Twins Of Sun And Moon

Rashi (Bereishis 38:27) notes the difference between the term תאומים used for Tamar’s pregnancy and תאמים used for Rivka’s. In Tamar’s case, both children were righteous, whereas Rivka bore Yaakov, a tzaddik, and Esav, a rasha. The Torah’s need to highlight this distinction suggests that there is a fundamental similarity between these two pregnancies. What is that comparison?

Regarding Zarach’s birth, Rashi comments that the phrase “ארבע ידות” appears, alluding to the four acts of treachery committed by Achan, who descended from Zarach. Others explain that it refers to the four items Achan took: a Shinar garment, two silver pieces totaling 200 shekels, and one golden tongue. Why is Achan’s sin hinted at here?

The Ramban, citing the Bahir, explains that Peretz and Zarach correspond to the sun and the moon. Zarach, whose name suggests “shining,” represents the sun—constant and unwavering. Peretz, whose name implies “breaking through,” parallels the moon, which waxes and wanes. What does this symbolism mean? Zarach embodies the tzaddik, whose light shines steadily and whose path is straightforward. Peretz represents the baal teshuva, whose spiritual journey includes ups and downs but ultimately reaches greater heights. This is why Mashiach descends from Peretz for the transformative power of teshuva surpasses the static righteousness of the tzaddik (see Likkutei Sichos vol. 30).

The Torah distinguishes between Yaakov and Esav, and between Peretz and Zarach, because the potential dynamic was similar. Yaakov parallels Zarach—the tzaddik—while Esav could have mirrored Peretz, becoming a baal teshuva. Instead, Esav succumbed to his lows and never rose above them.

The Maharal expands on the Ramban’s sun-moon analogy, noting that Achan’s four transgressions correspond to the four acts of betrayal against the four designated cherem items, reflecting the power of the sun created on the fourth day. Unlike the moon, which fluctuates, the sun is fixed and limited. Achan’s sin lay in trying to emulate Peretz—seeking expansion beyond his boundaries and taking what was not his. This overreach led to his downfall.

Self, Non-Self

 קטנתי מכל החסדים ומכל האמת אשר עשית את עבדך

The Gra (cited in Pardes Yosef) says this is the 8^th possuk in the 8^th parsha and that is where Chazal see to say a talmud chacham should have an eighth of an eighth of haughtiness (Sotah 5a.) The question is that this possuk seems to be the opposite of haughtiness, Yakaov is saying how small he is?  The Gemarah in Sotah is difficult for the Gemarah says haughtiness is a terrible middah and then throws in the statement about a talmud chacham, why is he given an allowance for a bit of haughtiness? The Gemarah compares this bit of haughtiness to the crown of the bristle-like growth on the top of the husk. What is the meaning of this comparison? 

The Midrash says קָטֹנְתִּי מִכָּל הַחֲסָדִים א"ר אבא ב"כ איני כדאי ר' לוי אמר כדאי אני. How can there be an opinion כדאי אני if this is the ultimate statement of humbleness on the part of Yaakov? 

Sfas Emes (5648) אך עי"ז עצמו שקטנתי. עי"ז כדאי אני. ואם אמנם לעיני בשר האומר קטנתי נראה כי הוא מתגאה. אבל מי שאומר לפני הבורא ית' קטנתי הוא שהכיר את עצמו וראה שיודע הוא שכל החסדים ואמת שעשה עמו הבורא ית' אינו בזכותו. ולכן באמת לא יגרע מזכותו כלום. וזה הכלל אם אדם תולה בעצמו נעשה לו באמת בזכות מעשיו.

When Yaakov says קטונתי it means that he felt so small, so nothing, that all he felt was his connection to Hashem. By totally negating himself he was able to say כדאי אני because the אני was not a אני of self merit but rather an אני of the Godliness within himself  being fit for anything. When there is the ultimate self negation that leads one to have a haughtiness, not of self inflation but due to the connection to The Infinite. 

The Alter Rebbe explains that the haughtiness of the talmud chacham is compared to the part of the chaff that guards the wheat for it is only a protective stage that the haughtiness is needed to inspire one to have the ability to increase one's avodah but after one reaches a greater level all haughtiness should be dropped. But as we see from Yaakov Avenu there is a third level of a haughtiness from the feeling of tremendous smallness. This is when haughtiness is desirable. That is why the Gra is pointing to this possuk as explanation of the Gemarah (based upon sicha of Rebbe 5749.) 

The Alter Rebbe after his redemption on 19 Kislev wrote a letter (Igros Kodesh Tanya letter 2) starting with this possuk emphasizing that the more chesed one receives from Hashem, the closer one seems, the more one sees their own smallness. This allows one to push aside their own self and be in tune with the Godliness within themselves.   

