Book Five

Midrash Eicha (1:1) describes three leaders that said the איכה throughout Jewish history.  The first is Moshe in our parsha, אֵיכָ֥ה אֶשָּׂ֖א לְבַדִּ֑י טׇרְחֲכֶ֥ם וּמַֽשַּׂאֲכֶ֖ם וְרִֽיבְכֶֽם.  The second is Yeshiyah (in the haftorah,) אֵיכָה֙ הָיְתָ֣ה לְזוֹנָ֔ה קִרְיָ֖ה נֶאֱמָנָ֑ה מְלֵֽאֲתִ֣י מִשְׁפָּ֗ט צֶ֛דֶק יָלִ֥ין בָּ֖הּ וְעַתָּ֥ה מְרַצְּחִֽים.  The third is Yermiyahu (Eicha 1:1) אֵיכָ֣ה׀ יָשְׁבָ֣ה בָדָ֗ד הָעִיר֙ רַבָּ֣תִי עָ֔ם הָיְתָ֖ה כְּאַלְמָנָ֑ה רַבָּ֣תִי בַגּוֹיִ֗ם שָׂרָ֙תִי֙ בַּמְּדִינ֔וֹת הָיְתָ֖ה לָמַֽס.  The midrash gives a parable contrast the three mentions of eicha. There was a noble woman who was observed by three close friends: one saw her in successful times; one saw her in her "haste;" one saw her in her disgrace. So too, Moshe asked eicha during the time of Bnei Yisrael’s honor. Yeshaya asked it in their struggles. Yirmiya used it in their disgrace.  

The Tikkunay Zohar #69 (pg. 110b) says the word איכה is made up from the words 'איך ה - how did the 'ה fall.  When Adam sinned he was rebelling against the malchus of Hashem, represented by the letter hey.  The hey fell.  It is the same reaction throughout all the tries and tribulations of Klal Yisroel that lead to all the tragedies.  How could it be that there is such a lack of recognition in the malchus of Hashem?

That is what Hashem asked Adam, וַיִּקְרָ֛א י״י֥ אֱלֹהִ֖ים אֶל־הָֽאָדָ֑ם וַיֹּ֥אמֶר ל֖וֹ אַיֶּֽכָּה.  How did you create this פגם in the 'ה.  

It is our job to fix this hey,  Rav Tzaddok cites the following amazing story of Rav Zusha.

That is why we enter 9 Av going into the fifth Book of the Torah.  It is to remind us what is our job to fix on this sad day.  (It is also noteworthy that this week was the yom hilulah of the Arizal on the 5^th day of the 5^th month, 5 Av.)

No Torah Today?

The ברייתא cited in Taanis (30a) says that one isn’t allowed to learn Torah on the 9^th of Av because they make a person happy as the possuk (Tehillim 19:9) says פקודי ה' ישרים משמחי לב.  Hence, one is permitted דברים הרעים.  This is codified in Shulchan Aruch 554:1-2.  The Gemorah in Moed Katan (15a) learns out from Yechezkal (24:17) where Hashem told him האנק דם that an avel is prohibited to learn in his state of avelut.  Because it is learnt from a different source, Tosfos (Moad Katan (21a) ד"ה ואסור) wants to suggest that in avelut one isn’t permitted to learn saddening material.  Tosfos though rejects this notion and seems to assume that פקודי ה' ישרים is a גילוי מילתא as to what words an avel isn’t allowed to say; hence, he is allowed to learn saddening subjects.  The Rambam records the issur regarding an avel in words of Torah only from האנק דום (Laws of Avel 5:15.)  He makes no mention of פקודי ה' משמחי לב even in the Laws of the 9^th of Av (Laws of Taanis Ch. 5.) 

We seem two approaches as to how to view the issur of learning Torah for an avel.  Either it’s to avoid simcha or it’s because the avel is supposed to be “shocked into silence.”  Based upon this we can understand the machlokes cited in Shulchan Aruch (ibid: sif 3) if on the 9^th of Av one is permitted to learn if you don’t say the words.  If the reason is to avoid simcha, it should still be prohibited, however, if the reason is just to be silent, it would be permitted.  [It is noteworthy that we see from here that there is a fulfillment of Talmud Torah even without speaking out the words.]

