Between A Gentile And a Jew

There is sometimes a concept in halacha of two opposite categories but sometimes something can fall in the middle of the two categories but be neither here nor there.  As an example, the Gemarah says (Sanhedrin 58b) that an eved kinani is out of the category of a gentile but has not entered the category of a yisrael.  I happened recently to be learning a few examples of this principle and was wondering about trying to find more examples but apparently a list has already been complied by Rav Moshe Adler.  This idea may be employed in the world of hashkafa as well.  In the book by Aviezer Revitsky, "Messianism. Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism," he points out that both Kookian Zionism and Satmer anti-Zionism both stem from the idea that a Jewish state is only applicable outside of the boundaries of golus and hence it must have to do with the geulah.  From there they take opposite approaches either to reject the concept of Israel being a Jewish stare before the Mashiach comes or to view it as the beginning of the geulah process. The author suggests it may be a middle ground, it is not the normal state of golus to have a Jewish state but it is not the process of geulah yet.  

One of the examples of the middle category is how the Radvaz understands the level of a ger who has done a bris milah but not yet gone through the tevilah in a mikvah.  He says in this case as well, the "ger" is no longer a gentile but is not yet a Jew and therefore he has dinim sometimes like a goy and sometimes like a Jew.  The Radvaz says that he will not make wine יין נסך.  It is hard to know when it comes to the status of something in the middle for which laws it figures in category 1 or category 2. 

Rav Yosef Engel suggests (חוסן יוסף #69, Gilyonay Hashas Yevamot 47) that the two parts of the act of gerus, milah and tevilah, reflect these two levels.  The milah is done to remove the status of a gentile and the tevilah is done in order to give the status of a yisrael.  This line of reasoning would fit very well with the Radvaz.  The prospective ger that has done milah is no longer a gentile but has not done tevilah yet in order to enter kedushas yisrael.  It is interesting that the Chelkas Yoav (volume 2 #8) assumes diametrically the opposite.  He says that if only milah is done the person still has the full status of a gentile.  However, if tevialah is done before milah, then the person does have somewhat the status of a Jew and in fact is obligated in mitzvot.  See more about this topic here.  

The Gur Aryeh Vayigash (46:10) asks why Chazal say that Klal Yisrael were prohibited to marry their relatives after Matan Torah, we should say גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי?  He answers that כקטן שנולד דמי is said only for a ger that comes voluntarily not for Klal Yisrael that the mountain was placed over their head.  He clearly says the rule of כקטן שנולד דמי does not apply to the gerus of Matan Torah.  However, the Meshech Chachma (Vaeschanan 5:27) says the idea of  כקטן שנולד דמי is derived from the gerus of Matan Torah itself from the fact that Bnei Yisrael were not told that they were prohibited to wives who may have been prohibited relatives. (For a collection of the sources to the idea of כקטן שנולד דמי, see Rav Asher Weiss.)  I subsequently found numerous sources that point out this contradiction, see Rav Yoel Amital and Rav Meyer Yisrael.  

Rav Yosef Engel (Beis Haotzer klal 1 #8 questions if the Avos had the status of Yisrael already before Matan Torah how was there gerus at Matan Torah?  In light of the previous discussion maybe there is a middle ground.  Before Matan Torah there was a concept of a separate Jewish nation that in it of itself had a concept of gerus to join as Chazal employ the terminology of gerus even for the people Avraham was teaching.  The Jewsih nation was not in the category of a mere ben noach.  On the other hand, there was no formal kedushas Yisrael and that is established only with the gerus at Sinai (see similar idea in the גרנ"ט כתובות סימן כח ויבות בימן יא.) וצ"ע.     

