though it is not the normal way of eating, since it's defined as an אוכל it is obligated in a beracha. However, the Alter Rebbe goes like the other Rishonim that one is obligated only for eating something that one benefits from. Hence, the Alter Rebbe doesn't say one is obligated to say a beracha on every מאכל like the Rambam, for he holds that being an אוכל doesn't obligate one in a beracha unless it's a normal form of eating, אכילה ושתייה.
That explains why the Alter Rebbe deviates from the language of the Rambam. However, we still need to understand how what he said is true, what happened to the rule of אין אכילה פחותה מכזית? The Rambam at the end of 1:2 says וּמַטְעֶמֶת אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה בְּרָכָה לֹא לְפָנֶיהָ וְלֹא לְאַחֲרֶיהָ עַד רְבִיעִית: The Kesef Mishne explains because there is no intent to eat - ואפשר לתת סמך לדבר דטעמא משום דכתיב ואכלת וברכת שיהא לו כוונת אכילה משמע. This is מדיוק in the beginning of the Rambam where he says נִתְכַּוֵּן לֶאֱכל אוֹ לִשְׁתּוֹת כָּל שֶׁהוּא, there is כונה to eat. But what does that mean, how can there be כונה to eat if אין אכילה פחותה מכזית? What we see is the rule of אין אכילה פחותה מכזית doesn't mean that is not considered a מעשה אכילה, that it's like eating something that's nor דרכו לאכול. Rather, there is a מעשה אכילה that was done to the food, but it's not considered as if the person ate. With this idea we can also explain some Achronim that hold one is obligated in ברכת המזון even if one didn't eat a כזית in the amount of time of כדי אכילת פרס or the חת"ס holds even for less than a כזית if one is satiated one is obligated. How can this be in the Torah says ואכלת? Because they hold its enough that a מעשה אכילה was done that made the person satiated, one is obligated even though it's not considered as if the person did a מעשה אכילה.
The Minchas Chinuch (430:2) learns that you need an אכילה to be obligated in birchas hamazon so if one ate for example שלא כדרך אכילה there is no obligation. He has a doubt if one ate a כזית normally and the additional amount to add up to כדי שביעה was שלא כדרך אכילה if there is a תורה obligation of birchas hamazon or the entire שביעה must be done through normal eating. The Minchas Chinuch equates שלא כדרך אכילה with a כזית not eaten בכדי אכילת פרס. According to this lomdus, even if you need the entire שביעה to be through אכילה, a כזית not eaten בכדי אכילת פרס, in other words, אכילה פחותה מכזית will be considered a מעשה אכילה to add to the original כזית to make one obligated in birchas hamazon.
Based upon this we understand why it is true what the Alter Rebbe writes לִפְנֵי כָּל אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה because even with less than a כזית it still is a מעשה אכילה of the food.
Rambam Laws of Brachos (1:2) וּמִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים לְבָרֵךְ עַל כָּל מַאֲכָל תְּחִלָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ יֵהָנֶה מִמֶּנּוּ. וַאֲפִלּוּ נִתְכַּוֵּן לֶאֱכל אוֹ לִשְׁתּוֹת כָּל שֶׁהוּא מְבָרֵךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ יֵהָנֶה. The Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch (167:1) echoes this ruling מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה מִן הַתּוֹרָה לְבָרֵךְ אֶת ה' אַחַר אֲכִילַת מָזוֹן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "וְאָכַלְתָּ וְשָׂבָעְתָּ וּבֵרַכְתָּ אֶת ה' וְגוֹ'". וּמִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים לְבָרֵךְ לִפְנֵי כָּל אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה. What is noteworthy is why the change in terminology from עַל כָּל מַאֲכָל as the Rambam said, to the words לִפְנֵי כָּל אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה that the Alter Rebbe chooses? Furthermore, the Rambam's words would seem to be more precise for the word אכילה means a כזית as the Alter Rebbe himself writes in 184:2 וּמִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים לְבָרֵךְ בִּרְכַּת הַמָּזוֹן עַל כַּזַּיִת, שֶׁהוּא שִׁעוּר אֲכִילָה, אֲבָל פָּחוֹת מִכַּזַּיִת אֵינָהּ נִקְרֵא[ת] אֲכִילָה כְּלָל, and one is obligated to say a beracha before eating even on less than a כזית (as the Rambam and Alter Rebbe 168:7 say)?
