Sunday, March 8, 2020
Thursday, March 5, 2020
Repetitive Rashi
I haven't posted a question on Rashi in quite a while but here is another one. Rashi this week's parsha, (29:18) explains the word ריח ניחוח regarding the עולה brought to sanctify Aharon ריח ניחח – נחת רוח לפני, שאמרתי, ונעשה רצוני. Again in possuk 25 regarding the שלמים Rashi says לריח ניחח – לנחת רוח, שאמר, ונעשה רצונו. Again in Vayikra (1:9) Rashi says ניחח – נחת רוח, לפי שאמרתי, ונעשה רצוני. Why does Rashi feel the need to repeat this comment multiple times and specifically in these places?
Wednesday, March 4, 2020
The Hidden Moshe
וְאַתָּ֞ה תְּצַוֶּ֣ה׀ אֶת־בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֗ל וְיִקְח֨וּ אֵלֶ֜יךָ שֶׁ֣מֶן זַ֥יִת זָ֛ךְ כָּתִ֖ית לַמָּא֑וֹר לְהַעֲלֹ֥ת נֵ֖ר תָּמִֽיד׃. Why does Moshe need to take the oil, he isn't lighting the menorah, Aharon is? Why does the Torah use this strange terminology of וְאַתָּ֞ה תְּצַוֶּ֣ה here and not צו את בני ישראל or דבר etc? The Gemorah in Megillah (13b) says about Haman, תנא כיון שנפל פור בחודש אדר שמח שמחה גדולה אמר נפל לי פור בירח שמת בו משה ולא היה יודע שבשבעה באדר מת ובשבעה באדר נולד. Why does the saying conclude with Moshe's death before his birth, it should have said שבשבעה באדר נולד ובשבעה באדר מת? And how does the fact that Moshe was also born on 7 Adar counteract the fact that he died then? The Rishonim bring from Chazal that this is the only parsha that Moshe's name isn't mentioned. The Meor Einayim points out that this week's parsha often corresponds with Moshe's yom hilulah so it hints to his removal from the world. However, Moshe is "hidden" in the parsha a few times, wouldn't it make more sense to omit him entirely?
What Chazal mean is that the death of Moshe wasn't a removal of his effect from the world, it was a metamorphosis. בשבעה באדר מת ובשבעה באדר נולד is דוקא. Moshe was reborn on 7 Adar. He is reborn into the Torah that is נתחדש in every generation. Yes there was a כפה עליהן הר כגיגית but then there was a קיימו וקיבלו היהודים. The constant learning of the Torah ensures that Moshe Rabbenu never left us. As the holy books point out that sometimes the Gemorah has an expression משה שפיר קאמרת because every Talmud Chachan has a ניצוץ of Moshe.
The name of a person is merely the representation of the individual, its a symbolic link referring to the person's body and deeds. The essence of an individual however, goes above his/her name. In our parsha the name of Moshe, the physical body of Moshe Rabbenu passes from our vision, however his essence remains with us. The Migalleh Amukot (57) (cited in Yalkut Reuvani) says the העלם, מילוי of משה is מ, ין, א which is 101, the number of pessukim in the parsha. This means that the external figure and presence of Moshe isn't there but his פנימיות is in the parsha. The menorah represents the Torah and oil represents חכמה; ergo Moshe Rabbenu was responsible for collecting the oil for he is the transmitter of the chachmas haTorah to Klal Yisroel. It isn't merely a body named Moshe that transmits the Torah but Moshe Rabbenu's essence can be found in the Torah itself. That is why the Torah uses the strange terminology of וְאַתָּ֞ה תְּצַוֶּ֣ה. It is וְאַתָּ֞ה תְּצַוֶּ֣ה for it the part of Moshe Rabbenu that can't be referenced by name that is present in the Torah. It is the Moshe that can't be accessed through the name that is infused into the Torah. [וְאַתָּ֞ה is א through ת and the ה מוצאות הפה used to pronounce the Torah.] [See Torah Menachem 5751, Likutay Sichos volume 26.]
What Chazal mean is that the death of Moshe wasn't a removal of his effect from the world, it was a metamorphosis. בשבעה באדר מת ובשבעה באדר נולד is דוקא. Moshe was reborn on 7 Adar. He is reborn into the Torah that is נתחדש in every generation. Yes there was a כפה עליהן הר כגיגית but then there was a קיימו וקיבלו היהודים. The constant learning of the Torah ensures that Moshe Rabbenu never left us. As the holy books point out that sometimes the Gemorah has an expression משה שפיר קאמרת because every Talmud Chachan has a ניצוץ of Moshe.