Regarding, the limud itself from פקודי ה' ישרים משמחי לב, it needs to be understood why that should be limited to learning Torah.  The possuk isn’t merely referring to Torah, it’s referring to mitzvot as well, for ex. The Radak: פקודי י״י – היינו מפרשים פקודי מצות כתרגומו, אלא שאמר אחר כן מצות יי׳, לפיכך נפרש פקודי מגזרת והיה האכל לפקדון (בראשית מא לו), שהוא ענין הגניזה וההנחה. והם הדברים שהשכל מורה עליהם, Malbim: החלק של המצות הנקראים בשם פקודים, שהם מיוחדים לזכר ע״י דברים אמוניים (כמו המועדים על יצ״מ) או במדות (כמו מצות פריקה וטעינה פאה ומתנות עניים וכדומה), נבדלים מן הפקודים כמוהם שעשו בני אדם עפ״י הסכמתם שאינם ישרים.  So why is learning prohibited but mitzvot are permitted?  Rav Bakshi-Doron (Binyan Av volume 5 #71) explains that when it comes to other mitzvot, simcha enhances the fulfillment of the mitzvah, but one can do the barebones, basic action of the mitzvah even without simcha.  However, simcha is part of the mitzvah of learning!  One who learns without simcha is lacking is his fulfillment of Talmud Torah.  [Of course, there is no way to see that difference in the verse, you will have to say that was the understanding of Chazal.]

לֹ֤א תָג֙וּרוּ֙ מִפְּנֵי־אִ֔ישׁ

Devarim (1:17) לֹ֤א תָג֙וּרוּ֙ מִפְּנֵי־אִ֔ישׁ כִּ֥י הַמִּשְׁפָּ֖ט לֵאלֹהִ֣ים ה֑וּא.  Rashi: לא תגורו מפני איש: לא תיראו. דבר אחר לא תגורו, לא תכניס דבריך מפני איש. לשון (משלי י, ה) אוגר בקיץ:  His source is from Sanhedrin 6b.  We see he understands both halachot are hinted to in the possuk (see Sifsai Chachamim.)  It is clear that the yesod of the halacha is to ensure righteous judgement. 

The Gemorah says that the judge may back out before he knows which way the verdict will be leaning toward, its only after the verdict is leaning one way that he can’t back down from judging the case.  Why is the judge allowed to back down before he knows which way the case is leaning?  Why is it different from the positive command of בצדק תשפט עמיתך which always applies?  The S’ma (Choshem Mishpat 12:2) explains that the end of the possuk, כי המשפט לאלקים הוא refers to the end of the end for that is the indication of the word משפט.  The Taz asks a few questions on his interpretation and gives a different explanation.  He says the prohibition is only on a דיין, before the din seems to lean in any direction, the judge doesn’t have a שם דיין. 

Assuming the nature of the issur is to ensure proper judgement is carried out, we can understand the S’ma.  The nature of the prohibition is the same as the positive commandment, but the Torah allows you to back out before the din is leaning in any way. 

The Taz views the nature differently; the issur is not a perversion of justice, rather it’s an issur for a judge to misuse his position.  It isn’t a lack of proper judgment, it’s an abuse of the position of judge.  It is an issur between the judge and God, not between himself and the litigants.  Hence, the issur only applies when the judge assumes the שם דיין.  This is reflected in the commentary of the Ramban on the end of the possuk: וטעם כי המשפט לאלהים הוא – כטעם: כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי לי״י ועמכם בדבר משפט (דברי הימים ב י״ט:ו׳), לומר כי לאלהים לעשות משפט בין יצוריו, כי על כן בראם להיות ביניהם יושר וצדק, ולהציל גזול מיד עושקו. ונתן אתכם במקומו, ואם תגורו ותעשו חמס, הנה חטאתם לי״י כי מעלתם בשליחותו

(Based upon Binyan Av volume 3 #67.)

Interuppted Beracha On Torah

Continuing on the theme of birchat haTorah.  Tosfos Berachos (11b) ד"ה שכבר brings Rabbenu Tam holds that birchat haTorah covers one’s learning through the entire day and one only becomes obligated again the following morning.  In his view, birchat haTorah is viewed like any other birchat hashachar that is appraise on creation which is recited once a day.  Such a viewpoint would seem to be reflected in the Rambam, who brings the obligation of birchat haTorah not in the Laws of Talmud Torah, rather in the Laws of Tefillah Ch. 5 in the context of birchat haTorah.  The Shulchan Aruch follows this order as well as well and brings it in the context of birchat hashachar albeit in its own siman, #47.  Based upon his understanding, he holds even if a person had an interruption from his learning throughout the day such as working, sleeping etc. there still is no need to say a new beracha for it only needs to be recited once a day. 

On the other hand, Tosfos and the Rosh disagree with Rabbenu Tam and hold if there is an interruption, then one will have to make a new birchat haTorah.  Based upon this, Tosfos is bothered why one doesn’t say a new birchat haTorah after returning from work?  He says: וי"ל דשאני תורה שאינו מייאש דעתו דכל שעה אדם מחוייב ללמוד דכתיב והגית בו יומם ולילה והוי כמו יושב כל היום בלא הפסק. 