To explain why the Alter Rebbe switched from the Rambam's terminology we can say they are going לשיטתם as to what creates the obligation of a beracha. The Rambam holds that anything that is a food obligates one to say a beracha before eating it. Other Rishonim and the ruling of the Alter Rebbe is that one is only obligated for a normal form of eating/drinking. This machlokes is illustrated by a few examples.
1. The Rambam (8:7) based upon Berachos (36b) says הַפִּלְפְּלִין וְהַזַּנְגְּבִיל בִּזְמַן שֶׁהֵן רְטֻבִּין מְבָרֵךְ עֲלֵיהֶן בּוֹרֵא פְּרִי הָאֲדָמָה. אֲבָל יְבֵשִׁין אֵין טְעוּנִין בְּרָכָה לֹא לִפְנֵיהֶם וְלֹא לְאַחֲרֵיהֶם מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן תַּבְלִין וְאֵינוֹ אֹכֶל. The Rambam says there is no beracha only because pepper and ginger aren't defined as foods. The Alter Rebbe (202:22) brings the reason of Rashi and other Rishonim that there is no beracha because its not considered fit for consumption, אֲבָל פִּלְפְּלִין יְבֵשִׁים וְזַנְגְּבִיל יָבֵשׁרמג וְכֵן הַצִּפֹּרֶן (שֶׁקּוֹרִין נעגלי"ך), וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱכָלִים בְּיֹבֶשׁ אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי תַּעֲרֹבֶת – אֵין מְבָרְכִין עֲלֵיהֶם כְּלוּם כְּשֶׁאוֹכְלָם בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָם, שֶׁאֵין זוֹ אֲכִילָה שֶׁל הֲנָאָה לְבָרֵךְ עָלֶיהָ בִּרְכַּת הַנֶּהֱנִין. Even if they were considered an אוכל, food, there is still no beracha for there is not the normal way to eat these things.
2. The Gemorah (35b) says that drinking olive oil straight is not beneficial for the body. The Alter Rebbe (202:10) holds that there is no beracha said. However, The Rambam (8:2) rules one must say a שהכל. Why, if it is not beneficial at all? The Kesef Mishne says because there is still pleasure in drinking it. That reason is contradicted by the Meiri that says there is no pleasure at all from drinking olive oil. The reason of the Rambam may be explained with a Rabbenu Yonah (28b in Rif cited in Beis Yosef 204:1) that says even though drinking vinegar is not considered drinking to be prohibited on a fast day, since one is obligated for eating on Yom Kippur if they drink an amount of רביעית, therefore, in regard to a beracha as well it is still considered a food. The Bach (204:4) says that is the explanation why the Rambam holds there is a beracha on olive oil. We see again, even though it is not the normal way of eating, since it's defined as an אוכל it is obligated in a beracha. However, the Alter Rebbe goes like the other Rishonim that one is obligated only for eating something that one benefits from. Hence, the Alter Rebbe doesn't say one is obligated to say a beracha on every מאכל like the Rambam, for he holds that being an אוכל doesn't obligate one in a beracha unless it's a normal form of eating, אכילה ושתייה.
That explains why the Alter Rebbe deviates from the language of the Rambam. However, we still need to understand how what he said is true, what happened to the rule of אין אכילה פחותה מכזית? The Rambam at the end of 1:2 says וּמַטְעֶמֶת אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה בְּרָכָה לֹא לְפָנֶיהָ וְלֹא לְאַחֲרֶיהָ עַד רְבִיעִית: The Kesef Mishne explains because there is no intent to eat - ואפשר לתת סמך לדבר דטעמא משום דכתיב ואכלת וברכת שיהא לו כוונת אכילה משמע. This is מדיוק in the beginning of the Rambam where he says נִתְכַּוֵּן לֶאֱכל אוֹ לִשְׁתּוֹת כָּל שֶׁהוּא, there is כונה to eat. But what does that mean, how can there be כונה to eat if אין אכילה פחותה מכזית? What we see is the rule of אין אכילה פחותה מכזית doesn't mean that is not considered a מעשה אכילה, that it's like eating something that's nor דרכו לאכול. Rather, there is a מעשה אכילה that was done to the food, but it's not considered as if the person ate. With this idea we can also explain some Achronim that hold one is obligated in ברכת המזון even if one didn't eat a כזית in the amount of time of כדי אכילת פרס or the חת"ס holds even for less than a כזית if one is satiated one is obligated. How can this be in the Torah says ואכלת? Because they hold its enough that a מעשה אכילה was done that made the person satiated, one is obligated even though it's not considered as if the person did a מעשה אכילה.