Listen And Renew Yourself

 ואשא אתכם על כנפי נשרים ואבא אתכם אלי

The Avodas Yisrael cites Rav Levi Yitzchak that the נשר is called נשר because of its nature of molting.  The feathers of the eagle are נושר, they fall off.  He cites Rashi (Tehillim 103:5) כנשר הזה שמחדש כנפיו ונוצה משנה לשנה.  He says in this vein Klal Yisrael as well are able to shed their sins and do teshuva.  The possuk is saying that Hashem will bring a person close to Him and give them the ability to do teshuva.  (My father wrote this idea the first time the Eagles won the Super Bowl.) I think this idea is not such a nice vort on these words but encapsulates the essence of Yisro himself.  Yisro was able to reinvent himself and go through various incarnations to go from the כהן in מואב to the father-in-law of Moshe, rejecting avodah zarah, joining Klal Yisrael, leaving again.  He did not just stay in his old ways but was willing to molt and be מחדש himself to do what seemed right to him.  וישמע יתרו, he was always listening to hear a new way.  Yisro teaches us that it is important to have one's "ears open" to be willing to hear and listen to a different and improved outlook.  This may be why Yisro serves as the introduction to the parsha of Matan Torah.  In order to be at a Matan Torah one needed to open their ears to acquire the capability of listening. The possuk in Tehillim (40:7) says זבח ומנחה לא חפצת אזנים כרית לי עולה וחטאה לא שאלת.  Rashi says the possuk is referring to Matan Torah and Hashem says I didn't ask for korbanot just to open your ears to listen.  A few perakim later (45:11) it describes listening to Torah, והטי אזנך.  A prerequisite to learning Torah is to be able to listen to the kol Torah, to be open to molting and molding one' character to be in tune with the Torah's commands.

Neros Shabbos Part 2

The Mishna Pesachim (53b) says that there were conflicting customs if one should light neros for Yom Kippur.  The Gemarah explains the machlokes according to Rashi's explanation that בין שאמרו להדליק - אותן שנהגו להדליק והנוהגין שלא להדליק לא נתכוונו אלא לדבר אחד להפריש עצמו ממשכבי אשה האומרים להדליק משום דאין אדם משמש מטתו לאור הנר והאומרים שלא להדליק סוברים כשהנר דולק רואה את אשתו ומתאווה לה.  The machlokes is about what is practically better to do to uphold the prohibitions of Yom Kippur.  The Gemarah continues that when Yom Kippur falls out on Shabbos, it is a machlokes if everyone agrees that one then lights candles, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים שֶׁחָל לִהְיוֹת בְּשַׁבָּת, אַף בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאָמְרוּ שֶׁלֹּא לְהַדְלִיק — מַדְלִיקִין מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד הַשַּׁבָּת. וְעָנֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בָּתְרֵיהּ: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים.  Presumably the Chachamam hold not to light for the same practical concerns as every Yom Kippur.  So why does רשב"א differentiate?  He would seem to hold that since Shabbos has an obligation of neros Shabbos, that applies even when Shabbos coincides with Yom Kippur.  In other words, he holds the practical concerns can't cancel out the obligation of neros Shabbos.  But why does he hold that a regular Yom Kippur doesn't have the same obligation?  It would seem to depend on the nature of the obligation of neros Shabbos.  In the post last week, 'Neros Shabbos,' it was brought up the issue is the mitzvah of neros Shabbos is for the candles to be lit on Shabbos or is the mitzvah to do an act of lighting the candles.  This debate may reflect what the reason of the mitzvah is.  Is the mitzvah is to give kavod to Shabbos, then it is an act to be done before Shabbos for the sake of Shabbos, so it would be a mitzvah to light the candles but if the mitzvah is for oneg Shabbos because having a lit house enhances one's enjoyment of Shabbos, then it would suffice for the candles to be lit on Shabbos, one does not need to actively ight for Shabbos.  Yom Kippur does have an obligation of kavod (Shabbos 119a) but does not carry the obligation of oneg.  It would seem רשב"א holds the obligation of lighting candles is in order to give oneg to the day and therefore, he holds a regular Yom Kippur does not have the obligation of lighting neros but Shabbos Yom Kippur does.  

The Rosh (Yoma Chapter 8 siman 27) however, says we always light a candle on Yom Kippur and say a beracha because of the mitzvah of shalom bayis.  He seems to be giving a third reason for the neros which is shalom bayis and that obligation applies even on Yom Kippur.  Rav Yosef Engel (ציונים לתורה כלל לח עמ' מז) is bothered that how can shalom bayis itself be a reason to light candles, if that is the case there should be an obligation to light a candle and one should say a beracha every single day of the year?  He says the Rosh must mean that due to the fact that there is kavod on Yom Kippur as well, one can say a beracha when lighting.  How does this fit in the words of the Rosh?  I assume he means that kavod is to do something is preparation for Shabbos that will enhance one's Shabbos experience.  In what way is one's Shabbos experience enhanced?  Because one's shalom bayis is enhanced that allows for a more enjoyable Shabbos. 

See more about this discussion in כוכבי יצחק siman 1.

Continuous Building

 Spoke at a sheva berachat for a minute and a half.  