The explanation of Tosfos is cited in Shulchan Aruch in sif 10.  By citing the explanation of Tosfos, it would seem the Shulchan Aruch is not like Rabbenu Tom. In sif 11 the Shulchan Aruch rules (at least based upon מנהג,) that if one sleeps in the day, they don’t need to say a new beracha.  This seems to be like Rabbenu Tam; a contradiction!?  In the Beis Yosef it is clear that the peshat is that we are not sure that sleeping is considered a significant הפסק from the beracha in combination with Rabbenu Tam who holds there is no beracha, its best to avoid saying a new beracha.  However, then it becomes difficult to understand why he rules in sif 12 that if one slept in the night and arose before the next day you do say a new beracha; why, it should be the same as sleeping in the day?  You have to say that sleeping at night is considered for sure a הפסק; it’s considered more of a קביעות than sleeping in the day.

 The Magen Avrohom understands sif 10 to mean that working isn’t considered a break from the beracha only if one plans on actually returning to one’s learning later in the day.  The Taz disagrees and holds the peshat is one is never considered separated from Torah, even if they didn’t actually plan on returning to their learning later on.  According to the Magan Avrohom our explanation makes sense, but according to the Taz, there is no הפסק from learning, so even when sleeping at night why should one have to say a new beracha?  It would seem even the Taz agrees its possible for there to be a הפסק between one’s beracha and learning; hence sleep at night will make a person obligated in a new beracha.  He just argues on the Magen Avrohom and assumes a person is always considered to be attached to learning throughout the day even if he doesn’t have intent to continue learning, for a person’s desire is to be able to learn.  However, when a person is sleeping in a manner of קביעות, he would also agree it is considered a הפסק and one must say a new beracha.       

Gaon On Birchas Hatorah

Last post discussed why one may say a beracha on thinking in learning even though generally there is no beracha on דברים שבלב.  The Steipler (Berachos #14) suggests that there is a difference between a beracha on a mitzvah that’s only Rabbinic vs. the beracha on learning Torah, which is a Torah obligation.  The assertion of the Steipler is that the beracha on learning Torah is a Torah obligation, but that may very well be a disagreement between the Ramban, that counts it a mitzvah vs. the Rambam that does not.  But working with the assumption, I would understand this idea only if the nature of birchas haTorah is different from that of a mitzvah.  There are many that suggest the nature is that of a birchas hashevach, beracha on the cheftah of Torah, some suggest it may even be a birchas hanehinin.  In that case, the difference makes sense.  However, if we assume the nature of birchas haTorah is that of a birchas hamitzvah, why would we differentiate, if anything, the Rabbis should pattern their beracha after the Torah’s example regarding learning Torah?  So, the question is what is the view of the Gra regarding the nature of birchas haTorah?  It would seem that he holds it’s a birchas hamitzvah as we shall demonstrate, which is why I find the Steipler’s answer unsatisfactory. 

The following opinions of the Gaon seem to indicate that in his opinion birchas haTorah is a geder of birchas hamitzvot.  At the end of siman 47, the Gra explains the reason why women say birchas haTorah is because woman can say berachot on any מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא even though they aren’t obligated.  Similarly, even though they are exempt from learning, they can still say a beracha.  Clearly, he is equating the beracha to birchos hamitzvah. The Gaon follows the opinion cited in sif 11 that when one sleeps in the day, he has to make a new birchas haTorah for he has interrupted between his beracha and learning.  It is clear that he doesn’t view it as just a birchas hashevach that can be recited only once a day, but it is a birchas hamitzvah that one’s learning must be attached to.  In Maaseh Rav (and end of siman 46,) the Gaon holds one should say korbanot immediately following birchas haTorah.  Why? Rav Shteurnbrach suggests since the Gaon holds it’s a birchas hamitzvah, one must follow not with a mere recitation of some pessukim and a berasay, but one must follow with a real learning of parshiot haTorah, Mishna and Gemorah, which is covered in korbanot. 

                  מענין לענין, here is a peshat in birchas haTorah based upon the Gra.

Blessing On Thought

עד שפירשו הקב"ה בעצמו דכתיב (ירמיהו ט, יב) ויאמר ה' על עזבם את תורתי וגו' היינו לא שמעו בקולי היינו לא הלכו בה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב שאין מברכין בתורה תחלה (Nedarim 81a.)  I was the one substituting to say the halachos in a Morrocon minyan last week and this Gemorah was my excuse to go through some of the laws of birchat haTorah.  As I was looking it over, I noticed some things I hadn’t picked up on beforehand. 