The Minchas Chinuch (430:2) learns that you need an אכילה to be obligated in birchas hamazon so if one ate for example שלא כדרך אכילה there is no obligation. He has a doubt if one ate a כזית normally and the additional amount to add up to כדי שביעה was שלא כדרך אכילה if there is a תורה obligation of birchas hamazon or the entire שביעה must be done through normal eating. The Minchas Chinuch equates שלא כדרך אכילה with a כזית not eaten בכדי אכילת פרס. According to this lomdus, even if you need the entire שביעה to be through אכילה, a כזית not eaten בכדי אכילת פרס, in other words, אכילה פחותה מכזית will be considered a מעשה אכילה to add to the original כזית to make one obligated in birchas hamazon.
Based upon this we understand why it is true what the Alter Rebbe writes לִפְנֵי כָּל אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה because even with less than a כזית it still is a מעשה אכילה of the food.
Thursday, August 6, 2020
Following G-d
וְשָׁ֣מַרְתָּ֔ אֶת־מִצְוֺ֖ת י״י֣ אֱלֹקיךָ לָלֶ֥כֶת בִּדְרָכָ֖יו וּלְיִרְאָ֥ה אֹתֽוֹ- ח:ו
וְעַתָּה֙ יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל מָ֚ה י״י֣ אֱלֹקיךָ מֵעִמָּ֑ךְ כִּ֣י אִם־לְ֠יִרְאָ֠ה אֶת־י״י֨ אֱלֹהֶ֜יךָ לָלֶ֤כֶת בְּכׇל־דְּרָכָיו֙ וּלְאַהֲבָ֣ה אֹת֔ו- י:יב
לְאַהֲבָ֞ה אֶת־י״י֧ אֱלֹקיכֶ֛ם לָלֶ֥כֶת בְּכׇל־דְּרָכָ֖יו וּלְדׇבְקָה־בֽוֹ - יא:כב
Why in the fist possuk does לָלֶ֥כֶת בִּדְרָכָ֖יו precede יראה, in the second one it comes after יראה before אהבה and in the third possuk it comes even after אהבה before לדבקה בו? The Chofetz Chayim (footnote end of intro. to אהבת חסד,) explains that when ever one moves to a higher level it must be preceded by הליכה בדרכיו.
The Rambam (Deos 1:5-6) says וּמְצֻוִּין אָנוּ לָלֶכֶת בַּדְּרָכִים הָאֵלּוּ הַבֵּינוֹנִים וְהֵם הַדְּרָכִים הַטּוֹבִים וְהַיְשָׁרִים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כח ט) "וְהָלַכְתָּ בִּדְרָכָיו": כָּךְ לָמְדוּ בְּפֵרוּשׁ מִצְוָה זוֹ. מַה הוּא נִקְרָא חַנּוּן אַף אַתָּה הֱיֵה חַנּוּן. מַה הוּא נִקְרָא רַחוּם אַף אַתָּה הֱיֵה רַחוּם. מַה הוּא נִקְרָא קָדוֹשׁ אַף אַתָּה הֱיֵה קָדוֹשׁ. וְעַל דֶּרֶךְ זוֹ קָרְאוּ הַנְּבִיאִים לָאֵל בְּכָל אוֹתָן הַכִּנּוּיִין אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם וְרַב חֶסֶד צַדִּיק וְיָשָׁר תָּמִים גִּבּוֹר וְחָזָק וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. לְהוֹדִיעַ שֶׁהֵן דְּרָכִים טוֹבִים וִישָׁרִים וְחַיָּב אָדָם לְהַנְהִיג עַצְמוֹ בָּהֶן וּלְהִדַּמּוֹת אֵלָיו כְּפִי כֹּחוֹ: Many commentators on the Rambam point you to Shabbos 133b for the source. However, that is only the basic idea but there אבא שאול derives it from זה קלי ואנוהו. However, the Rambam is understanding that is the commandment of וְהָלַכְתָּ בִּדְרָכָיו as stated in the Sifri in this week's parsha 11:12 on the words לָלֶכֶת בְּכָל-דְּרָכָיו. This is clear from the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvot #8 where he writes היא שצונו להדמות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת, והוא אמרו "והלכת בדרכיו" (דברים כח, ט). וכבר נכפל זה הצווי ואמר "ללכת בכל דרכיו" (דברים יא, כב) ובא בפירוש (ספרי על דברים, יא כב) "מה הקב"ה נקרא חנון, אף אתה היה חנון; מה הקב"ה נקרא רחום, אף אתה היה רחום; מה הקב"ה נקרא חסיד, אף אתה היה חסיד"
[The Avi Ezri asks how can the Rambam say part of the commandment is to be קדש like Hashem if the Midrash at the beginning of Kedoshim says we can't be קדש like Hashem. The answer seems obvious, the midrash means our kedusha can't equal the level of Hashem's. However, the commandment here is to come as close as we can to Hashem's middos. No one can claim to be as רחום as Hashem, but we are to emulate this as best as possible. I think that is what he answers too.]