There is a question in poskim as to if there should be a beracha on שהחיינו upon marriage based upon the fact that a) it is the first time one is doing a mitzvah which may warrant a שהחיינו and b) it should be no words than new כלים that one says a שהחיינו upon.  There are various answers given as to why common practice is to not say a שהחיינו.  There is an article from Rabbi Itamar Rosensweig in which he develops the idea in halachik grounds that the act marriage is not the completion of the relationship process but it is continued through the ביאה ראשונה and having children.  He says that שהחיינו is said on achieving a certain level of completion which can not claim is fulfilled in the middle of the process.  He cites the ר"י בר יקר that the idea of שהחיינו has its basis in Hashem's creation of the world ויברך אלקים את יום השביעי ,on the completion of creation a beracha is said.  So too, one says שהחיינו on a completion of a mitzvah and here the mitzvah is ongoing.  

The idea here (outside of halachik analysis,) is that marriage is an ongoing process.  Just because a couple set foot under the chuppah does not mean they are finished with a mitzvah, on the contrary, they are just beginning. 

The Orchos Chayim (cited in ibid,) says first we say a beracha משמח חתן וכלה and after that משמח חתן אם הכלה since the first beracha is for them to lead a successful life and the next beracha is that that they should be happy together, אם, together with each other.  This is not accomplished under the chuppah but is something that must be worked on together. 

Troubling Rashba

The Rashba in Teshuva 245 says there is no shecheyanu said on bris milah for the mitzvah is on beis din, not on the father.  It is quite outstanding that he seems to say the mitzvah is entirely on the beis din, not on the child or the father at all.  

Kiddush Points

Tosfos in Pesachim (106a) ד"ה זכריהו has a discussion if kiddush on wine is a Torah law or not.  The Magen Avrohom (371:1) says since the conclusion is that is merely a Rabbinic law to say the kiddush on wine and one can fulfill the Biblical commandment of kiddush with the prayer services when one says מקדש השבת.  Rabbi Akiva Eger says based upon this that saying good Shabbos also would suffice to fulfill one's Biblical commandment for one has mentioned that the day is Shabbos.  In the Beur Halacha he objects to the R.A.E. because the Rambam says one needs to say דברי שבח in kiddush and that is not said by merely mentioning Shabbos?  The Rashba Teshuva (volume 4 #295) also says that one can fulfill kiddush outside the context of on a cup of wine or prayer but says it has to be words of שבח וקילוס. (In the sefer Ratz Katzvi he says the Rashba fits the R.A.E. not like the question of the Beur Halacha bit I don't understand how he reads the Rashba who says one needs words of praise?  Rav Mordechai Eliyahu also notes this Rashba sounds not like the R.A.E.)  The one asking the question to the Rashba however does indicate that merely saying today is Shabbos does suffice for kiddush which would fit with R.A.E.  What may be the underpinnings of this debate?  This blog in the past mentioned the machlokes Rambam and Ramban if the nature of kiddush is to mention and designate the holiness of Shabbos as a distinct day from other days or is it a human form of injecting kedusha into day like Beis Din declaring the shemittah year holy.  The Rambam goes lishitaso and hence requires a mention of the holiness and praise of the day. According to the Ramban however, one can argue that it merely suffices to declare that the day is Shabbos. 

The Dagul Marevavah (271:2) raises the issue if the the man of the house prays maariv and already fulfills his Biblical obligation of kiddush how can he recite kiddush for his wife who is obligated on a Biblical level if woman are not part of arvus (which he understands based upon a Rosh.)?  R.A.E. takes issue because of how he learns the Rosh.  However, according to R.A.E. the whole question shouldn't get off the ground because the woman should also fulfill her obligation by lighting neros Shabbos.  As pointed out even not according to the R.A.E., if a woman adds words of praise after lighting candles about Shabbos, they also would fulfill the Biblical obligation according to the Magen Avraham. 