Firstly, I noted that the Shulchan Aruch writes the halachot in siman 47, which is one before מח, so its easy to remember the siman of birchat haTorah is beforeמח , which should be engaged in one’s learning.

The Shulchan Aruch rules in sif 4 that there is no requirement to say a beracha before thinking words of Torah, if one doesn’t actually speak.  In sif 3 he rules one must say a beracha before writing Torah, even if one doesn’t speak.  The Achronim ask what’s the difference?  To understand the difference, we first must understand why one doesn’t say birchat haTorah one thinking words of Torah.  There are two schools of thought as to how to understand this din, either it’s a din in Talmud Torah or a din in berachot.  The Taz and Magan Avrohom seem to understand the reason is that when one doesn’t speek the words there isn’t a complete fulfillment of Talmud Torah.  [The Gra disagrees and holds that there is a fulfillment of learning through thinking alone.  Presumably, the other Achronim agree that of course, thinking is an integral part of learning, but the optimal form of learning, the form which obligates a beracha, is when the words are said.]  Based upon this, some Achronim answer the contradiction by saying when writing, one will always say some words out loud.  However, it doesn’t fit well in the Shulchan Aruch, who says explicitly he’s dealing with a situation where the person didn’t say any words out loud.  The Aruch Hashulchan goes along the lines of this approach and explains that writing is also considered the main, optimal form of learning Torah for it preserves the words for the future.

Another understanding of the din is that it’s a general rule that one doesn’t say a beracha on thought.  This understanding of the Shulchan Aruch is taken by the Levush, Minchas Chinuch mitzvah 430 and Nitziv in Mashiv Davar #47.  The germane of this idea stems from the Beis Yosef #432 that explains there is no beracha on bittul chametz because אין מברכין על דברים שבלב.  Based upon this, we understand that when writing, there is an action and one does say a beracha. We need to understand why did the other Achronim not accept this explanation, and how can the Gra rule one must say birchat haTorah before thinking in Torah, why is it different from bittul chametz?

It is possible to suggest that when it comes to bittul chametz, there is no beracha because the thought of the person is just a means to the kium of bittul.  The thought is the “maaseh mitzvah” to negate the chametz from one’s mind, but the actual fulfillment of the mitzvah is an outgrowth from this;  the chametz is considered battal.  In such an instance, a maaseh mitzvah of a mere thought doesn't warrant a beracha.  On the other hand, thinking in learning is the action of the mitzvah and the kium hamitzvah together and as such, one will say a beracha beforehand (see Asher L'Shlomo volume 3 #18.)

What Type Of Journey?

Everyone asks why does the Torah record all of the travels in the midbar, of what importance is it to know all of their travels?

There are two types of traveling.  There’ one way in which you are going from point A to point B, so you must get through the distance that exists in between them.  That is usually the way I travel.  Then there is another way, a second way, what my mother often does, a walk just for the sake of the walk, the traveling isn’t a mean to get somewhere else, its an end in its own right.  What kind of journey was Klal Yisroel’s, type one or type two?  

The Torah says וַיִּכְתֹּ֨ב מֹשֶׁ֜ה אֶת־מוֹצָאֵיהֶ֛ם לְמַסְעֵיהֶ֖ם עַל־פִּ֣י י״י֑, the travels were all a command of Hashem, they weren’t just a means to an end, it was its own mitzvah – to travel (Rogatchover.)  Why was there such a command, why is travel an end of itself?

The possuk says אֵ֜לֶּה מַסְעֵ֣י בְנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֗ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר יָצְא֛וּ מֵאֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרַ֖יִם.  Why are all the travels referred to as leaving Egypt, they were already out of Egypt?  Why does the Torah refer to the מסעי, the travels if it’s naming the names of the encampments; it should say מחנות?  The explanation is that yes, physically they were out of Egypt by the first travel, but every additional part of the journey was another step in the spiritual exodus from Egypt.  The various legs of the journey weren’t just places that Klal Yisroel traveled through, each one was a step in the growth of Klal Yisroel.  That is why the Torah calls it the travels, to indicate the הליכה, the growth in every journey (like the well-known idea that man is called a הולך vs. angels are called עומדים because man can grow spiritually.)  (Based upon Likutay Sichos volume 23.)  That’s the explanation of why each travel is important in its own right, for each one was a spiritual improvement in the development in Klal Yisroel.

The Baal Shem Tov adds that the journeys of Klal Yisroel correspond to every individual’s journey in life.  The neshema is stuck in the body, that’s its Egypt and it must journey to rid itself of the impurities of the body (see inside Degel Machena Epraim here, see also maamer of Rebbe 5739.)