The name of a person is merely the representation of the individual, its a symbolic link referring to the person's body and deeds. The essence of an individual however, goes above his/her name. In our parsha the name of Moshe, the physical body of Moshe Rabbenu passes from our vision, however his essence remains with us. The Migalleh Amukot (57) (cited in Yalkut Reuvani) says the העלם, מילוי of משה is מ, ין, א which is 101, the number of pessukim in the parsha. This means that the external figure and presence of Moshe isn't there but his פנימיות is in the parsha. The menorah represents the Torah and oil represents חכמה; ergo Moshe Rabbenu was responsible for collecting the oil for he is the transmitter of the chachmas haTorah to Klal Yisroel. It isn't merely a body named Moshe that transmits the Torah but Moshe Rabbenu's essence can be found in the Torah itself. That is why the Torah uses the strange terminology of וְאַתָּ֞ה תְּצַוֶּ֣ה. It is וְאַתָּ֞ה תְּצַוֶּ֣ה for it the part of Moshe Rabbenu that can't be referenced by name that is present in the Torah. It is the Moshe that can't be accessed through the name that is infused into the Torah. [וְאַתָּ֞ה is א through ת and the ה מוצאות הפה used to pronounce the Torah.] [See Torah Menachem 5751, Likutay Sichos volume 26.]
Clothes Without A Body
Rashi in Chukas (21:1)
says יושב הנגב – זה עמלק, שנאמר: עמלק יושב בארץ הנגב (במדבר י״ג:כ״ט), ושינה לשונו לדבר לשון כנען כדי שיהו ישראל מתפללין לתת כנענים בידם והם אינם כנענים, ראו ישראל לבשיהם כלבושי עמלקיים, ולשונם לשון כנען, אמרו נתפלל סתם אם נתון תתן את העם הזה בידי. If Amalek was trying to mess up the prayers of Klal Yisroel why didn't they change their garments as well so that Klal Yisroel would pray against the wrong nation?
The Or HaMeir on the Megillah says the following teaching from the Baal Shem Tov.
What I believe he is trying to say is that the evil forces don't have any true self; they only exist as a cover up, as garments over the truth. It is impossible for Amalek to change their garments for that is their entire existence. Amalek without its clothes ceases to be Amalek. Amalek was trying to disguise itself as כנען but not steal their identity. In order to maintain their own identity, Amalek must remain in its own garb.
The Or HaMeir on the Megillah says the following teaching from the Baal Shem Tov.
What I believe he is trying to say is that the evil forces don't have any true self; they only exist as a cover up, as garments over the truth. It is impossible for Amalek to change their garments for that is their entire existence. Amalek without its clothes ceases to be Amalek. Amalek was trying to disguise itself as כנען but not steal their identity. In order to maintain their own identity, Amalek must remain in its own garb.
Atz Hadaas, Amalek And Weights
Rashi in the beginning of Parshas Zachor explains the juxtaposition of Amalek right after the parsha of weights זכור את אשר עשהא עמלק וגו׳ – אם שקרת במדות הללו ובמשקלות, הוי דואג מן גירויב האויב, שנאמר: מאזני מרמה תועבת י״י (משלי י״א:א׳), וכת׳ בתריה: בא זדון ויבא קלון (משלי י״א:ב׳). Why does cheating in weights lead to Amalek; what is the connection? The Gemorah Chullin (139b) says the hint to Haman in the Torah is in the word Berashis (3:11) המן העץ אשר צויתיך לבלתי אכל ממנו אכלת. Why is Haman connected to the these words?
Why was eating from the עץ הדעת prohibited; seemingly knowing between good and bad should be a good thing? Knowledge of the difference between good and evil is indeed a positive; but one has to be an honest judge between the two. Before the sin of the עץ הדעת, Adam and Chava also had a clear perception of good and evil but they had no personal bias and connection to it. They were able to judge between the two forces as outsiders and to separate between the two. The word דעת means connection. Eating from the עץ הדעת meant that know Adam and Chava became connected to the good and the evil. They could no longer be bystanders to arbitrate fairly between the two but they had to see the ideas through their own prism. They decided good and evil not based upon what it is inherently but based upon how they felt, how it affected them, was it good or bad for them.