In terms of Rambam in Gemerah Sotah, see letter of Rebbe. 

Oneg Shabbos And Yaakov

א"ר יוחנן משום רבי יוסי כל המענג את השבת נותנין לו נחלה בלי מצרים שנאמר (ישעיהו נח, יד) אז תתענג על ה' והרכבתיך על במתי ארץ והאכלתיך נחלת יעקב אביך וגו' לא כאברהם שכתוב בו (בראשית יג, יז) קום התהלך בארץ לארכה וגו' ולא כיצחק שכתוב בו (בראשית כו, ג) כי לך ולזרעך אתן את כל הארצות האל אלא כיעקב שכתוב בו (בראשית כח, יד) ופרצת ימה וקדמה וצפונה ונגבה (שבת קיח)

What is the connection between עונג שבת and meriting a נחלה בלי מיצרים? What is the נחלה without boundaries? Why is the beracha associated with עונג שבת said explicitly in the dream of Yaakov? Why is it said to Yaakov specifically? 

As explained in 'Two Yaakovs', the beginning of Veyetzei marks the transformation of Yaakov, the איש תם יושב אוהלים, into Yaakov, who is now engaged with the world at large. Yaakov takes the years of his involvement in purely holy work, and it gives him the ability to bring kedusha into חרן. It is at this juncture that Yaakov experiences his dream. The ladder is the ladder of connection between this world and the higher worlds, between Yaakov on earth and Yaakov of the כסא הכבוד, between kodesh and chol. The message to Yaakov is that it is time for him to take the spiritual heights he has developed and use them to transform the greater world. Chazal connect the סולם with סיני (minus the ו it is the same gematria.) The סולם alludes to Sinai, the giving of the Torah, and the connection of heaven and earth. The Torah is the ladder that connects heaven and earth; the ability to bring kedusha into the chol stems from the Torah. Yaakov is the Av associated with Torah. He sees the vision of the ladder; he is instructed to spread the kedusha through his power of Torah. 

The Zohar says that the beracha of a person's week stems from Shabbos. Shabbos is the point of kedusha that can elevate the chol of the week around it. The Bnei Yissachar cites the Alshich, who states that it says מענג את השבת, not המענג בשבת, for it is the appreciation of the oneg of Shabbos that brings this reward. It is not about having oneg one the day of Shabbos, but that the Shabbos adds oneg to one's activities. One who can appreciate the kedusha of Shabbos and use that to enhance the physical needs of the person, to incorporate their actions as part of Shabbos, by turning it into an act of עונג שבת, is following in the footsteps of Yaakov, of taking the point of kedusha and using that to enhance the physical matter. The נחלה בלי מיצרים is that one's life will not be limited by boundaries of where kodesh ends and chol begins, but will become a seamless life guided by the boundless kedusha that is innately within a person.  

(See Likutay Sichos volume 15, Beis Yishai derashos #12, sicha of Rav Rav Zalman Baruch Melamed.)

Esau's Milah

The Rabbenu Yona, in his commentary to Sanhedrin, says that Esau did bris milah. He explains the reason is that he would be included in the command to Avraham that his descendants should do bris milah. Even though Esau is excluded from כי ביצחק ולא כל יצחק, that was only established later on. The idea of the establishment of ולא כל יצחק was not said yet is cited by the Briskor Rav in the name of Rav Chayim to explain why the Rambam (Melachim 10:7) cites a different verse to exclude Esau from milah, שהרי יצחק אמר ליעקב ויתן לך את ברכת אברהם לך ולזרעך, מכלל שהוא לבדו זרעו של אברהם המחזיק בדתו ודרכו הישרה והם המחוייבין במילה. Why does he not cites ולא כל יצחק? Because the possuk itself doesn't say Esau is out, maybe Yaakov is out; it is only from the fact that Yaakov is given the mantle to carry on the legacy of Avraham that we know to read ביצחק ולא כל יצחק to exclude Esau, but that is not a given in itself. 

The Daas Zekanim (25:25) cites a Midrash כשראהו אביו אמר עדיין לא נבלע בו דמיו ולא רצה למולו לשמונה ימים כדאמרינן גבי מעשה דשתי נשים שבאו לפני נתן הבבלי וכו׳. כשעבר שנה או שנתיים וראה יצחק שלא החליף מראיתו ידע שזו תולדתו ואפ״ה לא מל אותו אמר הואיל ולא מלתי אותו לשמנה כמוני אמתין עד שיהיה בן י״ג כמו ישמעאל אחי ואמול אותו וכשהיה בן י״ג שנה הוא עכב בעצמו ולא רצה למול והיינו דכתיב אם לא דם שנאת ודם ירדפך. According to the Midrash Esau never obtained a bris milah. But it is clear that Yitzchak did want to give him a bris milah. According to Rabbenu Yona presumably there was no danger in doing the milah, however, if there is a machlokes, it may be explained in multiple ways. 