How can the Rambam conclude law 5 by saying that the mitzvah leads to being in the middle path if he continues into law 6 saying that the mitzvah is doing actions similar to Hashem?
The son of the Rambam was asked what is the novelty of this mitzvah any more than ואהבת לרעך כמוך? The Lubavitcher Rebbe (Likutay Sichos volume 34 sicha 2 on Ki Savo) says the answer lies in the words of the Rambam "היא שצונו להדמות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת". The mitzvah is to do the actions with intent to follow in the middot of Hashem. In the words of the Rebbe, והיינו ש"והלכת בדרכיו" אינו ציווי הבא לחייב את האדם על ההנהגה (בפועל) ברחמים וחנינה וכיו"ב, כ"א הוא ציווי על ההתדמות — "להדמות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת", שהתנהגותו ברחמים וחנינה כוונתה ומטרתה היא להתדמות לבורא (אלא שבדרך ממילא באה ההנהגה בפועל). ונמצא, שמצוה זו היא מחובת הלבבות, שכוונת האדם בהנהגתו ברחמים וחנינה וכו' צ"ל (לא (רק) משום שהשכל מחייב להתנהג באלו הדרכים משום שהן הנהגות טובות וישרות, אלא) כדי "להדמות בו יתעלה", דמכיון שדרכים אלו הם דרכיו של הקב"ה, לכן הוא מתדמה לו, וכדיוק לשון רז"ל "מה הוא כו' אף אתה כו'", שכל כוונת האדם בהליכה זו היא כדי להדמות לבורא. With this we understand the previous Rambam. Since the mitzvah is to do actions to be like Hashem's actions, therefore it will lead a person to have the perfect balance of the middot like Hashem and be in the middle path.
The Rambam (Deos 1:5-6) says וּמְצֻוִּין אָנוּ לָלֶכֶת בַּדְּרָכִים הָאֵלּוּ הַבֵּינוֹנִים וְהֵם הַדְּרָכִים הַטּוֹבִים וְהַיְשָׁרִים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כח ט) "וְהָלַכְתָּ בִּדְרָכָיו": כָּךְ לָמְדוּ בְּפֵרוּשׁ מִצְוָה זוֹ. מַה הוּא נִקְרָא חַנּוּן אַף אַתָּה הֱיֵה חַנּוּן. מַה הוּא נִקְרָא רַחוּם אַף אַתָּה הֱיֵה רַחוּם. מַה הוּא נִקְרָא קָדוֹשׁ אַף אַתָּה הֱיֵה קָדוֹשׁ. וְעַל דֶּרֶךְ זוֹ קָרְאוּ הַנְּבִיאִים לָאֵל בְּכָל אוֹתָן הַכִּנּוּיִין אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם וְרַב חֶסֶד צַדִּיק וְיָשָׁר תָּמִים גִּבּוֹר וְחָזָק וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. לְהוֹדִיעַ שֶׁהֵן דְּרָכִים טוֹבִים וִישָׁרִים וְחַיָּב אָדָם לְהַנְהִיג עַצְמוֹ בָּהֶן וּלְהִדַּמּוֹת אֵלָיו כְּפִי כֹּחוֹ: Many commentators on the Rambam point you to Shabbos 133b for the source. However, that is only the basic idea but there אבא שאול derives it from זה קלי ואנוהו. However, the Rambam is understanding that is the commandment of וְהָלַכְתָּ בִּדְרָכָיו as stated in the Sifri in this week's parsha 11:12 on the words לָלֶכֶת בְּכָל-דְּרָכָיו. This is clear from the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvot #8 where he writes היא שצונו להדמות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת, והוא אמרו "והלכת בדרכיו" (דברים כח, ט). וכבר נכפל זה הצווי ואמר "ללכת בכל דרכיו" (דברים יא, כב) ובא בפירוש (ספרי על דברים, יא כב) "מה הקב"ה נקרא חנון, אף אתה היה חנון; מה הקב"ה נקרא רחום, אף אתה היה רחום; מה הקב"ה נקרא חסיד, אף אתה היה חסיד"
[The Avi Ezri asks how can the Rambam say part of the commandment is to be קדש like Hashem if the Midrash at the beginning of Kedoshim says we can't be קדש like Hashem. The answer seems obvious, the midrash means our kedusha can't equal the level of Hashem's. However, the commandment here is to come as close as we can to Hashem's middos. No one can claim to be as רחום as Hashem, but we are to emulate this as best as possible. I think that is what he answers too.]