The idea of false measures isn't just in the scales in your fruit store, its a message for life. How does a person weigh what's important or inconsequential, what's good or inappropriate, moral or depraved? These are the scales of life. If one's scales are weighed down by their own feelings and ego, that is having false scales and measurements.
This is Amalek. They attack the bridge between the מוחין and מדות of the individual as is represented by the וה of the שם that they cut off. That bridge is דעת. Amalek infiltrates the דעת of a person to be מקלקל the חשבונות of an individual. That is why Haman is hinted to in the עץ הדעת for that is the source of his power.
Why was eating from the עץ הדעת prohibited; seemingly knowing between good and bad should be a good thing? Knowledge of the difference between good and evil is indeed a positive; but one has to be an honest judge between the two. Before the sin of the עץ הדעת, Adam and Chava also had a clear perception of good and evil but they had no personal bias and connection to it. They were able to judge between the two forces as outsiders and to separate between the two. The word דעת means connection. Eating from the עץ הדעת meant that know Adam and Chava became connected to the good and the evil. They could no longer be bystanders to arbitrate fairly between the two but they had to see the ideas through their own prism. They decided good and evil not based upon what it is inherently but based upon how they felt, how it affected them, was it good or bad for them.
The idea of false measures isn't just in the scales in your fruit store, its a message for life. How does a person weigh what's important or inconsequential, what's good or inappropriate, moral or depraved? These are the scales of life. If one's scales are weighed down by their own feelings and ego, that is having false scales and measurements.
This is Amalek. They attack the bridge between the מוחין and מדות of the individual as is represented by the וה of the שם that they cut off. That bridge is דעת. Amalek infiltrates the דעת of a person to be מקלקל the חשבונות of an individual. That is why Haman is hinted to in the עץ הדעת for that is the source of his power.
Tuesday, March 3, 2020
Don't Rip The Clothes
The Gemarah in Yoma (72a) says אמר רחבא אמר רב יהודה המקרע בגדי כהונה לוקה שנאמר שמות כח, לב לא יקרע. The Gemarah seems to be saying that somehow we derive that the prohibition to rip the priestly garments isn't limited to the מעיל which is mentioned in the possuk, but applies to all the garments.
The Rambam Kli Mikdash (9:3) says וְהַקּוֹרֵעַ פִּי הַמְּעִיל לוֹקֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כח לב) (שמות לט כג) "לֹא יִקָּרֵעַ". וְהוּא הַדִּין לְכָל בִּגְדֵי כְּהֻנָּה שֶׁהַקּוֹרְעָן דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה לוֹקֶה: The Achronim argue is the praise דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה is going back on the מעיל as well or only referring to the other priestly garments (see Mishne L'melech, Torah Temimah here.) Why would there be a difference? The Achronim (Michas Chinuch mitzvah 101, Rogatchover) explain that ripping the מעיל is an innate issur. However, ripping the other garments is only prohibited because of לא תעשון כן לה' אלקיכם (Reah 12:4,) which is only דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה. According to this the Gemarah doesn't mean to say that the issur of לא יקרע is learnt out to the other garments but rather that its prohibited as well, however, the issur is only because of לא תעשון כן.
The Rambam Sefer Hamitzvot (negative commandments #88) says הזהירנו מקרוע פי מעיל כהן גדול אבל יהיה ארוג כמו שהוגבל. והוא אמרו יתעלה כפי תחרא יהיה לו לא יקרע, ומי שחתכו במספרים או הדומה להם לוקה. (שם, שם): From here would seem to be a proof that the Rambam holds that the issur of לא יקרע applies only to the מעיל, and other garments are only prohibited because of לא תעשון כן לה' אלקיכם. However, from the fact that he records the issur of tearing the priestly garments next to the מעיל would indicate ripping the other garments is also a violation of לא יקרע. As noted last year on this blog, the Rambam also holds the לאו of לא יזח החושן applies only if one removes them דרך קלקול. If the rule of דרך קלקול applies to the מעיל as well then we would see the Rambam holds that definition of ripping apart the בגדי כהונה is דרך קלקול so that is the rule for לא יזח החושן as well. However, if its only a din in the prohibition of לא תעשון כן then why would it be a requirement for violation of לא יזח החושן as well? So, there seem to be opposite indications from the Rambam if other garments are prohibited because of לא תעשון כן or because of לא יקרע, וצ"ע.