The Mizrachi (Shemos 4:24) asks how Moshe could delay giving milah to his son, even if there is sakanah, there is no heter of וחי בהם for a gentile to not put himself in danger for the fulfillment of a mitzvah? He clearly assumes that וחי בהם is not said for a gentile, and hence, for a positive fulfillment of a mitzvah, there is no exemption even for life-threatening situations. The Parashas Derachim (Derech Ha'esarim #2) presents several points of argument against the Mizrachi's assertion. He argues on his principle, for he holds even without וחי בהם one does not have to put themselves in danger to fulfill a mitzvah, וחי בהם is only necessary to remove a possible limmud from the cardinal sins that one would have to give up their life (see more about the discussion in הרחבות לפניני הלכה.) Another point he raises is that even if the Mirachi is correct, how can Moshe put someone else in danger to fulfill his obligation? (The Chemdas Yisrael mitzvah 215) says this objection hinges on the nature of the father who does the milah for his son. If it is the obligation of the father, the Parashes Derachim is right, that wouldn't allow him to put his child in danger but if the mitzvah is on the father to fulfill the obligation of his son since he is to young to do it himself, then the father is just acting as the agent of his son who would be obligated himself to put himself in danger to fulfill his obligation and the father can do the milah for him.)  Either one of these points would be in play regarding Yitzchak giving a milah to Esau.  

According to the Midrash why did Yitzchak not do the bris on Esau once he saw there was no more danger, why did he wait untill he was 13? Rabbi Shulman has a fancy approach here.    

The simple read of the Ramban (Lech Lecha 17:6) איננו נכון בעיני שיבשרנו בעת ברית המילה על עשו, והוא אינו מקיים המילה וגם לא נצטוה עליה, כמו שדרשו בסנהדרין (בבלי סנהדרין נ״ט:) כי ביצחק – ולא כל יצחק sounds like Esau did not have any command of milsh. However, he may be referring to after it was established ולא כל יצחק which was not at birth. Either way, the Ramban assumes that Esau did not have a bris at all like the Midrash.  

Ask Her

ויאמרו נקרא לנער ונשאלה את פיה The Midrash says from here we derive one should marry an orphan only if she agrees. The inference from the Midrash is that only for an orphan does one need her acquiescence, since she is the one who is in charge of deciding if she should be married. However, if she has a father, her father can marry her unwillingly. This means that a gentile father has the right to marry off his daughter just like a Jewish father (this is noted by Rav Yosef Engel). However, it is unclear how we know this law applies to gentiles as well?

The Gemarah Kiddushin (3b-4a) explains how we know a father has a right to marry off his daughter. We need a source for this halacha, so how do we know the same law should apply to a gentile? There is a basic chakirah discussed in the Achronim regarding whether the father's right to marry off his daughter is a right the Torah gives him, akin to an automatic shliach for his daughter, or whether the halacha indicates that the father is considered the owner of his daughter, at least vis-à-vis the law of marriage. According to the first way, it is harder to see why we should extend a chiddush of a father's rights to a gentile. According to the second approach, once we see that the father is viewed as the owner of his daughter's marriage rights, that is a halacha in ownership, as a monetary law, and the same law would be true for a gentile. (It is noteworthy that the Maharal in Gur Aryeh on this possuk assumes a gentile does not have the right to marry off his daughter.)

Rashi says on the possuk that one should marry a נערה only if she agrees; he does not specifically mention the context of an orphan. Rav Yosef Engel questions why we need to derive that a woman needs to agree to be married; in every kinyan, both parties need to agree to go through with the kinyan?

The Mesoras Hashas in Kiddushin 2b points out a contradiction in Rashi Kiddushin vs. Rashi Yevamos if the reason for the need for the woman to agree to kiddushin is because of the requirement of דעת מקנה or derived from a possuk of והלכה והיתה לאיש חר מדעתה משמע. Rav Yosef Engel says, according to Rashi in Yevamos, it would seem not to be a law based on דעת מקנה, but a possuk, and that may not apply to gentiles. However, it is difficult to understand why you would not need her to agree to be married because of דעת מקנה? This can only make sense if you assume the woman is not playing an active role in the kiddushin at all but instead she is just מפקר עצמה אצל הבעל as the Ran Nedarim daf 30 says (according to the understanding of the Avnei Miluim in many places.) (The Achronim give different explanations for the Rashi Yevamos that he is being מחדש another din of needing her דעת for kiddushin since in the context of מאמר where there is already a connection between יבם ויבמה then her דעת would not be necessary if not for another din of needing דעת, see Sharay Chayim Kiddushin.)  However, maybe Rashi doesn't mean a halacha; he is just saying we see a proper code of conduct (see also Kiddushin 61b, וצ"ע)?