The Mishna Berurah (271:2) takes issue with the Magen Avraham for mitzvot need kavanah to fulfill the obligation and one is not thinking of fulfilling the mitzvah of kiddush when davening?  The Chasam Sofer actually advises one to have in mind not to be yotzei kiddush in tefillah in order to be able to fulfill kiddush according to the takkanah of Chazal with wine in the place of the seudah (צ"ע if the chasam Sofer means to activly have this in mind ,this is what it sounds like from his haghos on Shulchan Aruch ,or this is automatic that one is not yotzei untill the meal after the takkana of Chazal, see his teshuva #17 and #21 he says it is like לב ב"ד מתנה שלא לצאת?)  However, as noted by Rav Shlomo Zalman in Shulchan Shlomo this is an interesting implementation of lack of kavanah.  The person that is davening is intending to say the words of praise about Shabbas, the same very same text as kiddush in fact, and he is expressing his his acknowledgment and intent of sanctifying Shabbos, why where is the lack of kavanah?  Says Rav Shlomo Zalman, because the person's intent is to say this as part of tefillah not as a fulfillment of kiddush.  It may very well be that the Magen Avraham will tell you there is no lack of kavanah here for the person has intent to do the same thing as kiddush does, the fact that there is no intent for the specific mitzvah of kiddush is not relevant.

Hakaras Hatov

The Eban Ezra on Koheles (5:1) אמר אברהם המחבר: הנה נא הואלתי לדבר, כי בעבור היות כבוד המקום מלא כל מקום, ולא יוכל האדם להשמר בכל מקום, הוכן לו מקום שיהיה לו קבוע לתפילתו, והוא חייב לכבדו. גם חייב הוא האדם להודות ולשבח לאלהיו בכל רגע, כי חסדו עמו בכל חלקי הרגע, שיחיינו ויתענג בהרגשות. רק בעבור היות האדם מתעסק בעסקי העולם, הושם לו זמן שיתפלל בו, והם עתים ידועים: ערב ובקר וצהרים; כי כל מי שיש לו עינים ידע עת צאת השמש ועת נטותו ועת בואו. על כן חייב אדם שיתפלל, שישמור פתחי פיו ויחשוב בלבו שהוא עומד לפני מלך, בידו להחיות ולהמית. על כן אסור שיתפלל אדם ויכניס בתוך תפילתו פיוטין לא ידע עיקר פירושם, ולא יסמוך על המחבר ברצונו הראשון, כי אין אדם אשר לא יחטא, או המעתיקים חטאו.  The Eban Ezra says that really one is obligated to say thank you to Hashem every second for every second Hashem does chesed for a person! 

The Mesilas Yesharim Ch. 8 echoes such an idea וְאָמְנָם, מַה שֶּׁיּוּכַל לְהַגְבִּיר הַהִתְעוֹרְרוּת הַזֶּה הוּא הַהִסְתַּכְּלוּת בְּרוֹב הַטּוֹבוֹת, שֶׁהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עוֹשֶׂה עִם הָאָדָם בְּכָל עֵת וּבְכָל שָׁעָה, וְהַנִּפְלָאוֹת הַגְּדוֹלוֹת שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה עִמּוֹ מֵעֵת הַלֵּדָה עַד הַיּוֹם הָאַחֲרוֹן, כִּי כָּל מַה שֶׁיַּרְבֶּה לְהִסְתַּכֵּל וּלְהִתְבּוֹנֵן בִּדְבָרִים אֵלֶּה, הִנֵּה יַרְבֶּה לְהַכִּיר לְעַצְמוֹ חוֹבָה רַבָּה אֶל הָאֵל הַמֵּטִיב לוֹ,... הֶעָנִי חַיָּב לוֹ שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ בְּעָנְיוֹ מַמְצִיא לוֹ פַּרְנָסָתוֹ דֶּרֶךְ נֵס וָפֶלֶא וְאֵינוֹ מַנִּיחוֹ לָמוּת בָּרָעָב. הַחוֹלֶה עַל שֶׁמַּחֲזִיקוֹ בְּכֹבֶד חָלְיוֹ וּמַכּוֹתָיו וְאֵינוֹ מַנִּיחוֹ לָרֶדֶת שַׁחַת, וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, עַד שֶׁאֵין לְךָ אָדָם שֶׁלֹּא יַכִּיר עַצְמוֹ חַיָּב לְבוֹרְאוֹ.  The Ramchal says even one is a lowly state still owes gratitude to Hashem because he is alive.  The question is how far does one go with this obligation of hakaras hatov?  One who is in a lot of pain would sometimes prefer death, they would say they would rather not be alive, do they have to be thankful for being alive?  Do they just no understand the gift of life?  Rav Yehuda Amital was of the opinion that after the Holocaust one can not demand faith on the basis of hakaras hatov as after such genocide it is hard to demand such feelings of hakaras hatov.  He obviously felt hakaras hatov goes only so far.