The Rambam Kli Mikdash (9:3) says וְהַקּוֹרֵעַ פִּי הַמְּעִיל לוֹקֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כח לב) (שמות לט כג) "לֹא יִקָּרֵעַ". וְהוּא הַדִּין לְכָל בִּגְדֵי כְּהֻנָּה שֶׁהַקּוֹרְעָן דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה לוֹקֶה: The Achronim argue is the praise דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה is going back on the מעיל as well or only referring to the other priestly garments (see Mishne L'melech, Torah Temimah here.) Why would there be a difference? The Achronim (Michas Chinuch mitzvah 101, Rogatchover) explain that ripping the מעיל is an innate issur. However, ripping the other garments is only prohibited because of לא תעשון כן לה' אלקיכם (Reah 12:4,) which is only דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה. According to this the Gemarah doesn't mean to say that the issur of לא יקרע is learnt out to the other garments but rather that its prohibited as well, however, the issur is only because of לא תעשון כן.
The Rambam Sefer Hamitzvot (negative commandments #88) says הזהירנו מקרוע פי מעיל כהן גדול אבל יהיה ארוג כמו שהוגבל. והוא אמרו יתעלה כפי תחרא יהיה לו לא יקרע, ומי שחתכו במספרים או הדומה להם לוקה. (שם, שם): From here would seem to be a proof that the Rambam holds that the issur of לא יקרע applies only to the מעיל, and other garments are only prohibited because of לא תעשון כן לה' אלקיכם. However, from the fact that he records the issur of tearing the priestly garments next to the מעיל would indicate ripping the other garments is also a violation of לא יקרע. As noted last year on this blog, the Rambam also holds the לאו of לא יזח החושן applies only if one removes them דרך קלקול. If the rule of דרך קלקול applies to the מעיל as well then we would see the Rambam holds that definition of ripping apart the בגדי כהונה is דרך קלקול so that is the rule for לא יזח החושן as well. However, if its only a din in the prohibition of לא תעשון כן then why would it be a requirement for violation of לא יזח החושן as well? So, there seem to be opposite indications from the Rambam if other garments are prohibited because of לא תעשון כן or because of לא יקרע, וצ"ע.
פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה
Tosfos in Shabbos 75a and 103a says that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה is prohibited rabbinically on Shabbos for it is a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא which is a rabbinic prohibition. It is clear from Tosfos 103 that he doesn't hold only regarding Shabbos that a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה is prohibited but by other issurim it is prohibited as well. The law of מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא is only applicable by Shabbos so it would appear Tosfos must hold by other prohibitions it is forbidden from Torah law. However, regarding Shabbos one would have been exempt because its not מלאכת מחשבת, nonetheless it's still rabbinically prohibited (see also Tosfos Yoma 35a.)
However, if we look at Tosfos in Ketubot 6a, it appears that Tosfos there has a different take. There Tofos doesn't say it it a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא, but that the Rabbis prohibited just like a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא. In other words, Tosfos agrees that a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה itself is not a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא and technically should be completely permitted. However, just like the Rabbis prohibited a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא because it looks like your doing a מלאכה, one can't tell what's going on in your head, so too the Rabbis prohibited a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה because it looks like you're doing a מלאכה. According to this Tosfos it may well be that even regarding other issurim the prohibition of פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה is rabbinic in nature.
The Aruch is of the opinion that a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה is completely permitted. Tosfos says one of his proofs is from the Gemorah in Zevachim that one may offer a נדבה of wine and pour it on the fire of the alter even though one violates the lav of extinguishing the fire from the mizbaoch for the person's intent is not to extinguish, but to offer his נדבה. The Aruch asks how is it permitted because its a דבר שאינו מתכוין, its a פס"ר that it will be extinguished? He says we see that since you don't want the fire to be extinguished, its permitted. Tosfos in Ketubos says no proof; there its permitted to uphold the mitzvah of your libation. Tosfos in Shabbos answers that the question isn't right; its not a פס"ר, you can pour the wine slowly so it won't extinguish the fire. Tosfos in Shabbos can't say like Tosfos in Ketubot for saying מצוה שאני only makes sense if its a rabbinic prohibition. Since Tosfos in Shabbos holds its prohibited from Torah law, he is forced to say its not a פס"ר.