Too Much Chesed

Rav Kook in פנקס "אחרון בבויסק" (#10) says

אמנם אהבת עצמו במדה הראויה, היא מיסודי חקי המוסר. אמנם שמירה גדולה צריך שלא יבא לביטול העצמיות, ביחוד בישראל, כי נטיית הקודש מאברהם אבינו ע"ה הי' להתפשטות החסד בעולם, ושלא להתגדר לא בגזע ולא בלאם. על כן לא הי' נטיית שמירה כלל לצביון הלאומי לולא עירוב כח אהבת עצמו, שצריך הי' להרכבה זרה, על כן מלכות בית דוד הי' צריך להיות ממואב ועמון, מואב אהבת הגזע, עמון אהבת האומה. בהתרחב המושג הלאומי בימי רחבעם, שכבר נפלג הגזע לשני מטות, יהודה ואפרים, צריך להמצא מושג העממי למען השמירה הצוריית. וזהו מצאתי דוד עבדי, שאמרו חז"ל היכן מצאתיו, בסדום, מקום אהבת עצמו הגדולה ביותר, מלח סדומית שמסמא את העינים. והוא מציאה משתי בנותיך הנמצאות, כדי ליסד יסוד לאומיות עם ישראל בשמירת חטיבה לעצמו. Sometimes chesed has to be reined in otherwise there is no room for prioritizing self. 

Gevurah is actually necessary for chesed to be used properly for if chesed is left unchecked it goes to far and self destructs. This is one of the explanations why rain (chesed) is called gevurot geshamim (see siddur Alter Rebbe) for it is the division of rain into droplets that allows it to be beneficial to the world and not wipe it out. 

Chassidic books say that Yishmael was the פסולת חסד of Avraham. He inherited the middah of chesed but misuses it. Yishmael's chesed does not have the safeguard of gevurah attached to it and therefore, leads to immoral activities.  

The Alter Rebbe (Torah Or Lech Lecha) says that is why we say מגן אברהם, there has to be a block around the chesed of Avraham so that it doesn't go to forces that need to be eradicated.

The Beracha In The Middle (ברכת להכניסו 2)

The Gemarah Yevamot (71b) says that Avraham had a commandment to do מילה, but he was not commanded to do פריעה. That was a commandment said to Yehoshua. The Rosh Shabbos (137) says that we say the beracha of להכניסו בבריתו של אברהם אבינו before the פריעה since that is also considered עובר לעשייתן. The Chasam Sofer asks how can we say להכניסו בבריתו של אברהם אבינו for a commandment not even given to Avraham? 

According to the Rosh, why don't we just say the beracha before the beginning of the act of the milah? It would seem because of the severah the Rosh says right beforehand, that one does not say a beracha on a mitzvah beforehand if another person is performing the action of the mitzvah. (Some Rishonim say because one can't guarantee the other person will actually carry through with doing the mitzvah. It may also just be that a rule that before one is actively doing a mitzvah, one must say a beracha, not that a beracha needs to be said before the mitzvah is performed.) The Taz (265:1) says if the father himself is performing the milah, he should say the beracha of להכניסו before the milah itself, for one shouldn't stop in the middle of the mitzvah to say a beracha, and in the interim the milah will fill with blood and be hard to do the פריעה. Why doesn't he simply say, since the father himself is doing the milah, he should say להכניסו before starting the mitzvah at all? Either the Taz holds we would have said לא פלוג, since when done by a mohal, the beracha will be said between milah and פריעה, so too even when the father does it, except for the reasons he gives not too (see Maharasha Pesachim 7a) or he must have understood this is the correct place for the beracha to be said (as suggested here.) Why would this be the proper placement? The Bach says a twist on the Rabbenu Tam (cited in Tofos and Rosh Shabbos, and Tosfos Pesachim 7a) that the beracha is said to demonstrate that we are performing the mitzvah of milah לשמה. The Bach says we say the beracha before the פריעה to demonstrate that we are different from the Arabs, who just do milah but do not do פריעה. If that is the point of the beracha, even the father should say it between milah and פריעה, but the Taz has technical concerns, so he says the father should say it even before the milah.;