How can the Rambam conclude law 5 by saying that the mitzvah leads to being in the middle path if he continues into law 6 saying that the mitzvah is doing actions similar to Hashem?
The son of the Rambam was asked what is the novelty of this mitzvah any more than ואהבת לרעך כמוך? The Lubavitcher Rebbe (Likutay Sichos volume 34 sicha 2 on Ki Savo) says the answer lies in the words of the Rambam "היא שצונו להדמות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת". The mitzvah is to do the actions with intent to follow in the middot of Hashem. In the words of the Rebbe, והיינו ש"והלכת בדרכיו" אינו ציווי הבא לחייב את האדם על ההנהגה (בפועל) ברחמים וחנינה וכיו"ב, כ"א הוא ציווי על ההתדמות — "להדמות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת", שהתנהגותו ברחמים וחנינה כוונתה ומטרתה היא להתדמות לבורא (אלא שבדרך ממילא באה ההנהגה בפועל). ונמצא, שמצוה זו היא מחובת הלבבות, שכוונת האדם בהנהגתו ברחמים וחנינה וכו' צ"ל (לא (רק) משום שהשכל מחייב להתנהג באלו הדרכים משום שהן הנהגות טובות וישרות, אלא) כדי "להדמות בו יתעלה", דמכיון שדרכים אלו הם דרכיו של הקב"ה, לכן הוא מתדמה לו, וכדיוק לשון רז"ל "מה הוא כו' אף אתה כו'", שכל כוונת האדם בהליכה זו היא כדי להדמות לבורא. With this we understand the previous Rambam. Since the mitzvah is to do actions to be like Hashem's actions, therefore it will lead a person to have the perfect balance of the middot like Hashem and be in the middle path.
Prayer Without Worship
לְאַהֲבָ֞ה אֶת־י״י֤ אֱלֹֽקיכם וּלְעׇבְד֔וֹ בְּכׇל־לְבַבְכֶ֖ם וּבְכׇל־נַפְשְׁכֶֽם רש"י - עבודה שהיא בלב. בלב – זו תפילה
Obviously, if the point of prayer is עבודה שבלב it is an integral part of prayer. The question is if prayer without intent isn't prayer at all or is just a prayer in an incomplete form. In other words, is the קיום of prayer עבודה שבלב but there is a chaftzah, a maaseh mitzvah of prayer irrespective of עבודה שבלב or without the עבודה שבלב it is not a cheftzah of prayer at all.
The Briskor Rav was asked according to his father's yesod, that one must have the knowledge that he is standing before the King when praying Shemonei Esrai, if many people don't have that intent, does it come out one prayed without a quorum because it is as if they didn't pray as well? The Rav responded that even though a prayer without that intent is incomplete, it still is a chaftzah of prayer (cited in Shoalin V'dorshin of Rav Schlesinger volume 9 siman 4, see there his own answer.) He cited proof from the Keter Rosh of Rav Chayim Volozhiner:
We see although a prayer without concentration is not optimal, it still counts as something. (What is the comparison between korban vs. that of mincha needs an explanation, I don't know why it is that way.)