The big question is why according to the Aruch (and even Tosfos in Ketubot that disagrees,) it פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה not prohibited because of מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא? (See the gilyon on the Tosfos, Rashash and Chidushay Rav Reuvain.) The reason why a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה is permitted according to the Aruch is that he holds פס"ר is prohibited for we view it as if the person intended to do the מלאכה since its an obvious derivative of his actions. However, if its against his will, we can't view it as if the person has intent to do the מלאכה for the individual doesn't want to do the מלאכה at all (see Rosh Shabbos 16:8.) That is all if there is no intent to do the מלאכה. However, when there is intent to dd the מלאכה, but the person doesn't desire the results of the מלאכה, then its a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא (still needs to be worked through all the cases,וצ"ע.)
The Maggid Mishna (Shabbos 12:2) has a chiddush that when it comes to the מלאכה of מכה בפטיש there is no law of פס"ר being prohibited for it is only the though process of the person that determines if what they are working on is completing it to be a vessel. This seems to fly in the face of the Gemorah Sukkah (33b) that assumes there is a problem of פס"ר when plucking berries off the hadash branch for it makes it into a usable object for the mitzvah? [It is true the Rambam omits that step of the Gemorah which would work well for this Maggid but the Maggid there (Lulav 8:5) gives a different explanation of the Rambam which still doesn't work with his opinion.]
However, if we look at Tosfos in Ketubot 6a, it appears that Tosfos there has a different take. There Tofos doesn't say it it a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא, but that the Rabbis prohibited just like a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא. In other words, Tosfos agrees that a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה itself is not a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא and technically should be completely permitted. However, just like the Rabbis prohibited a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא because it looks like your doing a מלאכה, one can't tell what's going on in your head, so too the Rabbis prohibited a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה because it looks like you're doing a מלאכה. According to this Tosfos it may well be that even regarding other issurim the prohibition of פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה is rabbinic in nature.
The Aruch is of the opinion that a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה is completely permitted. Tosfos says one of his proofs is from the Gemorah in Zevachim that one may offer a נדבה of wine and pour it on the fire of the alter even though one violates the lav of extinguishing the fire from the mizbaoch for the person's intent is not to extinguish, but to offer his נדבה. The Aruch asks how is it permitted because its a דבר שאינו מתכוין, its a פס"ר that it will be extinguished? He says we see that since you don't want the fire to be extinguished, its permitted. Tosfos in Ketubos says no proof; there its permitted to uphold the mitzvah of your libation. Tosfos in Shabbos answers that the question isn't right; its not a פס"ר, you can pour the wine slowly so it won't extinguish the fire. Tosfos in Shabbos can't say like Tosfos in Ketubot for saying מצוה שאני only makes sense if its a rabbinic prohibition. Since Tosfos in Shabbos holds its prohibited from Torah law, he is forced to say its not a פס"ר.
The big question is why according to the Aruch (and even Tosfos in Ketubot that disagrees,) it פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה not prohibited because of מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא? (See the gilyon on the Tosfos, Rashash and Chidushay Rav Reuvain.) The reason why a פס"ר דלא ניחא ליה is permitted according to the Aruch is that he holds פס"ר is prohibited for we view it as if the person intended to do the מלאכה since its an obvious derivative of his actions. However, if its against his will, we can't view it as if the person has intent to do the מלאכה for the individual doesn't want to do the מלאכה at all (see Rosh Shabbos 16:8.) That is all if there is no intent to do the מלאכה. However, when there is intent to dd the מלאכה, but the person doesn't desire the results of the מלאכה, then its a מלאכה שאין צריך לגופא (still needs to be worked through all the cases,וצ"ע.)
The Maggid Mishna (Shabbos 12:2) has a chiddush that when it comes to the מלאכה of מכה בפטיש there is no law of פס"ר being prohibited for it is only the though process of the person that determines if what they are working on is completing it to be a vessel. This seems to fly in the face of the Gemorah Sukkah (33b) that assumes there is a problem of פס"ר when plucking berries off the hadash branch for it makes it into a usable object for the mitzvah? [It is true the Rambam omits that step of the Gemorah which would work well for this Maggid but the Maggid there (Lulav 8:5) gives a different explanation of the Rambam which still doesn't work with his opinion.]
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