The halacha is that if one doesn't have concentration in the first beracha of Shemoni Esrai, one must repeat the prayer. The Tur writes that nowadays when proper concentration is often lacking, one should not repeat Shemoni Esrai on account of a lack of concentration. The Beur Halacha beginning of siman 101 points out that from the Chayeh Adam it sounds as if this is true even if one is aware in the middle of their Shemoni Esrai of their lack of intent in Avos. Asks the B.H. how can we tell the person to go ahead and finish their Shemoni Esrai, saying for sure ברכות לבטלה just because repeating Avos may be to no avail? Answers the Steipler (Berachot #27) because although prayer without intent is not עבודה שבלב, it is still a cheftzah of prayer.
There is a lot more on this, תן לחכם וכו.
The halacha is that if one doesn't have concentration in the first beracha of Shemoni Esrai, one must repeat the prayer. The Tur writes that nowadays when proper concentration is often lacking, one should not repeat Shemoni Esrai on account of a lack of concentration. The Beur Halacha beginning of siman 101 points out that from the Chayeh Adam it sounds as if this is true even if one is aware in the middle of their Shemoni Esrai of their lack of intent in Avos. Asks the B.H. how can we tell the person to go ahead and finish their Shemoni Esrai, saying for sure ברכות לבטלה just because repeating Avos may be to no avail? Answers the Steipler (Berachot #27) because although prayer without intent is not עבודה שבלב, it is still a cheftzah of prayer.
There is a lot more on this, תן לחכם וכו.
Tuesday, August 4, 2020
Your Son Is A Gadol
The Rambam Daos (3:3) המנהיג עצמו על פי הרפואה אם שם על לבו שיהיה כל גופו ואבריו שלמים בלבד ושיהיו לו בנים עושין מלאכתו ועמלין לצורכו אין זו דרך טובה אלא ישים על לבו שיהא גופו שלם וחזק כדי שתהיה נפשו ישרה לדעת את ה' שאי אפשר שיבין וישתכל בחכמות והוא רעב וחולה או אחד מאיבריו כואב וישים על לבו שיהיה לו בן אולי יהיה חכם וגדול בישראל נמצא המהלך בדרך זו כל ימיו עובד את ה' תמיד
The Sefer הוגה דעות brings that we see one must raise their children to give them the capability to be giants in Torah.
The Sefer הוגה דעות brings that we see one must raise their children to give them the capability to be giants in Torah.
Guard Your Soul
רק השמר לך ושמר נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך
ונשמרתם מאד לנפשתיכם כי לא ראיתם כל תמונה
The Gemorah in Berachos (32b) brings a story תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּחָסִיד אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה מִתְפַּלֵּל בַּדֶּרֶךְ. בָּא הֶגְמוֹן אֶחָד וְנָתַן לוֹ שָׁלוֹם, וְלֹא הֶחְזִיר לוֹ שָׁלוֹם. הִמְתִּין לוֹ עַד שֶׁסִּייֵּם תְּפִלָּתוֹ. לְאַחַר שֶׁסִּייֵּם תְּפִלָּתוֹ, אָמַר לוֹ: רֵיקָא, וַהֲלֹא כָּתוּב בְּתוֹרַתְכֶם ״רַק הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ וּשְׁמֹר נַפְשְׁךָ״, וּכְתִיב ״וְנִשְׁמַרְתֶּם מְאֹד לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם״. כְּשֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ שָׁלוֹם לָמָּה לֹא הֶחְזַרְתָּ לִי שָׁלוֹם? אִם הָיִיתִי חוֹתֵךְ רֹאשְׁךָ בְּסַיִיף, מִי הָיָה תּוֹבֵעַ אֶת דָּמְךָ מִיָּדִי?! This is the source for the Rambam (Shmeris Hanefesh 11:4) says וכן כל מכשול שיש בו סכנת נפשות מצות עשה להסירו ולהשמר ממנו ולהזהר בדבר יפה יפה. שנאמר השמר לך ושמור נפשך. ואם לא הסיר והניח המכשולות המביאין לידי סכנה ביטל מצות עשה ועבר בלא תשים דמים. There are numerous questions on this, see Maharsha in Berachos and Minchas Chinuch on the mitzvah of making a מעקה. However besides all that , the simple read of the possuk is referring to a spiritual danger.The Chofetz Chayim derives from here a lesson; when one's being careful to avoid physical harm, one must also avaid spiritual harm:
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